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Abstract 
 
 
 In the annals of North Carolina history, few figures stand out more than Griffith 
Rutherford.  An orphan when he arrived in the new world, Rutherford settled in the North 
Carolina backcountry two decades before the American Revolution.  Almost immediately 
he ascended a social and economic ladder in Rowan County in his service as a soldier and 
elected assemblyman.  A consummate “fixer” during his military career, Rutherford 
continually rushed to scenes when a Loyalist insurrections or party of marauding Indians 
threatened the state.  As a militia general during the Revolution he was responsible for 
the defense of the entire western quadrant of the state.   
 When he was not engaging insurgents or leading an army into Cherokee villages, 
Rutherford served in several elected offices.  His first came during the 1766 Regulator 
insurrection that disrupted North Carolina.  After helping draft the state constitution in 
1776, Rutherford served in the state Senate, a post he held in between military campaigns 
that took him to Georgia and South Carolina.    
 This dissertation is the story of how Rutherford, in spite of his humble origins, 
eventually became one of the most prominent men in his state.  Though the information 
about his life is often scant, enough can be gleaned to utilize Rutherford as an example of 
a rapidly ascending backcountry figure.  By taking full advantage of the opportunities and 
connections afforded him, Rutherford illustrates how late colonial North Carolina was a 
place where rapid advancement could take place.  
Rutherford proved unusual, however, in the way he combined politics and 
military service at various times in his life.  On several occasions, Rutherford underwent 
a grueling military campaign and upon his return quickly jumped in the current political 
 v
debate.  His experience in one service always affected the other and shaped his decisions 
as a militia officer and as an elected official.  Though he lacked the legal or formal 
education of many of his contemporaries, Rutherford earned the respect and sometimes 
rage of the individuals who helped secure and create the state of North Carolina.     
 vi
 Introduction 
 
Along Route 74 in Rutherford County in North Carolina, a highway sign marks 
the location of Fort Hampton.  The marker, not far from my family’s home in the 
foothills, is one of many reminders of a bygone colonial frontier.  Fort Hampton served 
as an outpost of defense against loyalists, British troops, and Native Americans in the 
Carolina wilderness.  Driving on Interstate 40 east of Asheville, one can see an exit sign 
marking the spot of Old Fort, at one point the farthest reach of colonial settlement in 
North Carolina.  During the opening days of the Revolution, it became a rallying point 
for displaced settlers during the Cherokee War of 1776.  Moving toward Asheville near 
route 25, among strip malls and fast food restaurants, one can find another series of 
markers indicating the location of “Rutherford’s Trace.”  In these locations, the signs 
simply read that “The expedition led by Gen. Griffith Rutherford against the Cherokee, 
Sept. 1776, passed here.”1  
Highway markers are some of the only reminders left from the life of Griffith 
Rutherford.  They are scattered in what was once the frontier of the colony of North 
Carolina.  One such marker identifies the location where his home stood just outside 
Salisbury in Rowan County.  Others, located in western counties near the border of 
Tennessee, indicate the places where his militia force went into the woods to attack 
Cherokee settlements in 1776.  Although little else of Griffith Rutherford’s legacy 
remains visible in contemporary North Carolina, he was one of the most important people 
in the history of the colony. 
                                                 
1 Michael Hill ed., Guide to North Carolina Highway Historical Markers (Raleigh: Division of Archives, 
1990), 180,181, 191. 
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 An orphan when he landed in the New World, he arrived in the colony in his early 
thirties.  Within a short time, he purchased significant tracts of land, married, and started 
a family.  War on the frontier provided him another opportunity to advance as an officer 
in the army.  In time Rutherford used this military notoriety to initiate a political career. 
As an elected representative Rutherford served first in the colonial assembly and later in 
the revolutionary government of North Carolina.  Later, his fame as an officer helped him 
reach the highest echelons of power.  In that capacity Rutherford shaped policies in his 
state.    
For the biographer, Griffith Rutherford poses a host of challenges.  His family 
background is cloaked in mythology and conjecture.  Almost nothing is known about his 
first thirty years of life.  Early histories of the state portray him as a Daniel Boone type, 
the quintessential mountain man who dabbled in politics and saved the western part of the 
state from annihilation when the Cherokee attacked in 1776.  Some contemporaries liked 
to think of him as an undereducated annoyance, often playing to policies that his western 
constituents would approve of.  Of his military skills, one loyalist called him “a perfect 
savage.”  To one historian of the state, he was “by far the most important military man 
during our Revolutionary struggle in North Carolina.”2  
 During his life Rutherford rarely failed to tell people what he thought.  And for 
our twenty-first century sensibilities he definitely would not win humanitarian awards.  
He owned other people in order to make his existence more comfortable.  At the 
beginning of the Revolutionary War he led a column of militia that decimated Cherokee 
Indian towns in the mountains of North Carolina.  The campaign was marked by looting, 
                                                 
2 Robert Gray, “Observations on the War in Carolina,” in John Rhodehamel ed.  The American Revolution: 
Writings from the War of Independence  (New York: Library of America, 2001), 766; Samuel A. Ashe, 
Biographical History of North Carolina  (Greensboro, NC: Charles L. Van Noppen, 1905), 2: 381. 
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 scalping and shooting unarmed men.  After returning to the legislature, Rutherford began 
a legislative crusade against Loyalists in the state.  To him, they were traitors; Rutherford 
failed to see any reason to keep allegiance to the King of Great Britain. And he became a 
thorn in the side of Moravian settlers living on the other side of the Yadkin River.  A 
critical element to the Moravian Church included pacifism.  During the recruiting of 
troops or securing materials for the state, Rutherford as a military man often seemed 
insensitive to the Brethren community.  
In spite of such failings, one can argue, Rutherford above all was an advocate for 
the state of North Carolina.  He worked in the legislature to make improvements in his 
county.  Along with other western representatives, Rutherford successfully petitioned to 
create more counties, thereby giving the region more of a voice.  Few settlers moving up 
against and over the mountains during the 1770s could forget his efforts to insure the 
safety of the frontier.        
Recovering Rutherford from the past is a difficult challenge.  There remains the 
simple fact that Rutherford disappears from the record for great periods of time.  Little is 
known about his early life in the American colonies before he came to North Carolina. 
With few exceptions military and political topics make up his collection of surviving 
letters.  His scant education made him conscious of his writing limitations.  Since 
Rutherford had little formal schooling, his letters are to say the least, rough around the 
edges.  Historian Alfred F. Young ran into a similar problem writing his book on 
Deborah Sampson. It required detective work, hunting for small clues that might lead to 
discoveries about a subject.3  Visiting the sites Rutherford would have been familiar with 
                                                 
3 Alfred F. Young, Masquerade: The Life and Times of Deborah Sampson, Continental Soldier (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 15-16. 
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 is one way to a better understanding of his life.  Visiting the town of Salisbury, 
Rutherford Trace, Historic Halifax, and the Camden battlefield are small ways of 
following this trail to get a better grasp of my subject. 
Rutherford’s story in some ways is similar to several men who took advantage of 
crises like war to make a name for themselves.  George Washington and Andrew 
Jackson, for example come to mind.  Though neither man was born to privilege, each 
took pains to acquire an education in a trade and in the art of war.  Historian David 
McCullough believes experience served as the teacher for young George Washington.4  
Washington and Rutherford had limited educational opportunities but found early success 
as surveyors.  This trade gave them the opportunity to serve a need on the frontiers of 
Virginia and North Carolina, respectively.  The similarities, however, do not end there.  
War served as a training ground for Washington and Rutherford, their success propelled 
them into political careers during the crisis with Great Britain during the 1770s.  
Rutherford fought in three conflicts; the French and Indian War, the Cherokee War of 
1776, and the War of American Independence.  All three made a mark on this soldier that 
influenced his decisions as a politician.  The Seven Years War served as his military 
school.  He learned to fight in the woods, against the often elusive forces of organized 
Native Americans.  This experience helped him lead an army into the Carolina frontier 
twenty years later. 
His successful campaign against the Cherokee cemented his reputation among the 
Revolutionary leaders of the state.  Desperate for military commanders with some 
experience and success, governors of North Carolina came to rely on their militia officers 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4 David McCullough, 1776  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 45 
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 to keep the state safe from foreign and domestic threats.  Rutherford, throughout the rest 
of the war, took charge in keeping the colony safe from dangers from outside and within 
the state.  For the first years of the fighting that threat came from Native Americans and 
Loyalists.   
In other ways Rutherford is comparable to Andrew Jackson.  Both men claimed 
Scotch-Irish ancestry and grew up without a stable family life.  Self-educated soldiers, 
Rutherford and Jackson built a reputation fighting Native Americans along the edges of 
white settlement.  Each man’s repute in battle helped vault them into politics.  Rutherford 
also can claim firsthand knowledge of Salisbury in Rowan County, North Carolina.  
Jackson studied law in the town before settling in Tennessee.                 
In the only substantive work on Rutherford, written thirty years ago, Robert 
Claude Carpenter chose to emphasize the frontier thesis as a way to examine the life of 
his subject.5  While this approach is effectual, scholarship in the colonial period has 
continued to evolve during the intervening years.  Fortunately, where insights about 
Rutherford are often scant, the literature on the colony of North Carolina can tell us a lot 
about the society he knew firsthand.  When Griffith arrived in North Carolina the colony 
was only in its infancy.  He came to the backcountry when opportunities for young free 
men were abundant since land in the colony was inexpensive and could be readily 
obtained.  Rutherford spent the next five decades in the state, making significant 
contributions politically and militarily.   
With a stunted early growth as compared to Virginia and South Carolina, North 
Carolina continues to lag behind in the breadth of scholarship concerning the colonial 
                                                 
5 Robert Claude Carpenter, “Griffith Rutherford: Frontier Military and Political Leader” (M.A. thesis, 
Wake Forest University, 1974) 
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 period.  Until A. Roger Ekirch’s Poor Carolina appeared in 1981, few studies of North 
Carolina explored the unique condition of its backcountry.  According to Ekirch the 
backcountry of the province enjoyed an exceptional situation during the 1750s.  
Opportunities for social advancement were more fluid than in the eastern Albemarle 
region.  Western areas in fact became populated faster than the colony could organize 
them, remaining more open to economic and social advancement.6  Rutherford is one of 
many immigrants who hailed from other colonies and countries before making their way 
to North Carolina.  New arrivals did much to shape the backcountry of the colony. 
 This quick population change made North Carolina a unique British colony.  
Helping to mitigate the drastic lifestyle change of immigrants arriving in the colony, the 
legacy of the Scotch-Irish and Highland clan structure provided the necessary support 
system in the new world.7  Highlanders moved from Wilmington up the Cape Fear River 
to Cross Creek.  Across the state in Rowan County, where Rutherford settled, a different 
group of Scots moved in between established settlements and Native American 
communities.8  Forty-five percent of this population was made up of Ulster Scots, many 
of whom had traveled overland from northern colonies to settle in North Carolina.9
                                                 
6 A. Roger Ekirch, “Poor Carolina:” Politics and Society in Colonial North Carolina, 1729-1776 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 36-37. 
 
7 Harry Roy Merrens, Colonial North Carolina in the Eighteenth Century: A Study in Historical Geography 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), 53; David Hackett Fischer, Albion’s Seed: Four 
British Folkways in North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 665. 
 
8 Bernard Bailyn, Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on the Eve of the 
Revolution  (New York: Random House, 1986), 503. 
 
9 Daniel B. Thorp, “Taverns and Culture on the Southern Colonial Frontier: Rowan County, North 
Carolina, 1753-1776,” Journal of Southern History 4 (November 1996): 664. 
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  In both the eastern and backcountry migrations, settlers traveled together as 
families.10  The parents of Griffith clearly risked the oceanic voyage to North America 
for a combination of reasons that promised cheap land, religious toleration, and joining 
up with extended kinfolk.  Even when this plan took a tragic turn with the death of his 
parents, Griffith obtained some level of independence from his family connections.  This 
idea of strength in numbers brought him to North Carolina in 1752.11         
 The frontier helped shape Rutherford’s life and career in North Carolina.  On the 
edge of white settlement, the frontier is often glamorized as a place where rebellious 
individualism created a unique region, unlike the more established, landed eastern towns.  
Combining this wild environment with Rutherford’s Scotch-Irish character explain many 
of the decisions he made later in life.  At times he was suspicious of eastern leaders of the 
state and harangued them about their half-hearted war measures.  When he sensed 
hesitation from his colleagues concerning the revolutionary cause, Rutherford did not 
hesitate in advocating swift, punitive actions.  This behavior can be traced to his 
reputation as a man of the backcountry.  Frontier prejudices and self-righteousness 
showed themselves against those he fought in war and in politics.12  Though lacking the 
scholarly background in law or philosophy enjoyed by his contemporaries, Rutherford 
could call upon a well of practical experience to guide his decisions.  
                                                 
10 Carl Bridenbaugh, Myths and Realities: Societies of the Colonial South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1952), 135.  
 
11 James G. Leyburn, The Scotch-Irish: A Social History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1962), 185; Gregory H. Nobles, “Breaking the Backcountry: New Approaches to the Early American 
Frontier, 1750-1800,” William and Mary Quarterly 4 (October 1989): 651. 
 
12 Albert H. Tillson, Jr., “The Southern Backcountry: A Survey of Current Research,” Virginia Magazine of 
History and Biography  98 (July 1990): 405; Andrew Burstein, The Passions of Andrew Jackson  (New 
York: Random House, 2003), 23. 
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 Rutherford had the keen ability to turn one opportunity into another.  He 
speculated in land, seeing great potential in owning large tracts for himself and for future 
leasing.  This level of economic independence allowed him to build a military and 
political career.  A colonial surveyor also enjoyed other advantages in a new and 
burgeoning county.  His name is on scores of legal documents in the Rowan county 
collections, as a surveyor, assistant surveyor, or witness to a title or deed transaction.  
Settlers arriving in Rowan quickly might have come in contact with Rutherford during a 
transaction of land or court proceeding.  His name recognition helped him rally neighbors 
in western counties when North Carolina came under attack.   
One of the sure ways to advance in life came about by using personal 
connections.  This happened to Rutherford in several ways, through marriage, patronage 
of a colonial official, or the auspices of a local leader.  Rutherford took advantage of all 
three types of relationships.  He married the daughter of an established landowner in 
Rowan County.  It became of the most significant decisions of his life.  Rutherford then 
used a family connection to Lord Granville to purchase land in his new home.  With 
abundant land, and the income he derived from sales and leasing parcels, he could 
develop a comfortable income.  Once contented economically, his ambitions brought him 
into military service and then politics.     
For Rutherford, the 1765-1771 War of Regulation marked a turning point in his 
life.  Up to that point, he worked within the colonial system, using patronage and 
connections from the crown to enhance his status and the comfort of his family.  When 
members of his Rowan community joined protests in neighboring Orange and Anson 
counties, it forced Rutherford to ponder several controversial decisions, as sheriff, and a 
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 member of the assembly.  The ensuing violence in the backcountry proved a wake up 
call; in the aftermath Rutherford helped guide legislation through the assembly to 
establish additional western counties, giving that region more representation.    
Rutherford’s life is a case study in the possibilities for success one could achieve 
in the American colonies in the middle of the eighteenth century.  Certainly the factor of 
timing afforded Griffith advantages that many of later generations would not be able to 
enjoy.  However, being in the right place at the right time allowed him the opportunity to 
achieve a level of success personally and professionally.   
 In many respects, Rutherford represents one class of what James Kirby Martin 
called the “men of rebellion.”  In fact, Martin uses Rutherford as an example of this 
scenario when he compares the lives of planters, lawyers, and merchants on the eve of the 
Revolution.  In a few paragraphs on the North Carolinian, Martin calls Rutherford the 
“norm of the new revolutionary executive elite.”13  He owned more land than many of his 
fellow residents of Rowan, but less than the established planters on the east coast. After 
gaining some level of economic success, Rutherford entered politics with the help of 
supporters in Rowan.  His wealth and local offices of sheriff and surveyor set him apart 
from his the rest of the community.  Rutherford’s neighbors could feel good about 
sending their socioeconomic better to represent them in the colonial assembly.14     
What is unique about Rutherford was his ability to function in both the British 
colonial system and the revolutionary government of North Carolina.  Only once during 
his early political career did he find his office in jeopardy because he was out of step with 
                                                 
13 James Kirby Martin, Men in Rebellion: Higher Governmental Leaders and the Coming of the American 
Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1973), 83. 
 
14 Ibid., 61. 
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 popular opinion.  He never allowed this to happen again.  As a green Assemblyman in 
1766 he deftly maneuvered to keep his elected office and kept his hold on positions of 
power.  A hesitant Revolutionary, Rutherford became one of the most tenacious 
advocates for American independence.  Native Americans, Loyalists, and neutral 
members of Carolina society all felt the wrath of a man totally committed to the cause.  
Political opponents often resented his heavy handed tactics in the field and as a 
representative of the people.  Rutherford simply had little patience for anyone seeking 
conciliation or moderation.  Having lost a son and many possessions during the six years 
of fighting, he made the independence of his state and punishment of her enemies his 
passion on the battlefield and in the halls of government. 
 When he retired from both military and political service after two decades, 
Rutherford, in his eighth decade, moved his family over the mountains into Tennessee.  
By this time the land he obtained as a reward for his service was secure, and he felt safe 
enough to relocate out of the state of North Carolina.  Among transplanted North 
Carolinians who fought with him in the Revolution, he lived the rest of his years in 
relative quiet.            
 10
 Chapter One 
Early Life 
 
 Very little is known about the first third of Griffith Rutherford’s life.  He makes 
his first appearance in a primary source around 1753, the year Rutherford arrived in 
North Carolina and entered a land transaction.  County records and grant records mark 
his first appearance in that colony, but details from the previous three decades of his life 
are virtually unknown.     
 Sources differ on Rutherford’s birth date and place of birth.  Several secondary 
sources use 1731.  In an interview with Griffith’s son Henry by the historian Lyman 
Draper the family believes the year of birth to be 1721.1  From the date of his birth, until 
the time he arrived in North Carolina in the early 1750s, little is known about his first 
thirty years of life.  In fact, more is known about his family history beginning in 
Scotland, than about Rutherford’s adolescence.     
 It is always tempting for a biographer to find character traits in his subject’s 
lineage that would help explain the behavior and actions of that person.  Though the 
record is scattered and vague, enough is known about the Rutherford clan to trace a 
lineage of rebelliousness and resistance to authority.  His family hailed from the lowlands 
of Scotland, near the English border.       
 Reverend Samuel Rutherford, Griffith’s grandfather, a leader in the Scottish 
Presbyterian church, first came to the attention of the crown in 1644 with the publication 
of the “Lex Rex.”  A work of Protestant criticism of the Anglican Church, Lex Rex, after 
                                                 
1 Interview of Henry Rutherford, 1844, in Minnie R. H. Long, General Griffith Rutherford and Allied 
Families (Milwaukee: Cuneo Press, 1942), 104. 
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 the reformation of the Stuart monarchy, was ordered to be burned.  Reverend Samuel, its 
author, found himself under indictment from the crown, charged with high treason.  He 
missed his chance to be burned at the stake or beheaded by dying before his trial in 
1661.2
 Before his death Samuel also fell out of favor with fellow Presbyterians in 
Scotland and decided to move with others in the Rutherford clan to the Ulster region of 
Ireland.  Here, the Rutherford’s found fellow countrymen who moved to Ireland during 
the early 1700s.  The Irish migration bore fruit and is a fortunate circumstance for 
Griffith.  It was there Griffith’s father John met and married a Miss Griffith, a Welsh 
lady.  John Rutherford may have worn out his welcome in Ireland as fast as his father did 
in Scotland.  John and his new bride made plans to leave Ireland around 1730, with their 
young son Griffith.  Economic concerns also could have pushed the family into deciding 
to leave.  Whatever the case, the family of three left for America.3
 Historian Lyman C. Draper gleaned a bit of information about Griffith’s young 
life.  Around 1730 the Rutherford family decided to leave for the new world and boarded 
a ship.  Even before the family reached Pennsylvania, the destination of thousands of 
Ulstermen, calamity changed Griffith’s life.   Young Griffith was now an orphan in a 
strange world until relatives in New Jersey took in their kinsman.  From that point on, 
few details of Rutherford’s life are known until he arrived in North Carolina.4
                                                 
2 Samuel Ashe, “Rutherford’s Expedition Against the Indians, 1776,” North Carolina Booklet 4 (December 
1904): 24-25; Jethro Rumble, A History of Rowan County, North Carolina  Containing Sketches of 
Prominent Families and Distinguished Men (Salisbury: J.J. Brewer, 1881), 105. 
 
3 Carlton Sims ed., A History of Rutherford County (Murfreesboro, TN: Carlton C. Sims, 1947), 21. 
 
4 H. Tyler Blethlen and Curtis W. Wood Jr., From Ulster to Carolina: The Migration of the Scotch-Irish to 
Southwestern North Carolina (Raleigh: North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, 1998), 24-25, 
29; Long, 104. 
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  The early death of his parents proved unfortunate to young Griffith.  The relatives 
who took him in provided the young boy with a basic, but not thorough education.  
Rutherfords, going back to Scotland, prided themselves on their learning.  While far from 
illiterate, as one early scholar claimed, Rutherford clearly had only a rudimentary 
education. The letters that survive are written with a forceful, though crude hand.5  It is 
clear from reading his dispatches in his military career, that at times the General’s prose 
was edited by a more educated person.  In more hurried occasions, his correspondence 
was littered with creative spelling and grammar.   
In his twenties, Rutherford probably lived among other Rutherfords in Chester or 
Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.  Beginning in the 1720s, the area took in thousands of 
Scotch-Irish who settled near the fertile lands around the Delaware River.6  Sometime in 
his early life in the northeast, Rutherford learned the surveyor’s trade.  Taught to young 
Griffith by a family member or skilled expert, the vocation provided a necessary service 
for the expanding colonial population.  Surveyors measured plots of land, and the 
eventual sale was recorded in a land office.  His compensation depended on the size of 
the tract of land measured.7  A talented surveyor could earn as much as L125 per year, 
the same as a skilled artisan in colonial America.8   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
5 Herbert B. Adams, The Life and Writings of Jared Sparks  (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1893), 1:257. 
  
6 William S. Powell ed., Dictionary of North Carolina Biography vol. 5 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1994), 275. 
 
7 William S. Powell, North Carolina Through Four Centuries  (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1989), 131. 
 
8 John Ferling, The First of Men: A Life of George Washington (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 
1988), 13. 
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 By the time Rutherford reached adulthood however, conditions in Pennsylvania 
caused many to search for a new home. Historian Robert Ramsey, who studied the 
northwest frontier of North Carolina, cites many reasons for Scotch-Irish movement out 
of the northeast to Carolina.  As hard as it is to believe, in colonial times eastern 
Pennsylvania began to suffer from overcrowding.  An influx of German settlers and 
attacks from Native American tribes caused many Scotch-Irish to consider Pennsylvania 
an unstable place to live.  Fighting among the Penn descendents also initiated a migration 
out of the region.9  As a young surveyor Rutherford could see firsthand the increasingly 
limited opportunities of dealing in land.  Remaining unsettled parcels continued to rise in 
price, provoking newly-arrived immigrants to search for land in other colonies.          
A young bachelor with few attachments in the northeast, Rutherford started for 
the south around the year 1750.  According to one family history Rutherford stopped first 
in Lunenburg County, Virginia, in the year 1751.  There, young Griffith witnessed or was 
part of a land deed transaction, as well as serving as a witness to a will.10  The stay in 
Virginia did not last long; opportunities further south caused him to move again.  Many 
settlers quickly discerned that moving further south into North Carolina presented a host 
of other advantages.  Land was inexpensive, the Indian tribes peaceful, and religious 
toleration widespread.11  
The search for a safer colony with more open economic opportunities led many 
Pennsylvania settlers, including Rutherford, to the backcountry of North Carolina.  
                                                 
9 Robert W. Ramsey, Carolina Cradle: Settlement of the Northwest Carolina Frontier, 1747-1762 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), 174, 200. 
 
10 William K. Rutherford and Anna Clay Rutherford,  A Genealogical History of the Rutherford Family  
(Shawnee Mission, KS: Intercollegiate Press, 1969), 732. 
 
11 Sam J. Ervin, A Colonial History of Rowan County, North Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1917), 10.   
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 Rutherford followed in the footsteps of a more trailblazing relative in his move out of 
Pennsylvania.  According to his son Henry, Griffith stayed with family members upon his 
arrival in North Carolina.12  Arriving in the eastern region of the colony, he quickly 
learned that the best opportunities for new arrivals existed in the very unsettled western 
region of the state. 
When Rutherford first arrived in North Carolina, he stayed with Robert Wheatley, 
a kinsman to the Rutherford clan.  This family connection afforded Rutherford his first 
opportunity in North Carolina.  And the kindness Weakley showed was not lost on 
Griffith, who in his 1792 will names Wheatley’s son a trusted executor.  There, 
Rutherford’s surveying skills proved a benefit.  His connection with the Wheatley family 
got him a coveted position.  Another member of the Wheatley clan, Benjamin served as 
land agent to Lord Granville, a man who owned a substantial part of the colony.13
By the time Rutherford reached North Carolina at age thirty-two it is possible to 
establish a bit about his appearance.  Few, scattered details concerning his adult features 
have been handed down from his son.  According to Henry Rutherford his father as an 
adult stood five feet eight inches tall and weighed about 180 pounds.  Today he would be 
called stocky; his family depicted him as “compactly formed.”14   
Robert Wheatley helped get Rutherford the position as surveyor to the Earl of 
Granville, a large landowner in the colony.  The jobs took him to the sparsely settled 
lands in the North Carolina piedmont.  Upon arriving in the west, Rutherford first met his 
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 mentor, John Frohock, a surveyor for Henry McCulloh.  Surveyors headed into the 
western piedmont to begin surveys, and in the case of Rutherford and Frohock, purchase 
land of their own. Up to that point, the land around the Yadkin River was positioned in 
the western area of Anson County.  When Rutherford inspected the area, the traders and 
trappers made up more of the population than actual settlers.   
Rutherford arrived in a colony very much in its infancy.  A royal colony since 
1729, North Carolina seemed insignificant compared to her wealthier neighbors, Virginia 
and South Carolina.  Only a few years before, the crown considered simply adding the 
territory of North Carolina to its northern or southern neighbor.  Six counties, all along 
the inlets of Albemarle Sound, constituted the entire organization of the colony.  Up to 
the middle of the eighteenth century, the area had the unsavory reputation as a haven for 
pirates, who used their knowledge of the treacherous inlets to seize ships along the 
coastline.15
Further stunting North Carolina’s growth was the fact that it never developed a 
cash crop like its neighbors.  Tobacco could be grown along the eastern shore, but the 
lack of a decent port made its export extremely difficult.  Instead of tobacco or rice, the 
colony produced naval stores of two types.  Pitch, rosin, and turpentine were critical for 
sealing wooden hulls.  Other forest items were devoted to boards, barrels, and staves for 
transport.  With Great Britain relying heavily on her Navy during wars in Europe, North 
Carolina quickly became significant for what it could contribute to the British fleet.16
                                                 
15 Ekirch, Poor Carolina, 4; Powell, North Carolina Through Four Centuries, 81. 
16 Hugh T. Lefler and William S. Powell, Colonial North Carolina: A History  (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1973), 161. 
 
 16
 That economy did not rely dramatically on slave labor early on.  Thanks to its 
treacherous shoreline, ships carrying human cargo stayed away from the Carolina coast.  
The colony relied on the overland trade from its northern and southern neighbor in the 
early decades of the eighteenth century.  A headright practice instituted by the proprietors 
of the colony encouraged white and black settlement.  Slavery blossomed in the 
agricultural and export areas of the state.  Along the northeastern corridor bordering 
Virginia, where tobacco plantations dotted the landscape, slave ownership could be as 
high as sixty percent.  Further south, along the Cape Fear River, naval stores, lumber, and 
rice production required large labor forces. Here, the concentrated wealth of the colony 
emerged in the middle of the 1700s.17
The backcountry evolved much differently than the coastal region.  Without a 
major cash crop there was no demand for slave labor.  Subsistence farming, grain 
production, and cattle export did not encourage the creation of large plantations.  While 
some Cape Fear counties contained black majorities by the eve of the Revolution, the 
west never followed the pattern of the naval store and tobacco regions in the east.  A 
recent monograph on slavery in North Carolina has examined the population figures for 
different years in the colonial period.  For 1755, out just under 4,700 residents, Rowan 
County, where Rutherford lived during his years in North Carolina, had only102 blacks.  
The next year sampled, 1767 put the number of blacks at 719, a significant increase.  Yet 
                                                 
17 Jeffrey J. Crow, Paul D. Escott, and Flora J. Hatley, A History Of African Americans in North Carolina 
(Raleigh: Division of Archives and History, 1992), 3; Jeffrey J. Crow, The Black Experience in 
Revolutionary North Carolina (Raleigh: Department of Cultural Resources, 1977), 2; Donna J. Spindal, 
Crime and Society in North Carolina, 1663-1776 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 7. 
 17
 white population tripled during the intervening years as thousands more migrated to 
Rowan, Orange, and Anson counties in the west.18
Before Rutherford made a name for himself as a soldier and politician, he 
identified himself as a farmer.  He owned thousands of acres of land in the backcountry 
and used some of it for producing crops.  Tasks and chores around his homestead 
required extra labor.  During his life in Carolina Griffith Rutherford owned slaves, 
probably no more than five or six at the most.  Surviving tax lists of 1768 from Rowan 
County list a “Negro Poett” as a taxable in his household.  Nothing is known about Poett 
who was the lone slave in the household.  Poett worked either as a house slave, or 
assisted in tending to any small grain crops Rutherford planted on his land.  Despite 
Rutherford’s substantial land holdings, the inability to grow a rich crop prevented him 
from becoming a plantation patriarch.19  
Even without a staple export like tobacco, the colony had little trouble developing 
a successful agricultural base. For those living in the piedmont and backcountry, the soil, 
known in the area as Cecil clay, was able to support small grain.20  The Scotch-Irish had 
first-hand experience with this type of harvest from Ireland and Pennsylvania.   In 
addition, the swift tributaries and creeks of the Yadkin could churn grain mills to support 
small family farms.  It is not hard to imagine Rutherford having a gristmill at his 
homestead, keeping grain for the family and perhaps trading other stores in the nearby 
burgh of Salisbury. 
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 The favorable nature of the land Rutherford would one day occupy was observed 
and appreciated as early as 1700.  Englishman John Lawson passed though the area near 
the Yadkin River and observed Sapona Indians living along the banks of the river with 
the same name.  Lawson proclaimed it was the finest area he ever saw in Carolina.  The 
region is a “delicious country,” he declared.  Lawson decided the Sapona, later named the 
Yadkin River was “as noble a River to plant a colony in, as any I have met withal.”21  
 The land contained numerous advantages that first attracted Lawson and 
beginning in the late 1740s settlers moving onto it.  Besides the abundant creeks, the land 
between the Yadkin and Catawba consisted of fertile, treeless meadows.  The region was 
destitute of forest, a virtual open prairie suitable for cattle grazing.  In this area the Scots-
Irish from Maryland and Pennsylvania started arriving around 1745.  A large group of 
people settled on the western side of the Yadkin, only a few years before Germans, 
including the Moravians, settled on the eastern side of the river.22
During the late 1740s, this area of the colony was the property of John Carteret, 
grandson of George Carteret, Lord Granville.  Granville in 1663 owned one-eighth of 
Carolina, and refused to sell it when the crowned offered to buy up the land from the 
other seven proprietors.  George II honored this agreement and granted John a territory 
which ran from the Atlantic west of Salisbury in the piedmont.  Granville’s land included 
about two-thirds of the colonies population.23        
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 In 1753, settlers from Anson County, the westernmost county in North Carolina, 
petitioned the colonial assembly for admission as a new county.  As the main reason for 
their request, they cited the hardships of traveling into Anson.  Acting Governor Matthew 
Rowan signed the bill into law in the spring.  It effectively split the western half of the 
state along a line that demarked Rowan as the northwest county, running to the 
mountains.24  With the county established, residents created the legal machinery for 
administrating the county.  Almost immediately after the Governor created Rowan 
County, the Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions met in June 1753.  One of the first 
justices appointed by the crown was Squire Boone, father of Daniel Boone.  Daniel and 
Griffith Rutherford became friends during this time, taking long hunting trips into the 
woods.25
During his surveys of the area and excursions with Boone, Griffith Rutherford 
must have fallen under the spell of the land in the western piedmont.  A short time after 
his initial surveys of the area, he contemplated an initial purchase of land.  In colonial 
North Carolina purchasing land required a five step process beginning with finding an 
unclaimed parcel and then going through the legal procedure of getting title to the land.  
Rutherford, as a surveyor, would have been familiar with much of that progression going 
back to his days in Pennsylvania.  Once a settler requested a piece of land, a colonial 
official sent a surveyor to measure the land and draw a map, which was then filed and 
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 kept in the capitol.  When all the fees were paid, a clerk could deliver the grant to the 
settler had who first applied for the entry.26
 Within a short time of his surveys near the Yadkin, Rutherford made two 
significant improvements in his life.  He purchased a 656 acre-tract of land on what was 
known at the time as the Irish Settlement.  This parcel of land sat just seven miles 
southwest of the little settlement known as Salisbury.  In the spring of 1753, Rutherford 
made a second set of land purchases in the North Carolina backcountry.  The first parcel 
consisted of 700 acres in Anson County, near the Catawba River.  Subsequent purchases 
were made in Anson and Rowan Counties.  Within five years, he obtained over 4,000 
acres of land.  Being among the early settlers in the region, he arrived ahead of those who 
traveled overland to North Carolina.   He also located and kept the most desirable plots of 
land for himself.27    
His favorite parcel, situated on Grants Creek, a tributary of the Yadkin River, 
became his home for the next four decades.  Rutherford scouted the land in late 1753, and 
James Carter, the founder of the town of Salisbury did the surveying on the tract.  It took 
nearly three years for the grant of land to become official, giving Rutherford title in 
November of 1756.  That same month, the grant for an additional 656 additional acres in 
Rowan County was approved.  Though a series of fees were necessary before a settler 
could legally claim land, prices in colonial North Carolina were miniscule.  A square mile 
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 of land cost only three shillings, a small fraction of what Rutherford could collect on a 
surveying job.28
The land Rutherford first scouted and sought to purchase constituted part of what 
was known as the Irish Settlement.  Located west of the Yadkin River, this region 
contained many attractions for settlers moving out of Pennsylvania or Virginia down the 
Great Wagon Road.  The Yadkin and its creeks were rapid flowing streams, offering 
settlers the chance to establish mill sites.  Open pasture suitable for grazing dotted the 
landscape between the thick forests of the western piedmont.  For Scotch-Irish settlers, 
familiar faces and agricultural practices meant the transition from Pennsylvania or 
Maryland was a smooth one.29      
Settling in the Irish Settlement proved providential for Rutherford.  Soon after 
arriving in the colony, his personal life changed as well.  In 1754 Griffith married the 
daughter of his neighbor, James Graham, an early settler of the county, who also 
emigrated from Ireland.30  Born in 1714, James Graham was only seven years older than 
Griffith, meaning the age difference between Griffith and Elizabeth was at least ten or 
twelve years.  The couple wasted little time starting a family.  Their first child, a daughter 
named Jane, arrived in 1756; a son, James arrived two years later.  All together the 
couple had ten children, all born in Rowan County.31
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 After his initial purchase of land, Rutherford continued to be on the lookout for 
desirable pieces of property in Rowan and Anson counties.  His trade as a surveyor 
proved fortuitous in this pursuit.  He could evaluate pieces of land while looking for the 
best ones to buy and subsequently sell or lease to the hundreds of settlers streaming into 
the region.  To maintain a steady source of income, Rutherford continued to participate in 
the surveying of land.  
Once granted to him, Rutherford decided to sell parcels of his original holdings.  
In July of 1756, he divided his tract in half, selling 328 acres to the sons of Robert 
Luckie, a settler from Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.  Samuel and Joseph each bought 
one-half of Rutherford’s original Granville grants of land along the Fourth Creek in the 
Irish Settlement.32  After considering the value of both areas of land he owned near the 
Yadkin, Rutherford kept his Grant Creek land and made it his permanent home.  Located 
a short distance from the town of Salisbury, he enjoyed easy access to water as well as to 
the center of political life in Rowan County.       
Rutherford’s truncated education never seemed to affect him adversely during his 
early years in North Carolina.  He did, however, rely on the kindness of neighbors and 
fellow pioneers to facilitate his upward mobility.  Often there is a temptation to portray 
the frontier as a tabula rasa where hard work and rugged individualism would carry a 
person as far as he wanted to go.  Talent and skill opened many doors for Rutherford in 
his early life.  He learned the trade of surveying in his early life in the northeast.  This 
vocation served him the rest of his days, even after his military career ended.  A 
competent surveyor could make a decent living.  It paid well enough so that Rutherford, 
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 upon his arrival in North Carolina, could purchase a substantial piece of land to build a 
home and start a family.  His land holdings became a source of income as he leased 
parcels to his Rowan neighbors. 
Rutherford’s rise on the social and economic ladder never happened solely 
through his own efforts.  Timing and luck played a big part in his rise from orphan to 
respected member of Carolina society.  Rutherford, with surveyor’s equipment in hand, 
arrived in the colony of North Carolina at a time when only the eastern third could be 
considered settled.  White settlement in the piedmont proceeded slowly from those 
moving farther inland.  That stage of development for the colony changed dramatically 
around 1750.  A surge of migration from the north started filtering into North Carolina 
from Virginia and Pennsylvania.  Rutherford, as a surveyor, provided a necessary service 
to both Royal officials in the colony, as well as the stream of settlers arriving in the 
piedmont in the years after 1753.   
Rutherford achieved a certain level of success because he befriended prominent 
people in Rowan who saw promise in the young man.  Even the most gifted and 
ambitious of the founders did not reach a level of success without help along the way.  
George Washington achieved early success because of his wealthy and connected 
neighbor William Fairfax.  Fairfax opened doors to young Washington which otherwise 
might have stayed shut.  “Interest,” a series of familial, friendship and local ties helped 
facilitate the quick rise of Rutherford in Rowan.  According to Paul Johnson, interest and 
land mattered more than almost anything in colonial society.  Washington took advantage 
of it, and so did Rutherford.33  
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  One of his first famous acquaintances, Daniel Boone, moved with his family to 
Rowan County around 1750.  Boone quickly developed a reputation as an able marksman 
and hunter, talents suited for the backcountry of the colony.  Boone and Rutherford often 
hunted together in the area around the Yadkin River. In that area, plentiful game such as 
bear and deer roamed the woods, providing both sustenance and skins for Rowan settlers.  
On these hunts Rutherford became proficient with a weapon he may have seen in his 
youth: the Pennsylvania rifle.  He also adopted a particular mode of dress suited for 
woodland hunting, a mixture of Native American and white frontier dress which included 
a long hunting shirt, leggings, and accoutrements for the rifle.34
 Rutherford had barely established himself and his family in North Carolina when 
an international crisis between Great Britain and France began to impact the English 
colonies.  Tension between Great Britain and France over control of the Ohio Valley 
erupted in the woods around Fort Duquesne in 1754.  Though the initial fighting was 
isolated to western Pennsylvania, within a very few years the effects of the war would be 
felt in North Carolina.  Residents in Salisbury in no way could remain isolated from the 
war.  On her western mountain border, the powerful Cherokee Indian nation called North 
Carolina its home.  The Cherokee in 1754 constituted the largest Indian nation in contact 
with the British colonies.  With a total population of 8,500, Cherokee villages stretched 
from Virginia to the Savannah River. 
 Even if he had never traveled to the Cherokee towns prior to the French and 
Indian War, Rutherford would have been familiar with Native Americans. A small 
contingent of Catawba Indians lived on the forks of the Catawba River, just west of 
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 Salisbury.  Rutherford, soon after his move to North Carolina, purchased tracts of land in 
this region.  A smallpox epidemic in 1738 obliterated the Catawba nation, shrinking their 
numbers to under 1,000.  Smaller in population than its neighbors and with the powerful 
Tuscarora and Cherokee counted as their enemy, the Catawba kept friendly relations with 
the English.35   
 Occasions of violence in the backcountry did occur in conjunction with the war 
between England and France.  In 1754 Indians, allied with the French raided along the 
Broad River in North Carolina, killing sixteen settlers.  Friendly Catawbas tried to catch 
those guilty of the attack but failed to do so.  The incident proved that as far removed as 
North Carolina was from the battle, the colony could not escape the effects of this world 
war.  Attacks in the backcountry also put leaders in the east on notice that North Carolina 
was ill prepared for frontier defense.  In the aftermath of the Indian attack, hastily-
organized militia units arranged to patrol the frontier.  To serve as a second line of 
defense, the assembly voted funds to build a fort near a tributary of the Yadkin in Rowan.  
Named Fort Dobbs in honor of the Royal Governor, the walled structure, close to 
Salisbury, served as a haven from further attacks.36
  The first four years of the war had been marked by disappointment and 
frustration, especially in the Ohio valley.  By 1758 Great Britain prepared to launch a 
more vigorous effort to win North America from the French.  Expeditions under George 
Washington and Edward Braddock failed to reduce Fort Duquesne.  During planning for 
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 a third attempt to capture the fort, resources from neighboring colonies, including North 
Carolina were utilized.  To better defend the southern frontier, an offensive campaign 
would be launched against Duquesne.  Winning in the Ohio country became for the 
English not only a strategic goal but a matter of pride.37
 To help this renewed effort, North Carolina sent three companies of troops to join 
the expedition under British general John Forbes.  Forbes asked Governor Dobbs to 
provide reliable soldiers, “able bodied good men, capable of enduring fatigue, and that 
their arms be the best that can be found in the province.”38   Forbes and his subordinate 
Hugh Waddell found a dedication to duty severely lacking among the troops.  Most 
decided that militia service in their state did not extend to an expedition into Virginia and 
simply left.  A small percentage under the command of Hugh Waddell and Captain 
Rutherford stayed with the Forbes expedition and marched west through the 
Pennsylvania woods.39
A strong sense of adventure must have motivated Rutherford to travel north as 
part of the North Carolina contingent to the Forbes expedition.  Considering scores of his 
fellow militiamen left the campaign when faced with the prospect of leaving the state, his 
enthusiasm had to be strong.  At his home on Grant’s Creek, Rutherford left behind a 
wife and toddlers.  Perhaps the thrill of combat pulled him away from hearth and home.  
Daniel Boone, a teamster on the failed Braddock march to Fort Duquesne, might have 
filled Rutherford’s ear with exhilarating stories of the Virginia woods.   
                                                 
37 Lee, 65; William Fowler, Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North 
America, 1754-1763 (New York: Walker and Company, 2005), 155. 
 
38 John Forbes to Arthur Dobbs, March 21, 1758, Alfred Proctor James, Writings of General John Forbes, 
Relating to his Service in North America (Menasha, WS: Collegiate Press, 1938), 59-60. 
 
39 Maass, 12; E. Milton Wheeler, “Development and Organization of the North Carolina Militia,” North 
Carolina Historical Review 41 (July 1965): 315.  
 27
 Determined not to repeat the mistakes of Braddock, Forbes brought an 
overwhelming force to bear on Fort Duquesne.  The troops cut a road across the 
wilderness, advancing slowly towards the French fort.  Serving with Forbes, Colonel 
Hugh Waddell and the Carolinians made up a strike force under George Washington who 
raced to the fort ahead of the vanguard of the army.  North Carolina troops served as 
rangers in the campaign, scouting ahead of the main army and helping to foil an ambush 
by Indian allies of the French.  By late November of 1758, the French commander in 
Duquesne knew of the approaching British column and decided his position was 
untenable.  But before abandoning the fort, he blew up the fortifications, keeping an 
intact position from falling into enemy hands.40  Though the British had to rebuild the 
ruined works at Duquesne, the campaign removed at the very least, a significant French 
presence from the contested Ohio Country.  For Rutherford, his time in the campaign 
exposed him to countless new experiences.  He fought his first pitched battle along the 
trail against Native American allies of the French, who attacked an outpost on the British 
supply line.  All around him, he absorbed the lessons of woodland warfare, and the value 
of organization and planning when an army marched into the forest. 
 Upon his return, Rutherford became an integral part of the plan to keep the 
frontier safe from further Indian attacks.  He joined a “ranging company” with the 
express purpose of providing a frontline defense of the western areas of North Carolina.  
Rangers patrolled wooded outskirts of colonial settlements gathering intelligence and 
serving as a defense for Indian hit-and-run raids.41  For his service as a ranger, 
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 Rutherford received payment from the colonial government for the expenses his company 
accrued.  Donning the clothing he wore on hunting trips, he utilized his skills in the 
woods to search out and attack roving bands of Cherokee who posed a serious threat to 
the colony by 1758.  His service in the Forbes expedition also won him a prestigious 
appointment.  Governor Arthur Dobbs awarded Rutherford a commission as a provincial 
Captain in Colonel Osborn’s Regiment of Foot.  With an official rank in the army, 
Rutherford was at the beginning of a military career which would last throughout his 
years in North Carolina.42    
While Rutherford won battlefield experience and plaudits, frontier settlers paid a 
high price for the British failure to maintain Indian allies.  Attacks along the North 
Carolina frontier had been sporadic since 1756, but when white settlers skirmished with   
Cherokee warriors going home from the Forbes campaign, the Carolina backcountry  
exploded in 1760.  Angered by being denied the weapons and goods that the English once 
provided and encouraged by the French, the Cherokee attacked settlements as far east as 
Salisbury.   
The Cherokee’s offensive put the North Carolina backcountry in a state of 
emergency.  A thin line of militia and rangers stood between war parties of the Cherokee 
and white settlement.  Fear among inhabitants of Rowan pushed the line of settlement 
farther east as desperate refugees moved across the Yadkin seeking a safe haven within 
the Moravian settlement of Bethania.  The situation became so serious between 1756 and 
1761 that the taxables for Rowan dropped from 1,500 to fewer than 800.  By 1760 more 
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 than land and property was at stake for the people along the frontier.  Salisbury, the 
young town on the frontier stood in the path of a possible Cherokee onslaught.  Already 
in 1759, only a few years after its creation, the town had already become Rowan’s center 
of economic and legal activity.  A court system heard cases between parties, and roads 
connected Salisbury to Virginia and South Carolina.  Twenty-two different trade artisans 
lived in the town, and the increase in population showed no signs of slowing down.43  
Indian attacks along the frontier had the potential to curtail the promising growth 
Salisbury enjoyed just a few years after its creation. A series of concentrated Cherokee 
attacks against Salisbury could destroy the burgeoning commercial and legal center for 
the region.44
 All of these facts were driven home on February 27th of 1760 where manned by 
only a few companies of western militia, Fort Dobbs came under attack.  The men in the 
fort, including Hugh Waddell, Captain Rutherford and other frontier detachments, were 
alerted to the threat by the sound of barking dogs during the evening.  The Indian assault 
failed to capture the fort, but the Cherokee refused to let this setback stop an extremely 
effective terror campaign.  From the stockaded homes or reinforced Moravian towns, 
settlers continued to see Cherokee braves’ campfires as a constant reminder of the 
colony’s precarious position.45  
 Hoping to turn the tables, South Carolina initiated a direct campaign into 
Cherokee lands in an effort to end attacks on the frontiers.  Organized in 1760, an 
expedition marched into the lower towns bordering South Carolina, but a spirited Indian 
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 resistance prevented the British commander from moving further west.  In this campaign, 
white soldiers came to the harrowing conclusion that the Cherokee had a strong 
advantage as they were armed with rifles, weapons more effective in woodland warfare 
than the English musket.  The 1760 march failed to bring the war to a conclusion, forcing 
another trip into the Cherokee towns in 1761.46
 This second attack was again led by an English regular officer, James Grant.  
Since the foray into the Cherokee towns during the previous year failed to end the 
conflict, Grant decided to lay waste to the essentials needed for Indian survival.  He made 
a part of his army a fast-moving, lightly-equipped force, able to separate from the main 
body of troops and attack the Cherokee middle settlements.  In spite of its best efforts, the 
expedition could not bring the Cherokee to battle.  The Indians sniped at the army, while 
many others disappeared into the woods, abandoning villages before the onslaught of the 
army.   
To the officers and soldiers in the Grant expedition, the march in the woods 
proved to be grueling and difficult.  Cherokee attacks came without warning and ended 
just as quickly.  Fatigued in their effort to move swiftly, the army spent itself before it 
had the chance to march further west into the Overhill settlements.  Without an enemy to 
attack, Grant’s men burned houses and corncribs, destroyed crops, and commandeered 
livestock.  Facing a harsh winter, the more accommodationist Cherokee leader Little 
Carpenter sued for peace in August of 1761.  After two grueling campaigns, the Cherokee 
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 lost little land, and in subsequent years rebuilt destroyed villages.47  Left unscathed by 
Grant’s column, this set of villages would prove significant for future settler-Indian 
relations.    
The peace terms agreed to by white and Indian negotiators kept the frontier safe 
for a number of years.  During the war Salisbury, the struggling legal and trading center, 
had been threatened by the Indians during the war.  This caused migration to Rowan 
came to a standstill as families hesitated to move into the dangerous frontier.  Two 
powerful cultures collided in the Carolina woods: one trying to survive among the broken 
promises and encroachment of white settlers, the other clinging to a new life on frontier 
while facing European and Indian enemies.   
Despite the destruction wrought by Grant’s campaign, the condition of the 
Cherokee remained largely status quo antebellum.  In the months to come, Carolina 
negotiators helped draw a line between white and Cherokee settlement.  The crown went 
one step further, closing further settlement across the mountains in 1763.48  Colonists, 
who considered themselves winners in the French and Indian War were now shut out of 
the spoils of victory.  Virginia and Carolina pioneers bled in the woods to keep access to 
these areas open and to force Indian surrender of contested lands.  Now the King told his 
subjects that they could not enjoy the fruit of their sacrifices. 
 The Cherokee War made a significant impact on the life of Griffith Rutherford.  It 
exposed him for the first time to military conflict within and outside of his own colony.  
He met military leaders at the local level as well as professional soldiers in the King’s 
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 army.  On his march to Pennsylvania, he took note of the importance of supplies and the 
need to provision and supply an army moving deep into hostile territory.  Rutherford also 
witnessed woodland combat with Native Americans.  The thick woods of the 
Appalachians were nothing new to him.  He had hunted and ranged as soon as he arrived 
in North Carolina.  However, during the campaign with Grant, Rutherford took note that 
the best way to destroy an enemy meant devastating their ability to make war.  
For Rutherford the experience of war served as immediate instruction to a man 
with little textbook training.  Military service, including all the sights and sounds of 
combat shaped Rutherford’s character, providing a second profession for a forty year old 
man.  In the years to come, Griffith probably considered himself lucky to be a part of the 
war, learning from both successes and failures.  During the next conflict in the Carolina 
woods, Rutherford would be more than an officer in training; he would be the 
commander.49  
To westerners, the end of the conflict produced numerous lessons for Carolina 
settlers.  The Cherokee remained a powerful force residing just west of white settlement.  
Even considering the destruction caused by Grant’s army, the Indians surrendered little in 
the way of power and land in 1763.  If pioneers decided to flaunt the Crown’s 
proclamation, a strong, well-organized Indian nation stood in the way of any movement 
west.  Moreover, British Indian agents discovered during the Cherokee War that a 
generational difference existed in the Cherokee nation between young, aggressive braves, 
and older, more accommodating chiefs.  The older men urged caution when relations 
deteriorated with the English in 1758.  Yet they had little control when younger, nativist 
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 chiefs urged attacks on the frontier.50  A similar dilemma confronted the nation fifteen 
years later in the opening months of the American Revolution.     
During the next conflict with the Cherokee in the mountains, issues from the 
Cherokee War and access to western areas would come to the surface again.  This time, 
illegal encroachment of whites onto Indian lands would be set in the larger perspective of 
a colonial revolution.  By 1763, the British hoped to avoid war on the colonial borders by 
closing settlement along the mountains.  Peace in the western areas meant security for the 
hundreds of settlers living near Salisbury.  For Rutherford, the experience helped benefit 
him personally.  He turned his soldiering notoriety into a career in politics, hoping to 
serve his colony in another capacity. 
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 Chapter Two 
A Primer in Politics 
 
The Cherokee War brought a level of attention and fame to Griffith Rutherford.  
At the end of the fighting he was forty-two years old, married with four children.  He 
owned substantial parcels of land in Rowan County and could be considered one of the 
few experienced field officers in the region.  Attacks by the Cherokee threatened 
everything he and his fellow settlers held dear - home, land, and the town of Salisbury. 
That danger, once settled, meant that North Carolina could continue to grow at a healthy 
pace.      
 The French and Indian War temporarily stunted the growth of western North 
Carolina.  With Cherokee raids at regular intervals, settlers huddled in fortified homes or 
moved east to safety.  At the end of the fighting, the removal of the dual threat of France 
and Native American tribes re-opened the floodgates of migration to the western 
piedmont.  The new royal governor, William Tryon, noticed immediately the explosion 
of population in his colony.  Within a short time, he predicted the settlements would 
reach the mountains, a fact that spoke well of the industry of western settlers.1
 Among these settlers, Griffith Rutherford hoped to make a name for himself as 
more than just a family man and landed member of society.  During critical periods in the 
history of the colony, he offered his services and skills.  His name appears on scores of 
Rowan County deeds as a witness to land transactions and wills.  In addition, he served 
terms as a juryman in Rowan County, a service which did not require extensive 
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 knowledge of law but served another purpose.  With a signature on a legal document, his 
name listed on a court decision, or credit given on a land transaction, Rutherford by the 
middle of the 1760s developed name recognition in his region of North Carolina.  He 
could be proud of his service as an officer in the King’s army, having served in ranging 
duties on the frontier.  Rutherford also took part in a punitive expedition against the 
Cherokee, the success of which for a time kept the western areas of the colony peaceful.  
He never gave up his peacetime profession as a surveyor.  After the French and 
Indian War, Rutherford received an appointment to be deputy surveyor for Henry 
McCulloh.2  McCulloh owned several grants of land south of the Rowan County line that 
began to be occupied by settlers moving into the colony from the north after the war.  By 
the middle of the 1760s McCulloh hoped to turn his father’s land into a money-making 
business by collecting rents on his land in the western piedmont.          
It turned out to be the vocation that helped Rutherford enter North Carolina 
politics for the first time.  The man Rutherford worked directly under, John Frohock, did 
more than anyone to launch his political career starting in 1766.  By choosing Rutherford 
as Frohock’s assistant surveyor, Rutherford partnered with one of the most influential 
men in Rowan County.  Together, the two led or served as part of surveying teams 
helping to map out new land.  The deed books of Rowan County in the late 1750s and 
early 1760s show dozens of entries with both Frohock’s and Rutherford’s names on land 
transactions.  
 In Virginia during the 1750s, William Fairfax provided George Washington with 
royal connections early in life.  In turn, Washington used the fame won in the French and 
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 Indian War to fulfill the next part of his squire’s life:  he entered politics, winning 
election to the House of Burgesses.  For Rutherford, local connections in Rowan 
facilitated his professional career at the end of the war.  Rutherford’s equivalent to 
Fairfax was John Frohock.  Frohock achieved a level of success Rutherford hoped one 
day to have.  Like Rutherford and many settlers in North Carolina, Frohock moved to the 
Carolina backcountry from another colony.  Starting in Pennsylvania, he resettled to 
North Carolina around 1750, after a stint in Maryland.  Frohock’s association with the 
McCulloh clan of speculators helped him acquire choice land in Rowan during the 1750s.  
By 1762, he owned at least 6,000 acres.3   
A multiple office holder, and member of the militia, Frohock never failed to 
parlay his office-holding to his own benefit.  As clerk of the Rowan county court and 
surveyor, he could readily identify the most coveted plots of land in the region.  For 
Rutherford, getting to know someone like John Frohock gave him opportunities to 
advance in the colonial system.  By the end of the French and Indian War, Frohock was 
considered the wealthiest and most influential man in the region.  He owned thousands of 
acres of land, thirty-eight slaves, and his plantation home, considered one of the most 
elegant in the area, sat on one of his many tracts of land in Rowan County.4  To 
Rutherford, Frohock represented everything he hoped one day to achieve.  Frohock began 
a political career in 1760, using his east coast connections to improve his standing in 
Salisbury.     
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 Under Frohock’s tutelage, Rutherford was elected to lower house in the North 
Carolina assembly in 1766.  During his many surveying jobs in the backcountry, 
Rutherford must have made a good impression on Frohock.  Getting support from such a 
prominent man gave Rutherford an inside track to a local or state office.  It is not hard to 
imagine the two discussing the future of their colony as they took and recorded 
measurements. Frohock turned his prominent position as surveyor into successful 
election to the North Carolina Assembly.  Before the decade was through, his dabbling in 
different local positions made him a hated target for organized groups of settlers who 
hoped to regulate corrupt practices among officeholders in the piedmont.  
A relative ease in finding cheap land had always been characteristic of North 
Carolina.  Those settlers lucky enough to get title to a large tract might have success in 
farming or leasing land to new arrivals in the colony.  Rutherford enjoyed a comfortable 
level of economic success because he purchased land in the Granville district, a relatively 
unregulated swath of the colony.  Through his surveying profession Rutherford held the 
advantage of acquiring the best parcels of land.  His surveying fees also provided the cash 
necessary to purchase these tracts. 
Many settlers who arrived in North Carolina after the French and Indian War did 
not have these same benefits.  Suffering tribulations and attacks during the war, frontier 
settlement pushed east to Salisbury, where the town itself lived tenuously with the threat 
of Indian attack.  Migration slowed to a trickle and placed in jeopardy the future of the 
region.  In the aftermath of the war, as settlers tried to catch their collective breath, 
another threat from absentee landowners presented a challenge to their fragile existence.  
Henry McCulloh, who employed John Frohock as his surveyor, determined to make 
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 money from the land settlers lived on rent-free.  Unlike his father, who never set foot in 
the colony, Henry McCulloh took up residence in North Carolina beginning in 1761.  He 
began to collect quitrents from settlers on his father’s land.  His insistence that the settlers 
pay him made McCulloh one of the most hated men in the colony.  The timing could not 
have been worse.  Having just survived the harrowing experience of the Cherokee War, 
newcomers to the colony who delayed moving because of frontier troubles now had to 
face a challenge to their livelihood.5
McCulloh, to his credit, went about wooing the local members of Carolina 
society.  He courted men like John Frohock and effectively won their allegiance, 
realizing he needed their help in getting any kind of economic recovery from families on 
his land.  It proved a wise move, since many westerners rejected his claim to the land and 
his unrealistic demands for rent.  While several settlers on the land paid for it outright, 
others moved off the land, unable to afford the price or the rent which McCulloh 
demanded be paid in sterling notes.  Some families threatened McCulloh and the 
surveyors he brought out to measure the parcels and demand the settlers obtain title to the 
tracts they occupied.6
Through his effective use of patronage, McCulloh put the legal means in place to 
remove settlers from his land.  His associates, John Frohock among them, were given 
positions of power in several colonies and could be expected to enforce his collection of 
rent.  Residents who could not pay in the cash strapped colony either had to leave the area 
or take McCulloh to court.  Challenges to land titles involved lawyer fees and court costs 
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 many western residents could not afford.  Facing an eviction sanctioned by the legal 
system, or rent payments based on future profits, several settlers took matters into their 
own hands.7      
Attacks on the McCulloh surveying team became the opening chapter in what is 
known as the Regulator movement in North Carolina.  Beginning in 1765 backcountry 
residents in Anson, Orange, and Rowan counties began to blame county officials for their 
economic difficulties.  The Regulator movement in North Carolina, more than any other 
period in the history of the colony, is the subject of debate among early American 
historians.  Early historiography deemed the movement a first salvo in the fight against 
Great Britain.  Since then, the Regulation has been considered a regional dispute, class 
conflict, and more recently, the manifestation of settlers with a distinct dissenting 
Protestantism.8  Concentrated in the western counties of Orange, Anson, and Rowan, the 
movement dominated backcountry politics for six years.  Rutherford’s position as a 
county representative put him directly in the middle of this episode of North Carolina 
history.  
Compounded with frustrations concerning land holdings, residents in western 
counties had become increasingly frustrated with their local government.  The county 
government by 1765 had become out of control because of multiple officeholders 
embedded in “courthouse rings.”  These county institutions owed no allegiance to the 
people, since the governor appointed offices such as justice of the peace, sheriff, and 
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 town commissioners.9  These offices were chosen by the governor in the eastern capital, 
who approved their selection based on the recommendations of county assemblymen.  
When the courthouse rings combined with lawyers and land speculators, small farmers 
began to believe a conspiracy existed to drive them off of land in order to enrich county 
officials.10   
Roger Ekirch, who wrote a study of North Carolina during the colonial period 
offered a convincing explanation for the source of corruption about which Regulators 
criticized.  According to him, a new group of men entered politics in the piedmont and 
quickly became tainted, by holding multiple offices.  Using dire language, the Regulators 
spoke in terms of their very future being threatened by leeches in society who benefited 
from legal fees and foreclosures against honest, hard working farmers.  To these men, the 
local officials, merchants, and lawyers rose to wealth and prominence at the expense of 
the struggling settler.  Adding insult to injury, several men who ascended the ladder of 
county leadership, among them Henry McCulloh and Edward Fanning, had only recently 
arrived in the colony.  Outsiders; merchants, and lawyers, according to frustrated farmers, 
were leeching off the hardworking, honest frontier family.   
Upon arriving in New Bern in November of 1766, Griffith Rutherford tried to 
prove he was not deaf to the complaints of his fellow backcountry farmers.  He sponsored 
legislation that would have carved new counties of out Rowan, allowing for more 
representation to the backcountry.  New districts would, he hoped bring some relief to the 
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 western counties by more evenly reflecting the population dispersion in North Carolina.  
This bill failed to pass during either the 1766 or 1767 session.  Rutherford did, however, 
get an appointment to a Committee on Propositions and Grievances an assignment which 
would allow him to evaluate Regulator complaints more carefully.  Apart from 
Rutherford’s assignment to a committee to cut and clear a road through several western 
counties, the session turned out to be uneventful for him.11          
Following in the footsteps of Frohock, Rutherford took on further responsibilities 
while serving in the assembly.  His connections to influential east coast men got him the 
coveted position of Sheriff in Rowan County for 1767.  A local office appointed directly 
by the Governor, a county Sheriff carried a host of tasks.  At the basic level he served as 
the chief executive of the county.  Custody of the jail fell to the sheriff, who imprisoned 
criminals, and inflicted the death penalty for capital offenses.12  As sheriff, Rutherford 
performed many of these duties, including executing two men for horse stealing, and 
another for murder.13   
In addition, part of the sheriff’s duties included collection of parish and county 
taxes.  For this unpopular action, the sheriff received a list of taxables in the county, 
which included white males over sixteen and slaves.  After a successful completion of 
collections, the sheriff obtained a small fee.  In other words, the sheriff had to enforce the 
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 will of the local county court, otherwise known as, the “courthouse rings.”14  Oftentimes 
the justices of the peace, who set tax rates, also served as sheriff or after a term in one 
office, moved to another county position. Collecting public money entailed a huge 
responsibility, but it also proved a tremendous temptation for those fresh in power.15  
Special scorn was reserved by Regulators for the office of sheriff.  Backcountry sheriffs 
had the reputation of being notoriously corrupt.  Men who held the office often failed to 
turn in all monies to the colonial treasury.16       
Rutherford as sheriff became embroiled in the Regulator crisis right after his 
selection to that office.  He already held the position as justice of the peace, a prerequisite 
to becoming sheriff, the year before he took the post in 1767.17  Rowan County, along 
with Anson and Orange, was considered one of the hotbeds of Regulator activity after 
1768.  When Rutherford took this thankless position, the machinations of John Frohock 
already caused anger among the people in his county.  Sheriffs who preceded Rutherford 
failed to collect the necessary taxes dating back to 1765.  In a county of 3,000 taxables, 
more than 2,000 refused to pay for the year 1766.  The next year proved even worse, 
when Sheriff Andrew Allison collected from just 205 taxables.18   
Perhaps Rutherford, who since the mid 1750s served his county as surveyor and 
soldier, thought his name recognition might allow him to redeem the embattled county 
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 office.  In spite of his best intentions, the people in the county seemed unlikely to hand 
over their money to anyone after 1766.  During the legislative session of 1768, 
Rutherford saw firsthand the challenges in the sheriff’s office during a tax revolt.  An 
audit by the Assembly found Rutherford owed the colony  868, for the year 1767.19  This 
amount represented the shortage for tax collection that year.  This value reflects one of 
two scenarios.  Either Sheriff Rutherford’s accounts stood in arrears because he enriched 
himself during his first year, or the citizens of Rowan County failed to pay their taxes.  
The latter scenario seems more likely, but future developments in the Regulator 
controversy do not rule out the first.  The finances fell into such disarray that Rowan 
went without a sheriff in 1770. 
When repeated attempts at reform legislation failed to pass the legislature, angry 
backcountry residents organized themselves into Regulator associations and attacked 
courts, lawyers, and freed arrested leaders of their organization.20  In 1768 Governor 
Tryon personally attempted to intervene to stop the lawlessness in Orange County, a 
hotbed of the Regulator movement.  In September, Tryon accompanied by members of 
the Assembly left New Bern and traveled to Hillsborough for the Superior Court session.  
He spent a good part of the summer collecting militia from Rowan, anticipating possible 
violence from several hundred Regulators who gathered near the town.   
His show of force helped avert violence and allowed for the peaceful conduct of 
court proceedings.  As a measure of good faith, Tryon agreed to pardon all but seven 
insurgents if the Regulators delivered the most vocal leaders of the rebellion.  He came to 
this conclusion after a discussion with his militia officers and the six men, including 
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 Rutherford, who represented the Assembly.  Pondering this over night, most of the 
several hundred Regulators simply went home, agreeing to nothing.21  Returning to the 
capital late in the year, Rutherford again tried to do his part for the cause of reform.  
Along with two other western men, he helped prepare yet another bill for dividing Rowan 
County, making another district in the piedmont.22
If Rutherford needed a reminder about the danger of becoming involved in the 
“courthouse rings” he got one in the 1770-1771 Assembly session.  That year, Rutherford 
and other assemblymen investigated Thomas Person, an assemblyman charged with 
extortion, usury, and exacting illegal fees.  While investigating this matter, Rutherford’s 
persistence at reform measures paid off.  The 1771 session approved the separation of a 
part of northern Rowan County to be called Surry County.  Swept up in the cause of 
reform, the creation of a new county could at least provide representation for the fastest 
growing area of North Carolina.23   
With Surry County created, the machinery of a new county could begin and take 
some pressure away from Rowan County, which at one point made up the entire western 
portion of the colony.  Residents of Rowan asked their representatives for this change, 
and after several sessions of stalling, the request passed.  Perhaps inspired by this 
legislative victory, Rutherford, in a rare recorded vote, supported a bill for regulating and 
ascertaining several county positions including Chief Justice and Clerk of the Crown.  
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 Though he left the job as sheriff, and the pressures and scandal attached to that office, 
Rutherford in this case supported a reform measure.  Perhaps he kept in the back of his 
mind Assemblyman Person, under investigation for abuse in office.24
When he accompanied Governor Tryon and his militia to Hillsborough in 1768, 
Rutherford and other Assemblymen kept the peace in an effort to allow due process to 
run its course.  Two years later in Hillsborough, Regulators seized the court in the town, 
attacked officials of the county, and assaulted the hated Edward Fanning.  Fearing that 
anarchy had taken over in western counties, the Assembly passed the Johnston Act, 
giving Governor Tryon the legal means to call out militia and enforce the law.  Passions 
and rumor filled backcountry counties as news of the Johnston Act made its way west.  
Stories in the New Bern claimed an army of Regulators were on the march, heading for 
the capital.25
One of the organized groups of Regulators met outside the town of Salisbury in 
the spring of 1771.  By this time members of the Rowan community had become well 
aware of the militant stance taken by the Governor and legislature.  Responsive to the 
anxious situation, but compelled by duty to enforce the law, Rutherford found himself in 
a difficult situation.  He sympathized with the Regulators, helping to introduce new 
legislation to improve conditions in the west.  At the same time, his military stature 
compelled him to follow the dictates of the governor.  In March of 1771 Rutherford 
paraded his militia company in the town of Salisbury; a brave but undermanned show of 
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 authority.  In doing this, Rutherford carried out the orders of Governor Tryon, who asked 
his county militia officers to enlist volunteers for service against the insurgents.26  
Though Rutherford could muster a small contingent of troops, in reality he 
represented crown policy in a sea of disgruntled North Carolinians.  Facing this situation, 
and with several Regulators grumbling for a fight, a group of Rowan officials met with 
Regulator leaders to help alleviate the tense situation.  Among the fifteen Rowan 
Regulators was James Graham, Rutherford’s father-in-law, who sat down with the county 
leaders, who represented surveyors and sheriffs of the county.  Among these men an 
agreement outlined by the two parties gave satisfaction to both groups.  All of the county 
officials gathered agreed to repay to the persons in the county all excessive fees charged 
“through inadvertency.”  Rutherford in his capacity as surveyor signed his name on this 
document, along with his one time tutor in politics John Frohock.27
Frohock and Alexander Martin, two of the men who put their name on this 
agreement, then wrote Governor Tryon to inform him of the situation.  The letter implied 
that unlike Hillsborough, the Rowan Regulators had no intention of becoming violent and 
interrupting proceedings of the court.  If the situation escalated, several militia 
companies, including Captain Rutherford’s could be called upon to protect the court.  
Frohock and Martin hoped the letter outlined the general sentiment of the people of 
Rowan County: Regulator fatigue.  To the minds of the officials, the meeting achieved 
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 the needed results, for the people “gave three Cheers and returned to their homes without 
using Violence to any Person whatsoever.”28      
Governor Tryon however did not share the sentiment of the Rowan officials.  He 
reprimanded this arrangement as “unconstitutional, Dishonourable to Government and… 
dangerous to the peace and Happiness of Society.”  By meeting with the Regulators, 
Tryon implied, the Rowan men were all but admitting they had gouged the citizens of the 
county.  Tryon scolded the men for any abuse in office while at the same time he resented 
the mediation.29   
Meeting with members of the Rowan committee to discuss his collection of fees 
probably saved Rutherford’s political career.  While never formally admitting 
wrongdoing, he tried to appease the members of Rowan County.  What ameliorated his 
wrongdoing more than anything else was that he was not alone.  Earlier sheriffs in Rowan 
had failed in their duties, either by enriching themselves or failing to collect all the taxes 
in their district.30  By choosing to mediate with Regulator leaders in Rowan, the situation 
defused, in spite of the outrage it caused Governor Tryon.   
 Although Rowan has been considered one of the hotbeds of Regulator resistance 
by historians, by meeting with representatives of the organization, Rutherford and others 
avoided the fate of her eastern neighbors.  In more radical Orange County, the violence 
continued into the fall of 1770.  When Regulators in that region unleashed a spree of 
violence that stopped the Hillsborough Superior Court, officials asked the Governor to 
call out the militia in surrounding counties.      
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 When Tryon marched his militia into the backcountry, Rutherford as a militia 
captain rallied the willing members of Rowan to organize a support column and come to 
the aid of the governor.  By the time Tryon became aware of the negotiation in Rowan 
County his army was on the march.  Rutherford, in the role he would play for many years 
to come, served as both politician and military officer.  His efforts at negotiation helped 
resolve the tense situation in Rowan, but Regulators remained armed and organized in 
other parts of the colony.  Rutherford helped settle Regulator grievances and thereby kept 
Salisbury from descending into the chaos of Hillsborough.  But his duties as a militia 
officer meant he had to fulfill the commands of the governor.  In May 1771, Rutherford 
reunited with his commander from the French and Indian War, Hugh Waddell, near the 
Yadkin River.  Waddell organized a force of western militia to come to the aid of Tryon’s 
force, which was marching from the east.  Two converging armies, it was hoped, could 
bring the large Regulator army near Alamance Creek to bay. 
The presence of a strong force of Regulator militia on the Yadkin River forced 
Waddell to call his officers into a council of war on May 10th.  Captain Alexander swore 
before Rutherford that the large Regulator force extended a quarter of a mile, with ranks 
seven or eight deep.  If the information was credible, this would be a substantial force for 
Waddell’s men to face.  Though the intelligence turned out to be a gross exaggeration, 
the officers took it as a sign that a substantial force ten times their number organized 
against their troops, and advised Waddell to retreat behind the safety of the Yadkin.31    
Even without the assistance of Waddell’s column, Tryon defeated a Regulator 
force along the Alamance Creek on May 14th.  Tryon then left the theater of battle, 
                                                 
31 General Waddle’s Camp, Pott’s Creek, 10th May 1771, NCCR, 8: 608; Lee, 83. 
 
 49
 entrusting Waddell with marching his army through Rowan and Tryon Counties as a 
show of force.  Rutherford stayed with this army for a short time, but left the field in 
June, retiring to the Moravian town of Salem to recover from a spell of gout.32 
Throughout the Regulation, Rutherford attempted to walk a fine line between his 
responsibilities as a county official and his sympathies with other farmers in Rowan.  He 
was not unaware of the fact that in contentious Orange County armed farmers had 
interrupted court proceedings and become violent towards their most despised enemy, 
Edmund Fanning.  He maneuvered adroitly in the spring of 1771, cooling the tempers of 
disgruntled Rowan residents while fulfilling his duties as a loyal militia officer.    
Rutherford’s ability to play to popular politics served him well in another 
controversy that arose during the Regulator uprising.  In 1770, he became embroiled in a 
religious predicament that forced him to choose between his adherence to the official 
church and his own political positions.  A devout Anglican early in life, Rutherford 
served as a vestryman in St. Luke’s Episcopal Church in Rowan, but by 1770 he began to 
have a falling out with the parish church.  Much of his frustration had to do with the 
excessive fees ministers could charge for performing marriage ceremonies.33       
Many citizens of Rowan, not just Rutherford objected to the monopoly of the 
Church of England in North Carolina.  Presbyterians and Baptists dissenters who 
dominated the population of western counties resented laws that allowed only Anglican 
ministers to perform religious ceremonies.  In communities already loathe to pay taxes 
because of corruption, the Governor found it hard to force dissenters to pay for an 
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 Anglican clergyman.  By 1770 in complaints to the legislature, Tryon linked backcountry 
dissenting to a repudiation of the crown.34  That year, in the middle of the Regulator 
crisis Governor Tryon became adamant about enforcement of the Orthodox Clergy Act.  
Responding to a petition from Rowan Anglicans to send a minister for the local parish, 
Tryon dispatched Theodorous Swaine Drage to Rowan, and at this point he came in 
conflict with the county’s two representatives to the colonial assembly.   
Recent elections determined the people of Rowan overwhelmingly did not want 
an Anglican vestry to serve their religious needs.  To Griffith Rutherford and Matthew 
Locke, the residents of their county had already spoken on the matter.  Working with 
Baptist minister Joseph Murphy, Rutherford and Locke kept out any legally sanctioned 
Anglican by promising to help elect a dissenter to the vestry who refused to take the oath 
to the Anglican Church.  Any minister who refused to take this oath was imposed with a 
fine.  But the dissenters in Rowan favored paying a fine as opposed to the tax due from 
all citizens in the county that supplied the salary for an Anglican minister.  Rowan 
dissenters established a fund to pay the fine in upcoming elections, preventing any 
Anglican for years to come from serving in an official capacity.35              
Drage, by all accounts a kind, gentle man, grew increasingly frustrated at 
Rutherford’s and Locke’s reluctance to aid his efforts.  Drage made his case to the people 
of Rowan, but found many in the region contemptuous of the church and the crown.  
Nevertheless, he promised Governor Tryon that his logic convinced many residents of the 
legality of the establishment.  Rutherford and Locke however, were another matter.  Both 
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 men seemed disinclined to expedite Drage’s business, leading the minister to observe, 
“sincerity and confidence are herbs scarce to be found in this climate.” Unable to extract 
any obedience from a region already full of discontent for authority, Drage gave up his 
cause and left the area, calling the Rowan voters “rotten nuts.”    
Increasingly after 1770, western counties in the middle of the Regulator 
movement began to link an erosion of their civil liberties to the practices of the English 
Crown.36  To Rutherford and Locke, the principle was simple; elections by the 
Presbyterian majority in the county had outright rejected the Anglican candidates.  By 
attempting to send Drage into the county, Tryon went against the popular sentiment of 
the people Rutherford and Locke represented.  Many residents of Rowan County had 
moved to the area from Virginia and Pennsylvania to escape the Anglican or Quaker 
church.  Even Drage could recognize this powerful sentiment; he informed Tryon any 
intrusion on religious prerogatives “dangerous in itself not with respect to this county and 
the neighboring counties, but to the whole Back Frontier of America.”37       
The episode proved that governors and assemblymen alike had to dance carefully 
during this heightened time of anxiety.  In 1771, not all Rowan citizens championed the 
Regulators.  Tryon realized forcing obedience to the Church of England could eliminate 
any remaining support he might enjoy within Rowan County.  The controversy also 
permanently drove the Rutherford family out of the Anglican Church.  Late in life, after 
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 he moved to Tennessee, Griffith and Elizabeth Rutherford became charter members of 
the Shiloh Presbyterian Church.38   
The extent to which Rutherford enriched himself at the expense of his Rowan 
neighbors can never be known.  What is clear is that his agreement to hand back funds 
obtained as sheriff indicates his membership in the courthouse ring fattened his pockets.  
The Regulator movement in Rowan during the years of 1768-1771 provided a remarkable 
education in politics.  The tightrope Rutherford needed to walk proved to be very thin, 
indeed.  His tutor in politics, John Frohock, lost his seat in the assembly during the crisis 
because of his excesses in office.  Furthermore, Frohock became a despised member of 
the western planter elite, an ally of the hated courthouse ring member of Orange County, 
Edmund Fanning.  Frohock’s protégé Rutherford managed to survive because he 
maneuvered carefully enough to stay in office.  Rutherford served as sheriff for one year; 
the difficulty in collecting taxes or flaw in the fee system dissuaded him from staying in 
the position.  By agreeing with other Rowan official to pay back excessive fees, the 
voters of Rowan continued to send him to the Assembly.   
 Rutherford grew sympathetic to the demands of the Regulators in his region of the 
state.  A decade before, the creation of Rowan County out of Anson was seen as a much 
needed development for the future of the backcountry.  By 1770, with the Regulator 
movement becoming more violent, he believed carving out a new county from Rowan 
would assuage the residents of his region.  More representation in the west could provide 
for passage of measures demanded by Regulator leaders.   
Rutherford’s stance on the establishment of Anglican clergy in Rowan proved to 
be a timely position as well.  Against Reverend Drage, Rutherford gained support 
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 because he answered the demands of fellow dissenting Protestants.  In both instances, 
Rutherford played the role of a concerned representative of his county.  If his deeds were 
simply posturing to keep him in office; both of Rutherford’s courses of action were the 
exploits of a man with increasing political acumen.   
 As a westerner, Rutherford tried to keep the interests of his constituents close to 
heart.  If he enriched himself as sheriff, his efforts to pay back excessive fees redeemed 
him in the eyes of the people of Rowan County.  For a time however, his experience in 
the center of the Regulator movement threatened his political future at a critical juncture.  
If the people of Rowan lost enough confidence in Rutherford, he easily would have been 
voted out of office at a decisive moment in the history of the colony.  It seems more 
likely that by 1770 and 1771 heavy-handed actions of Governor Tryon left Rutherford 
concerned about the position of North Carolina in the British system.    
 
By surviving the Regulator crisis, Rutherford witnessed the next watershed event 
in North Carolina’s history.  Even as Tryon violently stopped the western uprising, 
protests against the King and Parliament began within the colony.  North Carolina led a 
concentrated effort at protesting the Stamp Act and Tea Duty.  While his participation 
against these actions of Parliament is unknown, Rutherford continued to serve in the 
assembly during the Imperial Crisis, listening as the relationship between colony and 
crown became more and more strained.    
It is likely that Rutherford, like other Assemblymen from western districts, 
distrusted the motives of the leadership of the colony’s eastern elite.  He needed the 
sponsorship of these men to attain office, yet many of these same individuals opposed 
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 and stymied legislation enacted to alleviate the burden of Regulator grievances.  
Whatever he may have thought of the eastern elite leading a revolution against the 
Crown, service to the rebel government put Griffith Rutherford on the fast track for 
promotion.  In the new system, birth or name meant far less than ability.  An experienced 
field officer like Rutherford, stationed in the vast expanse of the Salisbury district, gave 
the revolutionary government eyes and ears in the backcountry.   
In spite of any misgivings he may have harbored, Rutherford signed his name to 
the Continental Association in April of 1775.  The Association condemned British 
actions in Massachusetts such as closing Boston Harbor and initiated a boycott of English 
goods.  Soon after the spring meeting of the Provincial Congress in New Bern, 
minutemen and British soldiers battled at Lexington and Concord.  During the next 
meeting of the Provincial Congress, representatives in North Carolina contemplated their 
reaction to the bloodshed in Massachusetts.   
In August the Provincial Congress named Rutherford a member of the Rowan 
Committee of Safety.  These committees, organized in each county, helped enforce 
boycotts and acted as committees of correspondence to keep Provincial Congress 
members in communication with one another.  Rutherford’s appointment led to his 
promotion to Colonel of the Rowan Minutemen.  Throughout the fall of 1775 Rutherford 
received numerous assignments within the Rowan Committee of Safety.   Members of 
this group kept a careful eye on the sentiments and allegiances of citizens in the district.  
In the months to come, as a member of the Committee of Secrecy, Intelligence, and 
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 Observation, Rutherford’s duties included spying on and arresting anyone who showed 
wavering allegiance to the Provisional government.39          
For all intents and purposes, the Committees of Safety served as the county 
government for the Provincial Congress before a formal break with Great Britain was 
established.  In Rowan County, the list of responsibilities included watching suspected 
Tories, managing county affairs, and organizing military affairs.  Keeping tabs on 
Loyalists proved one of the more challenging duties after Lexington and Concord in the 
spring of 1775.  Tories organized early in Rowan County that year, and the Safety 
Committee legally could arrest and jail suspects or make them swear allegiance to the 
state.40  
For the Carolinas during the year before independence, the biggest threat to each 
colony did not necessarily have anything to do with British armies invading eastern 
shorelines.  During 1775 and 1776, both South and North Carolina dealt with dangers 
posed by residents within each colony.  No incident reflects this more than the late 1775 
uprising of South Carolina Loyalists.  When the South Carolina government attempted to 
send ammunition and powder as a token of friendship to Cherokees in the state, a band of 
Loyalist militia intercepted the cache.  Loyalist leaders claimed the supplies were to be 
used against them in an Indian raid.  The provincial government of the colony quickly 
organized, sending Andrew Williamson to stop the Tory army.  Instead of recapturing the 
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 stolen goods, Williamson found he faced a force three times his own, and hastily built a 
fort near the trading center of Ninety Six.41
  Considering the situation desperate, the Provincial Congress of South Carolina 
applied to North Carolina for help.  Three western North Carolina counties sent a total of 
750 men to the south, to relieve the siege at Ninety Six.  Griffith Rutherford raised 200 
men from Rowan, including his son James, and marched to Williamson’s aid.  Hearing of 
a large Patriot army on the move, the Loyalist force tried to scatter, but remnants of the 
force fell into the hands of the Patriot militia.  As the Carolina troops marched home in 
 December of 1775, an amazing thirty inches of snow fell in the backcountry, giving the 
winter march the name of “Snow Campaign.”42   
The incident makes clear the fact that as Carolina revolutionaries waited for an 
imminent attack from the British army and navy, the threat from Tories within each state 
posed an even more serious crisis.  For the Rutherford clan, the Snow Campaign made a 
significant impact.  Only a teenager, James Rutherford left school to join his father in the 
march.  James’s youthful quest for glory, which began in the snows of South Carolina, 
would end tragically in the swamps of that state six years later. 
Upon his return from South Carolina, Rutherford participated in the most 
significant of the revolutionary meetings in the colony of North Carolina.  At the Fourth 
Provincial Congress, permanent steps were taken to move North Carolina towards a final 
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 break with Great Britain.  In April of 1776, this body passed the Halifax Resolves, 
directing North Carolina Delegates to the Continental Congress to vote for independence.  
These resolves made North Carolina the first colony to take action making independence 
official.  The Provincial Congress created a Council of Safety as the governing body of 
the state.  To aid the military situation, the Congress divided North Carolina into six 
military districts.43   
Because of his military experience, the Council assigned Rutherford to several 
committees worthy of his knowledge.  These included groups that ascertained the amount 
of ammunition in the colony, and others that organized, regulated, and paid militia.44  
One of his most important obligations during the session included a report on the conduct 
of insurgents.  In one of the lengthiest reports of the Provincial Council journal, 
Rutherford’s committee detailed all of the Loyalists involved in the recent failed attempt 
by Carolina Highland Scots to rise against the new state government.  Most of the men 
were charged with crimes against the state.  The Highlanders must have thought it ironic 
that the men charging them with disloyalty were in the process of committing treason 
against George III.   
In the span of less than six months, Rutherford dealt firsthand with two Loyalist 
threats to the Carolinas.  During the previous December Rutherford and his son braved 
the winter of the Snow Campaign in South Carolina.  In late February, he marched east to 
help put down the Highlander rebellion.  His militia arrived after the battle had been 
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 decided, yet the experiences helped illustrate that dangers to North Carolina did not 
always wear a red coat.45  Unable to punish Tories in the field, Rutherford made it a part 
of his political agenda to punish their continued allegiance to Great Britain.                 
Thanks in large part for his service to the state in the recent Snow Campaign the 
state of North Carolina promoted Rutherford from Colonel to Brigadier General for the 
Salisbury district.  This promotion was no doubt flattering, but encompassed an 
incredible amount of territory: the entire western sector of the state.  Barely had 
Rutherford been given his assignment as Brigadier when rumors of an Indian uprising in 
the west shocked the Provincial Congress into taking action.  Before leaving that 
assembly Rutherford obtained permission to take a substantial amount of gunpowder 
along with him on his return trip to Salisbury.46  
Stirrings among the Cherokee began as Rutherford took a command role in his 
region’s preparations for breaking away from Great Britain.  In both the eastern village of 
Halifax and in Rowan, he witnessed firsthand the dramatic changes sweeping the colony 
during 1775 and 1776.  Unlike Massachusetts, North Carolina did not have a British army 
living within its borders.  Instead of the explosion of violence among minutemen and 
troops, North Carolina parried against organized Tory attacks in the Highland 
strongholds, and in South Carolina.   
By spring of 1776, a new threat from the west emerged as the most serious cause 
of concern for Carolinians living in frontier counties.  The Cherokee nation, stung by a 
series of land invasions, mobilized their younger warriors and prepared to attack white 
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 settlers living over the mountains in North Carolina.  Although smallpox and the 1760 
Grant campaign reduced the nation’s population the Cherokee continued to remain a 
powerful force bordering four states.  By 1775 the Cherokee numbered 12,000, of whom 
3,000 could be considered warriors.47  For Griffith Rutherford, Indian attacks would 
prove to be the most challenging chapter of his career.  Given responsibility for the 
western quadrant of the state, he faced a monumental task: putting the frontier areas on a 
defensive footing while waiting to see if a combined English-Cherokee thrust might be 
launched against the homes he promised to protect. 
Since the conclusion of the French and Indian War, North Carolina governors 
tried to keep their land-hungry settlers east of the mountains in obedience to the 
Proclamation Act of 1763.  Nevertheless, avaricious settlers attempted at every turn to 
press the settlement line into Cherokee land and hunting grounds.  Governor Tryon, at the 
request of the Cherokee, personally led an expedition in 1767 to draw a settlement line 
from South Carolina to Virginia.  This action was intended to keep whites off Indian 
lands, as well as to require settlers to move to the eastern side of the dividing line.48  
An amicable relationship between colonist and Indian did not last.  In spite of the 
fact that western areas of North Carolina remained sparsely populated, a strong desire for 
westward migration filled the minds of thousands of settlers.  The Regulator movement 
and difficulty getting title to lands claimed by men like Henry McCulloh may have had 
something to do with it.  Other men, former militia soldiers from the 1760 Cherokee 
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 campaign, were drawn to the mountainous areas during their service in the French and 
Indian War.49   
In spite of the best efforts of Royal officials, individual settlers and families 
decided to negotiate separately with willing Cherokee chiefs for the lease and purchase of 
land.  As early as 1769 cabins appeared in the valleys of the Watauga, Holston, and 
Nollichucky Rivers which run along the border of North Carolina and Tennessee.  This 
was part of a lease between western settlers, known as Wataugans, and willing Cherokee 
chiefs.  During 1775, without sanction by the Crown, the Cherokee sold large tracts of 
land in what is now Kentucky to the Transylvania Company, headed by North Carolinian 
Richard Henderson.  In addition, the Cherokee sold lands along the Holston and Watauga 
Rivers to families who arrived in the late 1760s.50
Desperate to avoid war in the distant western theater, British Indian agent John 
Stuart tried to keep the peace and stem the show of support excited by young Cherokee 
leaders like Dragging Canoe, who clamored for war.  He demanded the Wataugans leave 
their illegally-gained land.  Watauga leaders, who hoodwinked the Cherokee for ten 
years, responded with a clever ruse.  One crafty settler forged a letter supposedly written 
by a British official to another claiming the English army would march from Florida, 
rally Creek and Cherokee Indians, and attack the settlers.  In actuality, the British agents 
tried desperately to hold back Indian attacks.  Realizing the Cherokee would be doomed 
if they faced an enraged frontier population, John Stuart and his brother Henry did not 
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 want to anger frontier colonists wavering in support of the Revolutionaries or put under 
the knife loyal subjects living in the contested lands.51     
A turning point occurred in early 1776 when a delegation from the Iroquois nation 
visited the Cherokee in Chota.  As Colin Calloway has noted, the arrival of the northern 
Indians sparked a Cherokee revolution, in the middle of the American Revolution.  
Younger braves led by Dragging Canoe committed to war after a promise of support from 
northern tribes.  The older chiefs, who made the land sales that put the nation in its 
current predicament, lost favor and respect among their people.  For over a year after the 
Henderson land deal, Dragging Canoe vowed to fight further white encroachments.  His 
militant stance flew in the face of Cherokee elders, including his own father, 
Attakullaculla.52       
To the settlers in the contested region, any attacks on whites served as part of the 
British plan to ally Indians and Loyalists in an effort to crush the revolutionary cause.  
Though the theory that the British encouraged the Cherokee to strike along the frontier 
has been proven untrue, the perception among settlers of the Watauga and Transylvania 
communities made this fiction a reality.  To the whites living in river valleys close to 
Cherokee villages, British agent Stuart seemed intent to destroy their freedom and their 
lives.53   
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  Though divided in the course of action to take in the spring and summer of 1776, 
the Cherokee attacks began sporadically, then in a more organized fashion.  At the end of 
a long decade of discontent, the Cherokee had reached their limits of patience.  White 
settlement on their land and encroachment in their towns reached a boiling point by 1776.  
Although the leadership of the nation remained at odds, the militant faction won the 
argument.  Leaders like Dragging Canoe were savvy enough to realize the whites 
themselves had become divided thanks to the start of the Revolutionary conflict.54  For 
the Cherokee, the consequences of the ensuing war would be dire.  
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 Chapter Three 
The Cherokee Expedition 
 
 Attacks on settlers began in the spring of 1776; with intermittent raids on isolated 
families scattered around the frontier.  News of the violence terrified residents in western 
counties, as far east as the Moravian communities in Surry County.1  The reports filled 
the Moravians with tension in the spring of 1776.  At that time, news arrived in Salem 
that residents near the Holston River were fleeing the area or gathering together in a 
defensive stance.  This action could not have been an easy task considering the mountains 
received six inches of snow during the early part of April.2  The attacks became more 
widespread and coordinated in July, as forts on the Holston River became targets to the 
Cherokee.  Warriors also moved as far east as Crooked Creek, near present day 
Rutherfordton.3   
 Rumor and conjecture filled the correspondence of the people of North Carolina.  
With the Carolinas already threatened by an invading British force at Charleston, it made 
perfect sense to many that the British would naturally try to create chaos in the colony by 
inciting Cherokee allies.  This was the general opinion in the east, as one man blamed the 
“wicked and diabolical superintendent Cameron who resides in the over Hill Cherokee 
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 Towns.”4  As discussed in the earlier chapter, British officials did not approve of these 
attacks, but younger Cherokee warriors refused to heed their advice.5   
At his home outside of Salisbury, Griffith Rutherford heard of the news sometime 
in late June or early July.  The first letters exchanged with civilian authorities begin in 
earnest during July.  In late June, the Council set a tone for dealings with the Cherokee.  
Their letter to Rutherford repeated their suspicion that agents of Great Britain provoked 
the Cherokee into attacking white settlements.  But at the same time, they urged caution.  
“It is the Intention of this Council that you Cautiously avoid and to the utmost of your 
power endeavor to prevent the Inhabitants of this colony from committing any 
Depredations on the Indians.”6   
 The Committee asked that Rutherford contain not only himself, but the settlers in 
the western areas, no small task considering most settlers would naturally want a 
concerted retaliation from the state.  But Rutherford was reminded not to act unless the 
Indians extended their attack across the boundary line, east of the mountains.  This 
commitment to restraint was also accompanied by the Council’s promise that everything 
was being done to secure lead sent to Salisbury by way of Cross Creek, present day 
Fayetteville.7
 The words of the council did little to alleviate the tension in the Salisbury district.  
Rutherford continued to ask for instructions on how to handle matters, telling the Council 
that their instructions were not explicit enough.  And considering Halifax is over 200 
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 miles from Salisbury, the General had cause for his anxiety about the council being out of 
touch with matters in the west.  He felt limited in acting since he could not pursue war 
parties out of his district.  The General wanted to deploy ranging parties, men who could 
quickly move and counter Cherokee attacks.  In the meantime, Rutherford asked the 
council to consider writing the governments of both South Carolina and Virginia in an 
effort to launch a combined expedition.  This would in Rutherford’s mind ensure “a finel 
Destruction of the Cherroce Nation.”  To finish the letter, he thanked the Council for their 
work in getting him much needed supplies, which were beginning to drift into    
Salisbury. 8   
 Rutherford’s call for coordinated action is just what the leaders of North Carolina 
had in mind.  Already the Council of Safety drafted letters to the leaders of the 
neighboring states with the intent to send a three-pronged assault into the mountains.  
With a British army preparing to storm Charleston, and on the heels of a Tory uprising 
the previous winter, South Carolina needed little urging to make a strong show of force 
against their Cherokee neighbors.  Virginia and North Carolina also seemed little 
interested in fighting a two-front war and exercised a good deal of cooperation over the 
next few months.  This spirit of mutual aid displayed itself among the commanders in the 
three states responsible for leading each campaign into the Cherokee lands. 
 As July went on, the situation on the frontier became more critical.  Rutherford 
received more shocking information about Cherokee raids on western settlements.  As 
Brigadier for Salisbury letters were arriving daily giving updates from settlers about the 
conditions on the frontier.  Colonel William Graham wrote to Rutherford that he acquired 
information about families killed on the eastern side of the mountains.  He asked for help 
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 stating “the county will be ruined if not immediate assistance.9  He told the council on 
July 12 that “I am applid to Daley for Relefe,” and that he needed more instructions on 
how to proceed.  He also requested more gunpowder and salt from merchants at Cross 
Creek.10   
 Conditions had become critical in the west.  Rutherford’s letter also brought the 
Council up to speed about the level of destruction wrought by Cherokee warriors.  The 
Indians had moved as far east as the head of the Catawba River, near Crooked Creek.  
Rutherford knew the size of the Cherokee force was substantial, and that the Indians 
killed a Mr. Middleton.  He reminded the Council that letters for relief were arriving 
daily, and asked for clear instructions.11
 Insuring the safekeeping of the entire western quadrant of the state meant 
Rutherford had to keep his military district safe from foreign and domestic enemies.  The 
serious threat from the organized Cherokee war parties represented one, but not the only 
threat to the safety of the frontier during the summer of 1776.  Thousands of North 
Carolina residents refused to embrace the revolutionary government of that state when it 
officially broke from Great Britain that year.  In the middle of Rutherford’s preparations 
for an expedition into the Cherokee towns, residents of the western counties brought 
news east that Tories remained active and a serious threat to the safety of the region.  One 
writer even mentioned Rutherford by name, pleading to the Council to send Rutherford 
and some militia to put “those Rascals to death on site.”  Tory threats served as an 
unwelcome distraction to General Rutherford.  He directed the Safety Committee of his 
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 home town to arrest a John Auston from Tryon County, south of Rowan, and place him in 
jail.12  
 The Loyalist presence became an unwelcome distraction to the government of 
North Carolina.  Indian raids however, proved to be more immediate.  For planners of the 
expedition into Cherokee country, the facts seemed clear: British agents infiltrating the 
Cherokee towns were guiding Indian actions, creating havoc on the western settlers.  A 
letter to this effect came to the attention of the leaders of North Carolina.  This 
testimonial provided gruesome details about Alexander Cameron’s activities among the 
Cherokee.  He instructed them to take no prisoners, kill all the white men they could, 
“and steel all negroes & drive away all Cattle & horses they Can find.”13   
 With information on supplies and intelligence pouring into Salisbury, Rutherford 
followed up his July 12 letter to the Council of Safety with a blunt assessment of 
conditions in his district.  The Indians, Rutherford explained, were “making Grate 
prograce, in Distroying & Murdering, in the frunteers of this County.”  He claimed thirty-
seven settlers were killed the week before, and that a militia officer along with 120 
women and children were under siege on the Catawba River.  Rutherford fully expected 
them to perish and implored the Council to send him more supplies.  Finally, he asked for 
men from the neighboring Hillsborough district to join the proposed expedition to the 
Cherokee towns.  Before leaving to march a relief column to help the surrounded settlers, 
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 he asked the Council to move west to the town of Hillsborough, in an effort to speed 
communication.14
 Idle for three months since the initial attacks, Rutherford hoped to get official 
sanction from the Council to proceed against the Cherokee.  But with a significant group 
of besieged settlers facing certain doom, he obliged his natural combativeness and swung 
into action.  He hinted at this action in his last letter to the Council and moved on the 14th 
of July.  First marched to Quaker Meadows on the Catawba River, Rutherford’s militia 
pushed west to Davidson’s Fort just east of the mountains.  Leaving much of his force at 
the fort, he traveled through the mountains against an estimated 200 warriors on the 
Nollichucky River.  Moravian records from the summer of 1776 indicate that a battle was 
fought at the head of the Catawba, with casualties inflicted on both sides.  Among the 
Indian dead were two whites, which caused a great stir among the Moravians.15  Their 
presence only added more ammunition to the charge that Tories and British Indian agents 
helped instigate and organize attacks on the settlers. 
 With the immediate threat to besieged settlers momentarily settled, Rutherford 
and the Council went about coordinating the efforts of three states to crush the Cherokee 
problem in the west.  As he scattered Cherokee braves amassed on the Catawba, the 
Council of Safety for North Carolina dispatched letters to South Carolina and Virginia 
informing each governor of conditions on their frontier.  South Carolina recently had 
parried a British attempt to capture Charleston and could now devote more attention to 
their frontier.  On July 7th, General Charles Lee, commanding all troops at Charleston and 
John Rutledge, president of the South Carolina Council of Safety, wrote to both North 
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 Carolina and Virginia authorities stating their belief that the Cherokee had instigated 
nothing short of a war against the southern states.  While hoping to get cooperation from 
her neighbors, the civil authorities in South Carolina ordered Major Andrew Williamson 
to attack the Lower, Middle, and Valley settlements of the Cherokee.  South Carolina 
leaders hoped her neighbors to the north could organize an expedition against the 
Overhill settlements.16   
 In an effort to better share information between the provinces, North Carolina sent 
a packet of letters to both South Carolina and Virginia respecting the Indian situation.  
The packet contained testimonials from Rutherford and another militia colonel 
concerning the conduct of the Indians and the Council of Safety’s efforts to secure 
ammunition and supplies.17  To General Charles Lee, a General in the Continental Line, 
the Council of Safety pledged their cooperation, assuring Lee that in Griffith Rutherford, 
the western counties were in good hands.  The council expressed optimism about the 
upcoming Cherokee expedition, telling Lee, “the Troops Brigadier Rutherford carries 
with him are as chosen Rifle Men as any on this Continent and are hearty and determined 
in the present cause.  We have every expectation from them.”18
 On the same day, the Council sent Rutherford news that they received his letters 
detailing atrocities against settlers in the west.  The Council asked Rutherford to 
coordinate his activities with the field commanders of South Carolina and Virginia.  This 
correspondence formally informed Rutherford that his march into Cherokee lands 
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 constituted one third of a coordinated expedition with North Carolina’s neighbors.19  The 
Council pledged to Rutherford “every assistance” to “put an end to this cruel unjust & 
wicked Indian War.”  Rutherford also learned more powder was coming and the letter 
closed by the civil authorities stating “all other matters we leave entirely to your 
discretion.”20
This would not entirely be the case.  Throughout the beginning, middle, and end 
of the planning stage of his march, the Council of Safety gave specific instructions about 
troop dispositions, the importance of conserving supplies, and their impossible hope that 
a peaceful settlement might be reached.   At first, when news of Indian attacks reached 
Halifax, the new state government acted slowly.  In fact, Rutherford at first was at as loss 
as to how to proceed against the sporadic attacks against settlers in his district of North 
Carolina.  It must have been fairly frustrating for Rutherford, 200 miles closer to the 
frontier than the leaders of the state, to stand idle as Cherokee warriors could inflict terror 
on the frontier.  Even with the swiftest horses in the colony, instructions from Halifax 
were slow in arriving in Salisbury, and as spring became summer, the situation looked 
more desperate.    
Virginia already organized its part of the expedition, an attack on the Overhill 
towns, further west than the Valley and Lower towns that the Carolina armies planned to 
sweep.  With this coordination in mind, the leaders of Virginia asked North Carolina for 
more troops.  Concerned that the eastern towns might retreat and rally near the Overhill 
locations, Virginia requested any available North Carolina militia.  Its appeal was passed 
to Rutherford.  In addition to the men, the Committee of Safety instructed him to provide 
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 both powder and salt to the detachment sent to Virginia.  Both the supplies and men 
constituted precious commodities for a 2,000 man army about to march into hostile 
territory.21  
 General Rutherford accepted the request of the council with something less than 
unbridled enthusiasm.  He wanted to keep men from Surry County, which bordered 
Virginia to the south, in North Carolina unless an expedition left for the distant Cherokee 
towns.  With the combined expedition taking place, it seemed necessary to bring these 
men along.  Now, however he had orders to allow them to reinforce the Virginians.  
Rutherford felt frustrated and expressed his aggravation on August 6th in a letter to the 
Council.  This made Rutherford in effect responsible for a two-front war in the western 
counties. His responsibilities included keeping a careful watch on Loyalist activity.  With 
this in mind, Rutherford could not recruit from the several counties that had the potential 
to provide able-bodied troops.22  
 The depletion of his army was not the only concern Rutherford shared with the 
council.  More and more of his troops became sick with fever as the army waited for 
supplies from the east.  He needed men and suggested 500 be raised from the 
Hillsborough district in the piedmont.  Unfortunately for Rutherford, the Hillsborough 
area had a reputation for balking at civilian authority since the unrest during the 
Regulator movement.  In fact, the problems in the district came to the attention of the 
government of North Carolina, which instituted court martials against the militia 
recruiters responsible for drafting men into service.  Rutherford shared their frustration, 
he closed his letter, lamenting “No wonder that this and many more Distresses and 
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 Disorders should attend us, when Gentlemen to whom we ought otherwise to look up, 
and from whom we ought to have had many and necessary Orders have denyed their 
Presence.”23  
 With the expedition in the last stages of planning, commanders of the three armies 
began to coordinate their movements in an effort to inflict what they hoped would be a 
crushing blow to the Cherokee nation.  On August 5th, Rutherford wrote William 
Christian, commander of the Virginia troops, hoping the three armies could meet.  He 
planned to leave the head of the Catawba River as soon as Christian’s forces were ready.  
Rutherford passed along the news that Colonel Williamson of South Carolina had about 
2,000 men in the field and that Rutherford had attempted to coordinate the attacks with 
armies of both states.  He closed by reminding Christian that the goal of the expeditions 
was to “crush that treacherous, barbarous Nation of Savages, with their white abettors, 
who lost to all sense of Humanity, honor and principle, mean to extinguish every spark of 
freedom in these United States.”24
 In distant Philadelphia, on the heels of declaring the colonies of Great Britain an 
independent nation, North Carolina’s contingent to the Continental Congress gave their 
express approval of the expedition to the Cherokee towns.  To help, the delegates ordered 
gunpowder sent to North Carolina to help the “distressed and defenceless situation” in 
their state.  A follow up letter reminded the Council of Safety that with the eastern shore 
of North Carolina clear from danger, all efforts should be made against the Indians.  
Their attack on the settlements, the delegates reasoned, “shuts them out from every 
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 pretension to mercy.”  The Council of Safety would be failing in their duty to whites on 
the frontiers if they did not “carry fire and Sword into the very bowels of their country 
and sink them so low that they may never be able to rise and disturb the peace of their 
Neighbours.”25
 For almost a month, Griffith Rutherford had wanted to take bold action against 
those who disturbed the peace on the frontier.  His civilian superiors in Halifax urged 
caution, hoping to avoid open warfare.  Now it seemed that North Carolinians in distant 
Philadelphia echoed the General’s sentiments.  In his book on the South Carolina 
Cherokee, historian Thomas Hatley argues the North Carolina delegates actually 
envisioned a conquest of the Cherokee nation.  Their letter to the leaders in North 
Carolina does little to mitigate this view.  The delegates spoke in near-Biblical terms, 
believing the mission into the Cherokee towns allowed the combined armies “to 
extinguish the very race of them and scarce to leave enough of existence to be a vestige 
in proof that a Cherokee nation once was.”26    
 With the endorsement of both the Committee of Safety and the Delegation to the 
Continental Congress, Rutherford had the full support of civil authority to wage a 
campaign against the Cherokee villages in the mountains.  After calling out the necessary 
number of troops from surrounding western counties, the leadership of the state procured 
for Rutherford the supplies and arms needed to take a substantial army into the thick 
woods of western Carolina.  
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  While the expedition had been quickly organized, Rutherford still carefully went 
about putting in order the essential stores needed for this journey.  A resident in North 
Carolina for over two decades, he knew the outlets for acquiring food supplies and 
staples needed to keep his army in the field.  And in Old Fort, he chose a rallying point 
western settlers knew first hand.  On the western extreme of white settlement, Old Fort 
then and now sits just east of the Swannanoa Gap, a cut in the mountains the army would 
have to cross in order to get into the Cherokee villages.   
 Like Rutherford, the commanders of the South Carolina and Virginia troops had 
roots in the frontier and experience as soldiers.  William Christian, born in Staunton, 
Virginia, actually resigned his commission in the Continental Line of his home state to 
lead the militia against the Cherokee. Christian’s early military experience came in 
Dunmore’s war of 1774.  Andrew Williamson also claimed the frontier as home, owning 
a homestead near the outpost of Ninety Six in South Carolina.  Williamson first served as 
an officer in the Cherokee War of 1760 and later fought Loyalists in his home state in 
1775.27  All three men going into the woods had experience leading men in battle, and all 
three had knowledge of fighting an often elusive Native American force.  
 Plans for the expedition hoped to coordinate attacks on the Cherokee towns by 
three armies.  The execution of the assault however failed to execute a planned pincer 
move that would simultaneously sweep through the Indian villages.  Difficulty in 
eighteenth century communications combined with the fact that all three armies were not 
ready at the same time made the synchronization nearly impossible.   
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 Rutherford, anxious to move his army continued to be delayed by a lack of 
supplies.  He also griped about the fact that a portion of his troops were siphoned to the 
Virginia forces on their march to the Overhill towns.  These villages were situated farther 
west than the Middle and Lower towns, the target of the armies from North and South 
Carolina.28   
As Rutherford waited for supplies at his rallying point east of the mountains, the 
South Carolina troops got a head start.  By the middle of August, Williamson’s troops 
stormed into the lower towns, finding nothing more than abandoned villages.  The army 
did not find Indians to fight or Loyalists to capture.  As predicted by the civilian planners 
of the expeditions, Cherokee scouts learned of the South Carolinians’ approach and 
instructed villagers to flee across the mountains into the Overhill settlements.  
Williamson in a best case scenario thought he could capture Alexander Cameron, but 
repeatedly found the Cherokee villages empty.  With Cameron gone, and the Indians 
scattered, the South Carolina troops went about systematically destroying crops, houses, 
and hundreds of abandoned deerskins. From his camp at the village of Keowee, Colonel 
Williamson drafted a letter to Rutherford.29
Williamson expressed his desire to meet Rutherford at the Middle settlement of 
Necasa on September 9th.  During his time in the Lower towns, Williamson’s army made 
sure that “desolation is spread all over the lower towns,” and he hoped the same fate 
awaited the Valley and Middle settlements.  In a postscript, Williamson offered 
Rutherford a careful assessment of the campaign in the Lower towns.  The letter gave a 
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 blueprint for what the North Carolinians might expect when marching into the Middle 
towns.     
According to Williamson Cherokee resistance proved to be scattered and 
inconsistent.  Only a few warriors remained near the towns and these men did not seem 
anxious to offer Williamson’s army battle.  A group of Cherokee tried to stop the South 
Carolinians from making a river crossing, but failed to halt their progress.  On another 
occasion, a scouting party came under fire from warriors on hills surrounding a village.  
After a sharp skirmish, the Carolinians triumphed and scalped the fifteen Cherokee 
bodies found.  Williamson’s casualties were light, one dead and several wounded, and he 
continued to burn dwellings and destroy all stores he found.30
Based on the subsequent actions of his army in the field, Rutherford took this 
advice to heart.  Because he received Williamson’s letter before his own troops set off 
into the woods, Rutherford had ample time to consider the recommendations of his 
counterpart from South Carolina.  Rutherford knew that speed and surprise were critical 
components of an army operating in hostile territory.  From his years as a ranger, he 
absorbed the best woodland tactics of both Anglo and Indian armies.  With Williamson 
and Christian on the move and proposing combined operations, Rutherford must have 
been anxious to leave. 
Commanding Virginia’s troops, William Christian did his best to effect a 
rendezvous with Rutherford in the Overhill towns.  Christian proposed a meeting on the 
distant Holston River, a far trek for the North Carolinians, especially considering 
Rutherford made meeting the South Carolinians his first priority.  Nevertheless, civilian 
authorities knew the Cherokee would retreat to the Overhill towns after the approach of 
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 two armies from the Carolinas.  In his letter to the North Carolina general, Christian gave 
Rutherford news from the distant north, where George Washington prepared to meet an 
army 20,000 strong on the islands around New York.31  
At the end of August, as he waited for the last shipments of supplies, Rutherford 
received his final letter of direction from the Council of Safety.  The Council made 
preparations to move to the General’s hometown of Salisbury in order to keep in closer 
contact with the frontier.  Their latest reports indicated that the Cherokee had fled to the 
Overhill settlements.  With this bit of information, and news that Williamson’s troops 
encountered only abandoned villages in the lower towns, the Council had every reason to 
believe that the Virginians would face the toughest opposition.  Rutherford received 
instructions to garrison men on the frontier as a measure to protect the vulnerable western 
counties.  With every man serving against the Cherokee, the Council reasoned, some had 
to be left behind to conduct a defensive-offensive strategy.32   
Finally, on September 1, Rutherford and his army left the head of the Catawba 
River and marched west toward the Cherokee towns.  The commander expressed his 
anxiety at the late date, giving the Council of Safety a brief description of the men and 
supplies he took on the expedition.  Rutherford, now struck with the fever making its way 
through camp, estimated that he commanded 1,971 men, with a complement of eighty 
light horse.  Following the wishes of the Council, the General left a total of about 400 
men dispersed in three companies “to Range and defend the forts on the frontiers.”  
Though the delay in gathering supplies concerned him, Rutherford had 1,400 pack horses 
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 and over 250 drivers to supervise the movement of supplies.  He conceded that the 
Cherokee might evacuate the Middle and Valley towns, and left open the possibility of 
marching into the Overhill towns.  His field decisions had to do with his supplies.  
Rutherford’s army carried forty days provisions, and could only operate in enemy 
country for as long as these stores lasted.33  A fast sweep through the Middle settlements 
might allow him to march further to the west.   
Eighty miles in the distance, through a cut in the mountains, the Cherokee Middle 
towns were the target of Rutherford’s army.  Able to move in relative secrecy with the 
help of friendly Catawba Indians, the army remained free from attack during the first fifty 
miles of the march.  With Williamson’s troops to the south hoping to rendezvous with 
Rutherford in the Middle towns, the commander of the expedition pushed his men.  After 
crossing the Black Mountains at Swannanoa Gap, Rutherford wisely kept his army on the 
mountain rivers.  After three days and thirty miles, the troops crossed the French Broad 
River just below present day Asheville.34  
William Lenoir, an officer of Surry County, left one of only three accounts of the 
expedition’s progress after it departed Davidson’s fort on September 1.  Like Rutherford, 
Lenoir had little formal education but a driving ambition. Lenoir spoke of the devastation 
along the Catawba as his fellow troops marched to meet Rutherford at the rallying point.  
His detailed diary, which notes the number of miles the army traveled each day, is the 
most detailed account of the North Carolinian’s progress. 
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   Rutherford’s army faced two daunting tasks.  First, they had to cross the difficult 
terrain of the southern Appalachians.  Second, Rutherford knew speed and the element of 
surprise were critical for the march.  The Council warned Rutherford that if the Cherokee 
abandoned the Middle and Valley towns, the Indians might rally in force at the Overhill 
villages.  Civilian and military leaders held on to a sliver of hope that the army from each 
state taking each set of towns by surprise and defeating them.35  
Less than a week into the march, Rutherford’s men made contact with Indian 
skirmishers.  A soldier from Mecklenburg County spotted five Indians and gave chase 
after getting reinforced by fellow troops.  The army began to run into Cherokee scouts 
stationed along the river paths Rutherford’s troops followed.  Unable to detain the Indian 
scouts, the warning of the approaching army spread to the Cherokee in the Middle 
Towns.  As the expedition approached the Tuckasegee River, Reverend James Hall shot 
at a black man, a trader who lived among the Indians known as John Scott.  Hall mistook 
Scott for an Indian, a mistake which indicated the high tension within the troops on the 
march.36     
After his first firefight over the mountains, Rutherford felt it necessary to increase 
the speed of his march.  If Cherokee skirmishers warned the villages of the presence of 
his army, any element of surprise would be ruined.  He detached a group of 1,000 men 
under his Rowan neighbor Francis Locke to race beyond the Tuckasegee and attack the 
Cherokee living on the outskirts of the Middle towns along the Little Tennessee River.  
This advance group participated in the first pitched battle with a contingent of Cherokee.  
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 The Indians wounded one of the soldiers in the foot.  William Lenoir, a part of this 
detachment, could not say if the Indians suffered any casualties.  Most troops seemed to 
quarrel among themselves over who could share in the danger and participate in the 
action.37
The following day, this advanced group reached the Middle town of Watauga and 
found it deserted.  On September 9, Rutherford arrived with the remainder of the army.  
He found that Williamson and the South Carolina troops had not arrived.  Guessing 
Williamson to be on his way, Rutherford detached a force of 600 men to move south and 
look for the South Carolina army.  The remaining troops began slowly to explore the 
towns near Nuquassee, the appointed meeting spot of the Carolina forces.38  Rutherford 
at this point clearly felt comfortable enough about the military situation in the Middle 
towns to disperse his troops into smaller units.  No part of the army strayed further than a 
few miles apart from each other.  This allowed for quick reinforcement should one 
section find itself in a fight.  Without any concentrated force of Indians, Rutherford kept 
Nuquassee as his base camp and broke his army into light, fast moving strike forces. 
One such force encountered strong Cherokee resistance at a place called 
Sugartown, a triangular shaped village on the confluence of two rivers.  Indian warriors 
opened fire when soldiers came into the town and a rescue party of men from a 
neighboring town quickly came to aid the pinned down troops.  The army as a whole then 
moved upstream along the Little Tennessee to the major Middle town village of Cowee.  
As William Bartram described it only a few months prior to the army’s arrival, Cowee 
                                                 
37 Lenoir, 255; Letter from the North Carolina Council of Safety to Governor Patrick Henry, of Virginia, 
October 25, 1776, in NCCR, 10: 860.  This letter contains a report from William Sharpe, a member of the 
Council of Safety who accompanied Rutherford on the expedition.  Hereafter cited as Sharpe’s Report. 
 
38 Lenoir, 255. 
 81
 consisted of about 100 dwellings on both sides of the river.  Bartram noted substantial 
buildings, including a large council house “capable of accommodating several hundred 
people.”  From Cowee, Rutherford sent another advance party north to Allejoy.  This 
detachment of soldiers killed and scalped an Indian squaw, according to Lenoir.  In an 
exchange of musketry, a soldier from Rowan County died on this mission.39   
Harming women and children is just what the Council of Safety warned 
Rutherford against in a letter written after he left for the Cherokee towns.  The Council 
reminded Rutherford that “we have to desire that you will restrain the Soldiery, from 
destroying the women and Children.”  It was hoped Rutherford could join William 
Christian’s force of Virginians if the Middle and Valley towns were abandoned.  Finally, 
the council hoped their general could construct a stockade fort on the frontier, and supply 
it with confiscated corn and single, unattached men who would be willing to serve 
there.40
Two weeks after the expedition left, Rutherford gave up waiting for Colonel 
Williamson.  The fifteenth of September opened with a church service by Reverend 
James Hall conducted on an Indian temple mound in the town of Nuquasee.  Afterwards, 
Rutherford assembled his officers for a council of war.  He decided to lead a contingent 
of his most able bodied troops and continue west towards the Valley towns.  Keeping the 
remainder of his corps in Nuquasee in case Williamson ever made it out of the Lower 
towns, Rutherford took command of a 1,200 man detachment.  The troops left in good 
spirits and with high hopes but became hopelessly lost in the march west.  Lacking an 
experienced guide, the troops swung too far south and strayed off the more direct route to 
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 the Valley towns.  The troops grew surly as individual and small groups of Indians shot at 
the column.  Getting lost also caused a great deal of embarrassment to the officers, and 
could not have instilled a great deal of confidence among the men.41   
The wrong however, turn proved to be a fortunate development for the North 
Carolina troops.  At Waya Gap, the more negotiable cut through the mountains, 500 
Cherokee braves set up an ambush.  This Indian force offered the most organized and 
concentrated resistance any of the three armies would face in the campaign.  Without an 
experienced guide to take the army through the woods, Rutherford’s troops swung almost 
ten miles to the south.  Though lost and facing more difficult terrain, the army avoided 
what could have been a significant setback.42
Williamson’s South Carolinians were less fortunate.  On September 18th, his army 
made it to Nuquassee, nine days after the date agreed upon by the commanders.  Learning 
from the officers in Rutherford’s army that a detachment of North Carolinians had 
already left for the Valley towns, Williamson immediately gathered his army and chased 
the North Carolinians.  Williamson’s army had better luck finding the easier crossing at 
Waya Gap.  Upon their arrival, the Cherokee sprang the trap.  A sharp fight ensued.  As 
the troops maneuvered into line of battle, both sides took casualties.  The din of battle 
was loud enough to send a detachment of North Carolinians from Nuquassee who rushed 
to the sounds of musketry.  The engagement ended by the time this force caught up with 
Williamson’s troops.  Scouts around Nuquassee could find no other Indian force in the 
area.  Losses to the South Carolinians were twelve killed and twenty wounded.  The 
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 Indian losses amounted to at least fourteen dead, based on the number of bodies found on 
the field.43  
By the time of the ambush, Rutherford had already reached the Valley town of 
Quanassee.  Over the next week, the army raided the abandoned Valley towns, 
encountering little Indian resistance.  Nevertheless, Rutherford remained attentive to the 
fact that his army was divided.  His troops remained in isolated Indian country, and only 
through dumb luck had he missed marching into a concentrated attack of Cherokee 
warriors.  Remaining cautious, he sent a force of 200 into Chowa, which he later 
reinforced by cavalry.  All the while, he kept an eye out for Williamson, moving west 
with his force after the skirmish at Waya Gap.44
With few Indians to fight, Rutherford’s army became glorified pillagers.  The 
detachment he led into the Valley towns methodically destroyed corn and, according to 
William Sharpe, “took nine Indians, and make prisoners seven white men from whom he 
got four Negroes.”  In addition to taking winter stores, the army also confiscated 
gunpowder and lead, hoping to eliminate further Cherokee resistance.45
On September 26, the meeting of the Carolina armies finally took place, 
seventeen days after the initial plan drafted by the generals.  Playing the part of upstart 
commander, Rutherford gathered all of his light horse cavalry in tow when Williamson 
entered camp.  The South Carolinians received a thirteen gun salute upon their arrival.  
Within a short time the two commanders adjourned to discuss the next move of the 
combined armies.  It took the men less than a day to decide that neither would continue 
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 north to the Overhill towns.  Combined, the two armies had destroyed thirty-six towns in 
the Cherokee country.  Both officers felt little need to trek across more difficult mountain 
passes only to have a concentrated force of Indians waiting for them.  In other words, 
William Christian’s Virginia troops would have to go it alone.  Out nearly a month, 
logistics also had to be considered.  Taking forty days’ rations in the field, a trip into the 
Overhills meant living off the land.  A general jeopardized the support of his men if they 
marched hungry.46
A trip to the Overhills risked much, for perhaps little gain.  With a substantial 
force from the state of Virginia already in the field, it seemed risky to cross more 
mountainous terrain. Williamson and Rutherford learned the hard way that the further 
they headed into Indian territory, the more the danger.  It is doubtful that either man 
wanted to force a march to the north and fight a combined force of warriors from the 
Lower, Middle, Valley, and Overhill towns.  For all intents and purposes, the men 
accomplished the mission both outlined in the weeks before.  Cherokee warriors had 
scattered, villages lay in ruin, and the winter food stores were either destroyed or taken.  
Little reason remained to stay in the mountains.  Only after the expeditions safely 
returned was it learned that while some Indians disappeared into the mountains or into the 
Overhill towns, most fled to the Coosawatee River, seeking refuge with the upper 
Creeks.47
Following the decision to head back to their respective states, the armies parted.  
Though the troops were disappointed at not finding a substantial Indian force to fight, the 
commanders were glad to avoid a protracted, blood campaign.  Rutherford decided to 
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 follow the route east that would take him through Waya Gap, where Williamson met the 
Cherokee ambush.  The North Carolina troops were envious of the troops who had 
engaged in a sustained firefight and hoped to prove their own mettle.  But the warriors 
disappeared into the woods, leaving the army to quietly pass through Waya Gap.  While 
noting meticulously the towns and terrain he passed, William Lenoir could not help but 
observe “the most beautiful Valy I ‘de seen,” as the army marched east along tributaries 
of the Hiwassee River.  As the troops passed Waya Gap, Lenoir witnessed the carnage 
from eleven days earlier.  Some of the Indian dead were gathered and buried; others 
remained where they had died on the ground.  By September 29th, the two sections of the 
army united at Nuquassee.48
From there, with little threat of attack, the army marched east back to Davidson’s 
Fort, the departure point almost one month before.  Following the orders from the 
Council of Safety, Rutherford had his men carve out a road from the Cherokee towns that 
afterwards became known as Rutherford’s Trace.  The troops moved at an amazing pace; 
Lenoir claimed as much as twenty-five miles during some days.  Companies from Tryon 
and Anson County seemed to consider the return trip a race and strived to out-distance 
the other.  William Lenoir reported in his last diary entry that he made it home on 
October 7th.49   
On his return trip to Salisbury, Rutherford could reflect on the events of the last 
several months and enjoy some satisfaction.  The greatest threat to the safety of his 
region, the Cherokee Indians, would have to endure a difficult winter short of supplies 
and foodstuffs.  During the six weeks in the woods, Rutherford and Williamson destroyed 
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 thirty-six towns, devastating the Indian’s ability not only to make war, but to survive a 
Carolina winter of cold and snow.  Casualties on both sides proved light - twelve Indians 
had been killed, while Rutherford lost only three men.50  The expedition against the 
Cherokee towns proved to be an overwhelming success.  In the months ahead, 
representatives of the states and the Cherokee leaders would meet to end hostilities by 
way of a treaty. 
  In the meantime, Rutherford relished his success.  Responsible for the western 
part of the state, a charge given to him with the promotion to Brigadier, he received the 
gratitude of a relieved state.  For his benefit, the expedition had far-reaching effects.  
Rutherford grew as a military leader by directing his first large scale operation.  He took 
charge of recruitment, logistics, and direct command of men in the field for the first time.  
The outcome of this march into the unknown enhanced his stature among his peers.  
Delegates to the state Constitutional Convention could meet with the knowledge that 
Rutherford left the frontier a safer place.  Western counties continued to endure sporadic 
violence in 1777 after his army returned from the Cherokee villages, though nothing like 
the terror of earlier in the year.  In the fall of 1776, as he prepared to assist constructing 
the state government, Rutherford could justifiably enter Halifax with his head high.  For 
Rutherford, his next set of battles would move to the halls of government.      
Though the Cherokee expedition consumed Rutherford in the summer and fall of 
1776, his role as a soldier-politician required him to switch gears quickly.  When he 
returned to Salisbury in October, his thoughts already drifted to politics.  With the 
situation on the frontier momentarily stabilized, leaders of North Carolina kept one eye 
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 looking towards the west waiting for a permanent resolution to their Indian problem.  In 
the meantime, priorities turned to politics, specifically, constructing a new government 
for the state of North Carolina. 
 As he marched his army east after laying waste to the Middle and Valley towns, 
the final chapter of the Cherokee war opened near the Overhill towns.  William Christian 
took his army out of Virginia and crossed the Holston River in October 1776 just as 
Rutherford and Williamson left.  The sporadic skirmishing he encountered with Cherokee 
braves led Rutherford to believe he might meet significant resistance in the towns.  
Christian, however, enjoyed the advantage of having an experienced guide, the trader 
Isaac Thomas.  Thomas directed the Virginians near the Overhill towns with expertise, 
putting the troops there two days before Christian anticipated.51  Aside from Thomas’s 
information, Christian worked with very little information.  Almost six weeks had passed 
since Christian heard from Rutherford; he probably had no idea the North Carolinians 
were heading home as he inched toward the Overhill towns.  His troops expected to meet 
a concentrated force of warriors, perhaps led by Dragging Canoe himself, but cooler 
heads prevailed upon the warriors to move into the mountains of Georgia and live among 
the Upper Creeks in north central Alabama.52   
In spite of the fact that the Virginians functioned alone, the operations of the 
Carolina armies proved effective in cooling the warlike ardor of the Overhill leaders.  
Christian moved into the outlying Overhill towns and quickly burned five of them.  
Fortunately for the Cherokee, other towns such as Chota avoided similar destruction 
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 when negotiators put a halt to hostilities.  One of the village elders, Raven, sent out a flag 
of truce to Christian’s army, agreeing to meet the Virginia commander.  Christian proved 
reluctant at first; he still believed a significant force of warriors had assembled to ambush 
his army.  He also wanted Raven to deliver Alexander Cameron, “that enemy to white & 
red people.”  But Cameron slipped out of the Overhills and fled to Creek country.  
Without Dragging Canoe or a British Indian agent to encourage resistance, Raven led a 
peace delegation hoping to spare any untouched towns.53
Ready to negotiate, Christian extracted a series of promises from Raven and the 
Cherokee who remained in the towns. These included promises to deliver John Stuart or 
Alexander Cameron.  Leaders of the three states that sent armies into the Cherokee lands 
still operated under the assumption that these men had encouraged the initial attacks on 
white settlers during the previous spring.  Raven’s peace feelers put a halt to further 
destruction. Nevertheless, the Cherokee faced a difficult winter and spring after three 
armies had devastated their winter food stores and scores of dwellings.  Shelters could be 
erected quickly with efforts from the members of the tribe, but food was another matter.  
The combined expeditions against the towns disrupted the cycle of festivities, harvests, 
and hunting.54
According to the agreement between Christian and the chiefs, an exchange of 
prisoners would also take place as a sign of good faith between the two peoples.  
Christian also hoped to insure a truce by agreeing to forbid anyone entering the Overhill 
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 towns without proper authorization.  This preliminary agreement began with the intention 
that a more permanent peace would be established by representatives of both parties 
during the following spring.  By mid-November, with peace on the frontier, the 
Virginians went home.55
 Conditions in the west never escaped Rutherford’s mind.  As he served 
constituents in Rowan, a follow up expedition, under his orders, moved into Cherokee 
towns in November of 1776.  William Moore led 100 Light Horse as far as the Middle 
town of Cowee.  Moore’s men witnessed the reconstruction of homes within the town 
only a few short weeks after Rutherford’s army leveled most of it.  Some villagers 
returned but most retreated into the mountains forewarned about the approaching 
troops.56  
 This follow up foray into the Cherokee towns produced some of the uglier 
incidents in frontier warfare.  While chasing Indians in the woods, Rutherford’s men 
repeatedly scalped captured Cherokee men.  Captain Moore, commanding the cavalry 
detachment reported that Indians stole horses from his men at night.  The severe act of 
scalping may have been in retaliation for these acts, but Moore’s report is riddled with 
incidents of men acting on their own, firing guns which ruined surprise attacks, and 
abundant plundering. 
 When Moore’s men finally brought in prisoners, they demanded the opportunity 
to sell them as slaves.  Moore, probably knowing live prisoners could serve as a 
bargaining chip in the upcoming negotiations reminded his men that the prisoners were to 
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 be guarded and their fate decided by the civilian government of the state.  Moore’s men 
offered their commander a difficult choice, “the Greater part swore Bloodily that if they 
were not sold for Slaves upon the spot, they would Kill & Scalp them immediately.”  
Moore acquiesced, telling Rutherford at the end of his letter that his command left him 
frustrated.  Putting men together from different counties without a clear leader led to the 
incident of selling Indians into slavery.  Moore wanted no further part of a second 
expedition with this type of command structure.57   
 Moore’s regret about the conduct of his men may have reminded Rutherford 
about his own disciplinary problems while on the march.  William Lenoir, the young 
diarist on Rutherford’s expedition, also took note of the arbitrary way the men took life.  
On the same day a Rowan county man died in a firefight with Indians, men scalped a 
Cherokee woman.  In another incident, a Mr. Roberson killed an Indian prisoner in 
retaliation for a family member murdered in a tribal raid.  Rutherford tried to place 
Roberson in custody for the act, but his men became incensed at the action, and the 
commander released the man.58  Moore and Rutherford, commanding troops in an 
organized expedition tried to draw boundaries for the behavior of the soldiers.  
Unfortunately, their decisions could be easily overruled by a frontier sense of justice. 
In the spring of 1777 when it appeared to the civilian leaders of North Carolina 
that full scale war with the Cherokee might start again, payment for scalps become legal.  
This rather macabre initiative, sanctioned by the state, hoped to enlist willing recruits to 
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 fill militia rolls.59  The situation on the frontier remained tense, even after Rutherford and 
the combined expeditions returned.  As early as February 1777, he received information 
about more attacks on settlers living in the Holston River.  Rutherford told Governor 
Caswell that his source in the Indian towns, a white trader, brought him information that 
the Cherokee, Creek, and Chickasaw, instigated by British agent Alexander Cameron, 
“are determined for war.”  As commander of the district, letters poured in to Rutherford 
asking for help, yet he hesitated to act, not knowing the extent of his authority in this 
situation.  He also briefed Caswell about the Loyalist situation.  Tories in western Surry 
County were organizing, and Rutherford needed instructions on how to proceed.60   
Caswell, to his credit, acted quickly after Rutherford’s letter reached him.  He 
presented to the Council of State a letter describing conditions in the Washington district.  
The Council directed Governor Caswell to send militia from Salisbury to the region and 
station three companies in the frontier counties.  Rutherford obtained the legal sanction to 
organize militia in the newly established Washington District, the furthest extent of 
western settlement.  Along with this authority, the Council sent a substantial amount of 
gunpowder from the Halifax armory.61
 A continuous state of tension on the frontier illustrated the necessity of 
establishing a permanent peace settlement with the Cherokee.  As reports of murder on 
the frontier and organized Tory resistance reached Caswell, the Governor realized that 
fighting two enemies, perhaps three if British warships appeared on the coast, demanded 
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 that one potential danger zone be eliminated.  South Carolina and Virginia by the spring 
of 1777 started efforts to make a permanent peace with the Cherokee.  During the spring 
of the year skirmishes between white militia and Indians continued as Virginia and South 
Carolina dispatched commissioners to establish a permanent treaty with the Cherokee 
elders.62  The end result, a treaty at Long Island of Holston, ended hostilities between the 
two nations and ceded Cherokee land east of the Blue Ridge Mountains to the state of 
North Carolina. One stipulation of the treaty also limited white access to Overhill 
towns.63  
 After the treaty was signed in the summer of 1777, commissioners from North 
Carolina urged Rutherford to meet with Indian representatives and appoint a commissary 
to the Cherokee who would provide supplies to the nation for the upcoming winter.  In 
spite of this stipulation within the treaty, representatives from the state government 
complained about Rutherford’s reluctance to hold talks with Cherokee representatives.  
The conference, according to commissioner Waightstill Avery, would show the Indians 
that Rutherford served as “Head War Captain over all the Warriors in the West End of 
North Carolina.”  In other words, it became important to Avery that Rutherford show 
himself to the Cherokee and make it clear that “all other Captains and Warriors in these 
parts must obey him.”  Rutherford seemed unmoved by this situation and hesitated in 
only in meeting with the Cherokee Leaders, but also in appointing a commissary to the 
Cherokee nation.64
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 Unfortunately for all parties involved, commissioners from the three states made 
settlements with a divided nation.  Even as the tribal elders signed treaties, they could 
make no promises to bring Dragging Canoe and his 400 braves to the meetings.  In spite 
of the fact that North Carolina, Virginia, and South Carolina had made peace with three 
sets of Indian towns, the younger, militant warriors continued the battle, forcing North 
Carolina and Virginia to take another militia force into the Georgia frontier in 1778.65
The increasing number of settlers in western areas presented two concerns for the 
state of North Carolina.  First, as the summer and fall of 1776 indicated, the 
encroachment of white settlers on Indian land forced the state to deal harshly with its 
Cherokee neighbors.  Secondly, the territory would have to be organized.  In the midst of 
putting together the expedition against the Cherokee, which consumed the Council of 
Safety, settlers on the Watauga and Holston rivers on the western side of the mountains 
sought the protection of the government of North Carolina.  To secure it they applied to 
the state as the Washington District.  With their attention squarely on making 
preparations for Rutherford’s expedition into the Cherokee lands, the Council of Safety 
nevertheless approved the petition of the Washington District in August of 1776.  The 
area became integrated into the state by a vote in the Fifth Provincial Congress in 
November of that year.66     
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 Chapter Four 
Creating the State of North Carolina 
   
  The Cherokee War consumed Rutherford during the summer and fall of 1776.  
And the planning of the expedition occurred during the same time North Carolina 
contemplated breaking her ties to Great Britain.  Throughout 1775 and 1776, Griffith 
Rutherford found himself in the middle of the North Carolina revolutionary movement.  
He actively served in the Committee of Safety in Rowan, where his knowledge of 
military matters helped him gain rapid advancement.  Rushing to the aid of South 
Carolina, Griffith and James Rutherford deflected the first challenge to the new 
revolutionary government: the Loyalist presence within the borders of the state.  Then, 
when Cherokee attacks began in the western military district Rutherford served, he 
organized and led the expedition to remove the powerful Indian threat from North 
Carolina. 
During the opening months of the rebellion, as he marched to points south and 
west, Rutherford continued to serve as one of the representatives from Rowan County.  
When royal authority crumbled, and the governor took refuge on a British warship, his 
service and allegiance shifted from colony to state.  For a time, the Committees of Safety 
governed North Carolina through the challenges of a Tory uprising in the east and 
Cherokee attacks in the west.  Leaders in the state however, realized independence would 
require a new, more permanent government.  Barely had Rutherford returned from the 
Cherokee expedition when his duties in the legislature called him eastward. 
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 The Provincial Congress met in the spring of 1776 but was unable to draft a 
constitution.  During that debate, delegates could not agree on the qualifications for 
voters in the state.  Several members of the group favored property ownership for voting, 
while others desired no prerequisites.  Unable to come to an agreement, the Provincial 
Congress postponed the matter until the November meeting.  In August the governing 
body of the state called for another election.  This vote would be critical for the state of 
North Carolina.  Legislators made a point of reminding constituents that the delegates 
chosen would craft a new state government.1  The fact that Rowan sent Rutherford to this 
meeting shows their continued trust in a man who represented the county since 1766.  In 
the interim between meetings of the Provincial Congress, Rutherford concerned himself 
with the organization of the march into Cherokee lands.  Until the new Provincial 
Congress met in the fall, Rutherford as Brigadier for the Salisbury district answered to 
the Council of Safety, an interim body organized to exercise the powers of government 
until the fall congress convened.2  
The 1776 election to the Fourth Provincial Congress in North Carolina continues 
to remains a subject of contention among historians.  Elisha P. Douglass believed it to be 
one of the most tumultuous in the colonies.  According to his chronicle of the period 
Douglass claims riots erupted in piedmont elections to the convention.  In other parts of 
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 the state, concerted efforts were made to unseat long established aristocratic 
representatives in favor or more democratically-minded delegates.3
Subsequent evaluations have discounted the more violent aspects of the contest, 
agreeing that the election sent radical and conservative representatives to Halifax.  Yet a 
decidedly moderate spirit marked the proceedings, evidenced by the fact that the meeting 
represented many interests, from military men to ministers.  Upon his arrival at Halifax, 
Rutherford was assigned to the committee that would draft the constitution and bill of 
rights.  Making this work more enjoyable was the fact that Rutherford knew most of the 
men on the committee.  Richard Caswell would become a trusted comrade in arms during 
the ensuing years, and later governor of the state.  Hezekiah Walker, part of the chosen 
drafting group, served as Rutherford’s Commissary during the Cherokee campaign.4
The two competing groups who met in Halifax to draft a constitution each 
entertained different ideas about what type of government should take shape in North 
Carolina.  One group, eastern conservatives, favored a separation from Great Britain but 
with a limited change to the government.  These men believed the meaning of the 
Revolution was to be rid of the royal governor and crown, but in the process they did not 
expect to lose power themselves.  Conservatives supported few changes from the colonial 
system, or significant revamping of qualifications needed to participate in government.  
Rutherford sided with a group of more radical members, western men of middling 
wealth who preferred a wider franchise, elimination of privileges, and a stronger 
legislative branch.  Radical Whigs required that religious freedom also exist, without an 
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 established state church.5  Rutherford’s stand on this proposal is not surprising 
considering his efforts in 1770 to prevent an Anglican minister from serving in Rowan. 
With the committee divided ideologically the selection of Richard Caswell, a well-liked 
moderate, to manage the proceedings helped put aside partisan feelings separating the 
two factions.   
Also influencing the drafting committee was the timing of North Carolina’s effort 
to write a constitution.  In the months between meetings of the Provincial Congress, 
several other states drafted their own constitutions, often choosing a bicameral legislature 
for the assembly.  From western counties, instructions to the delegates in Halifax arrived 
during the months preceding the November gathering.  Mecklenburg County hoped the 
convention would choose a simple democracy, and oppose government of the aristocracy 
or rich.  Residents of Mecklenburg hoped the constitutional convention would allow all 
people to vote for both houses of the legislature.  From Orange County, the onetime 
hotbed of the Regulator movement came a reminder that principle and superior power 
came from the people, and a derived power from the servants in the legislature.6            
Developments in other states and instructions from western counties could not 
have gone unnoticed by the committee charged with drafting the constitution.  Though 
Rutherford has been included in a group of radicals, the final evidence for the true 
measure of how sweeping the changes were in 1776 is the text itself.  The Halifax 
assembly in the end produced a compromise document.  Rutherford and his committee 
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 spent less than a month on the manuscript, starting on November 13 and presenting it on 
December 6.  For all the radicals demanded at the start of the session, the finished 
product could not be considered a drastic change from the colonial system.  Yet, in many 
respects the finished product reflects the influence of the Regulation in several aspects.  
Each county in the new government enjoyed equal representation, regardless of 
population.  This stipulation answered one demand from western counties during the 
Regulator movement.  Rutherford attempted to correct this imbalance in the 1760s by 
creating more counties.  Equal representation also gave western counties parity with older 
counties in the east.  North Carolina, with a population that had grown six fold between 
1750 and 1775 finally addressed a long standing controversy between the settled 
Albemarle region and the growing backcountry.7    
If the radicals like Rutherford favored a more simple democracy with one 
legislative body, more conservative members steered the committee to a compromise of a 
lower and upper assembly.  Radicals who supported a wider franchise would also have 
been disappointed that land ownership still preceded voting rights.  Since concessions to 
both sides seemed to predominate the session, more reform minded members in the 
drafting committee could point to several innovations.  North Carolina Senators would 
stand for election every year, and anyone owning 300 acres could qualify to run.  
According to Jackson Turner Main, the new requirement greatly opened access to this 
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 chamber as compared to the system under the crown.  Membership was higher than in 
colonial days, and tenure in the Senate short.8   
Perhaps with other war matters on the mind of the Congress, Caswell’s skilled 
leadership helped produce a frame of government that contained something for everyone.  
Another theory is that the radical members may have been influenced by the more 
moderate constitutions coming out of other states in the spring and summer of 1776.  So 
happy were the delegates with the committee’s product that only a small amendment was 
changed in the final document.  Desiring to avoid a prolonged public debate, the Halifax 
convention did not send the finished text to the people for a vote.  A direct election on a 
new state constitution would truly have been a radical innovation in eighteenth century 
politics.9    
The speed with which the Provincial Congress drafted the new constitution 
illustrates that the new state had to deal with wartime measures in addition to forming a 
government.  By early 1777, even though Rutherford and the combined expeditions 
destroyed the Cherokee’s ability to make war, activities of Native Americans in the west 
had to be monitored closely.  Vulnerable western borders forced Rutherford, as the 
Brigadier for the region, to keep militia posted in force along the foothills.   
No one had to remind Griffith Rutherford that a second potential enemy existed 
with in the state of North Carolina.  The Loyalist presence preoccupied leaders of the 
revolutionary movement from the time news reached the south of the first battles in 
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 Massachusetts.  Committees of Safety in each county included in their responsibilities 
observations of Loyalist activity.  Within a year of Lexington and Concord, Rutherford 
marched to upstate South Carolina and eastern North Carolina in an effort to put down 
Tory revolts as they threatened the new independent state.   
 After the successful conclusion of the Cherokee campaign in 1777, Rutherford 
took advantage of his notoriety and won election to the North Carolina Senate.  His 
efforts and those of the more democratically-minded drafting committee allowed for the 
popular election of state senators in the new constitution, provided a voter owned fifty 
acres of land.10  Rutherford, with abundant land holdings easily satisfied the 
constitutional requirement for Senate candidates.  Senator Rutherford wasted little time 
weighing in on the issues confronting North Carolina.     
As a man of action, Rutherford’s experience in drafting the state constitution may 
not have been the most satisfying experience during his political career.  He had 
negotiated popular politics enough to survive scandal during the Regulator movement.  
But as a surveyor and soldier, he may have felt a bit out of his league in this gathering of 
more educated men.  Rutherford’s political beliefs relied more on instinct, not on a deep 
reserve of legal history or philosophy.  The men meeting to write the constitution 
represented professions such as merchants, soldiers, and lawyers.  Though he could not 
be counted among the top legal minds of the state, Rutherford nevertheless used his 
experiences in local politics to help shape his views on representative government.  No 
records of the committee debates at the convention exist to document each 
representative’s contribution.  In spite of his shortcomings on legal theory, Rutherford 
would have had few qualms about giving suggestions to the drafting of the constitution.  
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 Certainly no one among the east coast elite expressed hesitation in giving 
Rutherford important committee assignments during the drafting of the document.  Most 
criticism of him in the months to come centered on his more radical plan for government, 
which heavily favored the legislative branch.  Others criticized his aggressive Loyalist 
legislation, which advocated confiscation before most of his fellow legislators considered 
the idea.  Rutherford could only base his decisions on his own experience, including the 
Regulator movement.  As always, military matters preoccupied the government of North 
Carolina, from provisioning their troops serving in other theatres to rallying forces within 
the state.      
Safe from British invasion for the time being, the state turned to matters close to 
home during 1776 and 1777.  The activities of Loyalists occupied the revolutionary 
government before Redcoats arrived on Carolina shores.  The Tory threat concerned the 
Provincial Congress even before Rutherford marched west into the Cherokee towns.  As a 
member of the Rowan Committee of Safety, Rutherford’s charge included the entire 
western quadrant of the state.  Before North Carolina became an independent state, the 
loyalties of her citizens weighed on the minds of her leaders.   
The Continental Congress gave the states full authority to deal with Tories in their 
territory.  Each state considered using oaths of allegiance or seizure of property.  With as 
many as one third of the population remaining faithful to the King and Parliament, many 
states attended to this matter immediately following independence.  For North Carolina, 
two concentrations of Loyalist support concerned state leaders.  A large pocket of 
Scottish Highlanders lived in the Cape Fear region in the eastern part of the state.  The 
allegiance of a second group, former Regulators in the piedmont counties, was unknown 
 102
 in 1776.  Most of this group probably wanted no part of the revolution and stayed neutral.  
Josiah Martin, the last royal governor of North Carolina, did his best to buy the loyalty of 
the Scots in the form of generous land grants. 11
As the tension within the colony mounted and a shadow rebel government came 
together, Governor Martin went about organizing allies of the crown.  He also sent rosy 
predictions to London, promising the ministry that the rebellion in his colony was the 
work of only a few and most of the residents of North Carolina remained loyal.  
Governors of South Carolina and Virginia shared Martin’s forecast, dictating that during 
the first year of the war a concentrated effort should be made against the south.  
Nevertheless, when the Highlanders rallied in early 1776, the rebel government acted 
quickly, crushing the Tories at Moore’s Creek Bridge in February 1776.  English 
planners shelved but did not forget the idea of employing the King’s friends to aid a 
British invasion of the Carolinas.12
Backcountry residents were of a particular concern to legislators like Griffith 
Rutherford.  Former Regulators, new arrivals to the colony, and Protestant Germans such 
as the Moravians could easily become suspicious of a revolution engineered in the most 
part by mostly eastern elite.  Governor Martin realized this and planned to utilize 
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 suspicions in the backcountry counties, the most populous in the state, to crush the 
revolution in his colony.13
Griffith Rutherford became aware of the Tory danger before he led his expedition 
against the Cherokee.  Sent to South Carolina in late 1775, he and his son helped defeat 
an upstate threat to the new revolutionary government.  Though his militia arrived after 
the battle at Moore’s Creek Bridge, the experience displayed the volatile situation in the 
colony.  His military service completed for the time being, Rutherford used his political 
capital to punish those who threatened the independent state of North Carolina.  As part 
of the Committee of Safety in Rowan, Rutherford spied on and watched potential Tories 
in his county and military district.  After the Highlander’s defeat, he sat on the committee 
which named each participant in the recent uprising. 
In April 1777, Griffith Rutherford sat in the first meeting of the North Carolina 
Senate.  During the previous fall, Rutherford participated in the convention that helped 
draft the plan of government.  Immediately, he won appointment to committees, some in 
his field of expertise, others ceremonial.  The Senate spent a good deal of time creating a 
body of rules for transacting business between the lower assembly and Senate.  Protocol 
had to be established before the business of the state began.  And though this seemed 
mundane business, Rutherford accepted this task and fulfilled his duties.14  
More serious matters continued to gain the attention of the Senate in 1777, 
including the safety of the western border and military organization of North Carolina.  
Rutherford joined three fellow senators in forming a committee to consider stationing 
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 troops along the frontier.  After a grueling campaign in the Cherokee towns, it seems 
likely Rutherford supported this suggestion; keeping his military district quiet from 
Indians and Loyalists consumed him for the remainder of the war.  Assignments to 
military affairs occupied Rutherford in the Senate, including matters such as evaluating 
officer conduct and chairing a committee looking into his brother-in-law’s behavior as a 
militia officer.15   
In the 1778 Senate session, Rutherford weighed in on all of the issues affecting 
the state of North Carolina as it waged war.  The Cherokee Indians along the western 
boundary of Rutherford’s military district were a constant concern.  A year before, he 
advocated stationing troops in the area to protect settlers near the mountains.  A year after 
the peace treaty with the Cherokee, native leaders complained to state officials that 
Carolinians continued to trespass on Indian hunting grounds. Rutherford, mindful as 
always of western residents, understood the situation “may involve this state in a second 
war with the said nation.”  He requested the state to prosecute any offenders and 
requested that only licensed traders do business with the Cherokee.16             
When he took his seat in the Senate, the legislature of North Carolina prepared to 
address the Loyalist threat.  To Rutherford this became part of a very logical two-step 
method in dealing with Tories - defeat them on the battlefield and demoralize them 
politically.  As a militia officer, Rutherford utilized his reputation to rally able-bodied 
men to take the field against Tory insurgents.  In the chambers of government, he sought 
to punish anyone who impeded the progress of the Revolution. 
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 That sentiment, at least in the immediate months after the Highlander uprising, 
was not shared by his fellow legislators.  In the wake of the Tory defeat at Moore’s Creek 
Bridge, the Provisional Congress arrested Tory leaders but overall favored a policy of 
conciliation.  To Whig leaders, the Loyalists were simply misguided; a lenient policy 
would surely bring them to the Patriot cause.  With that in mind, the state government 
removed those from the state responsible for the 1776 uprising and left the sale of 
property and estates to their own discretion.  During the next Congress in the fall of 1776, 
with the separation from Great Britain made official, the Provisional government offered 
pardons to all who took an oath of allegiance to the state.  Few Tories accepted this offer, 
forcing the new state government to take up this matter after it drafted a constitution.17   
By the time the matter was brought up again, Griffith Rutherford had taken his 
seat representing Rowan County.  North Carolina lawmakers made Loyalist legislation a 
top priority beginning in 1777.  A year after an organized Loyalist uprising, many 
members of the Senate prepared to enact stronger anti-Tory measures.  Lenient laws from 
the year before did not end the invisible threat to the state and most Loyalists simply tried 
to live quietly, without the notice of the state or neighbors. 
When the legislature did act, it again passed a law defining treason, which seemed 
too moderate for many senators.  For more spiteful Whigs like Rutherford, the bills 
coming before the Senate gave local authorities too much discretion in deciding who 
could escape the law.   Furthermore, the 1777 bill did not specifically name any Tories 
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 who should be targets for confiscation.  For the second year in a row, despite 
Rutherford’s vote against the measure, moderates carried the day.18       
Called away to South Carolina and Georgia in the fall of 1778, Rutherford missed 
part of the 1778 session but returned the next year more determined than ever to push his 
proposals through.  He wanted to repeal the earlier, and in his mind, lenient Confiscation 
Act of 1777, which allowed numerous exceptions for taking a person’s property.  After 
the disastrous 1778 campaign in Georgia, Rutherford appeared to be in no mood for 
compromise.  He proposed a repeal of the 1777 act; in his new version certain Tories 
could be identified by name and the profits from sales of assets deposited in the treasury 
of the state.  In spite of Rutherford’s best efforts, Senators failed to act on this new piece 
of legislation during the spring session.  Fortunately for Rutherford and his allies a 
different mood predominated in the fall session.  With finances bleak, and the constant 
threat of the British Navy appearing on the coast, Rutherford’s patience was rewarded 
and the new 1779 act identified by name Loyalists who were subject to confiscation.  
How satisfying it must have been for former Regulators to learn that William Tryon and 
Edward Fanning were recognized in the 1779 Confiscation Act.19
The 1779 session of the Senate proved to be a triumph for Rutherford.  His more 
radical Confiscation Act passed in both houses.  During that session he wielded 
considerable power, submitting his ally Abner Nash to the position of Speaker of the 
Senate.  He endured one setback in relation to confiscation.  Moderate Senators defeated 
a provision for confiscation that allowed for the seizure of household goods belonging to 
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 the relatives of Loyalists.  Rutherford led a contingent of only three colleagues who 
supported this measure.20    
Indians and Loyalists were not the only groups with whom Rutherford and the 
Senate reckoned during the first year of the Revolution.  Within the borders of the state, a 
group of Moravians lived in the piedmont communities of Salem and Wachovia.  Going 
back to colonial times, the Moravians made special agreements with the King and North 
Carolina governors exempting them from military service.  During the French and Indian 
War, the Brethren raised individual militia units for the defense of their towns in what 
they considered a desperate situation.  This temporary arrangement helped preserve their 
lives and belief system.21    
When North Carolina declared independence in 1776, Moravians simply changed 
their allegiance from King to state. Although the Moravians were well known to have 
conscientious scruples against bearing arms, the group remained subject to the militia act 
which enlisted able-bodied men from age 16 to 60.  In 1776 as Rutherford organized the 
expedition to the Cherokee towns officers under his command attempted to recruit in 
both Moravian and Quaker communities.  At the time Rutherford, commanding the 
Salisbury district, demanded that if the Moravians did not serve, they offer a substitute or 
pay a steep fine.  The Brethren did not answer the militia call in 1777, and several who 
lived in Rowan County outside the Moravian villages paid a fine for refusal to serve.22   
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 By 1778, the military situation in North Carolina changed enough for lawmakers 
to revise the Militia Act for that year.  The law required each county to provide a given 
number of troops based on the quota determined by the legislature.  This legislation 
applied to the Moravians and forced them to pay a tax in lieu of service in the army.  
Leaders of the Brethren continued to argue that their beliefs should exempt them from the 
tax as well as compulsory military service. Others offered no opposition a tax to aid the 
efforts of the state government.23  
To Rutherford, the Moravian situation triggered his instinct against special 
privilege and against those who burned with less than his own revolutionary zeal.  More 
than anything else, as a military man, religious niceties seemed secondary considering the 
long odds facing the revolutionary governments.   In 1778 militia regiments continued to 
be undermanned and the principal concern for Rutherford became filling the ranks with 
men needed to defend the state.  He also appeared to be keeping true to his radical 
political roots.  During the course of his political career up to this point, Rutherford 
frowned upon special privileges given to any group.  He impeded the appointment of an 
Anglican minister in 1770, and worked against extending preferential treatment to his 
Moravian neighbors.   
Rutherford was not alone in this sentiment.  Several fellow senators looked at the 
Moravian refusal to take the oath of allegiance as a way to simply stay under the 
protection of the British crown if the war went badly for the Patriots.  For assemblymen 
who represented counties surrounding the Moravian communities, economic jealousies 
fed an underlying suspicion of allegiance.  By claiming that an oath to the state of North 
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 Carolina threatened European Moravian congregations, the Brethren, according to 
resentful legislators, could easily keep their thriving communities intact when the fighting 
came to the North Carolina backcountry.24   
In 1777 two Brethren took their petition for military exception to the legislature.  
By this time the Moravian leadership decided to pay the tax, which provided a service to 
the cause without risking the lives of their men.  Rutherford would rather have a man in 
formation with a musket than the money, but acceded to this agreement.  He remained 
stubborn on the Moravians unwillingness to take an oath in support of the state.  
Appointed to chair the committee that considered the Brethren’s request, he used the 
opportunity to speak out against the measure which might exempt the Moravians from 
taking the oath.  In the end, the government of North Carolina allowed the Moravians to 
pay a tax instead of mandatory military service, but insisted on the Affirmation of 
Allegiance.25             
In the short time since he took the revolutionary cause as his own, Rutherford 
clearly became defined as a radical in politics.  The label seems crude; many of the 
positions he took hardly appear radical by the standards of the day.  In his time however, 
shifting power from the executive to legislative branches and opening up political 
participation sat outside mainstream thought.  His aggressive punishment of Loyalists 
identified Rutherford as a man with a mission.  Anyone who impeded the progress of the 
Revolution in North Carolina effectively became an enemy of the state.  This sort of all 
or nothing approach did not even allow the Moravians, who remained loyal to the state 
but outside of the fighting, to escape his wrath.  Rutherford, a man of ambition and 
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 adventure, coveted and received positions of great responsibility, and by 1778, his main 
attention shifted to the battlefield.  That year, British ships again appeared in the south, 
ready to commence another invasion of Georgia and the Carolinas.  In the months to 
come, Rutherford called on all of his patience and skills as an officer to rid North 
Carolina of internal enemies and repel an invasion by a trained and determined army of 
professional troops.   
With a British army on the march, more was at stake in 1778 than simply the 
revolutionary cause.  The very lives and fortunes of the North Carolina patriots came 
under direct attack by British arms and her Tory allies.  From the time he arrived in 
western North Carolina, Rutherford surveyed and purchased land, selling parcels to 
fellow Rowan residents.  By 1778, his taxable land holdings equaled  6400, a sizeable 
amount of property compared to his neighbors.  With a large family, and a son in the 
service, the risks in taking up the revolutionary cause were considerable.  The coming 
years would be the most difficult endured by the Rutherford clan. 
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 Chapter Five 
The Revolution Comes to North Carolina 
 
After the French entered the war as an ally of the United States in 1778, the 
British revised their war strategy and renewed attempts to capture ports in the south.  
English planners dusted off the old tactic from 1776 that would use a combined force of 
regular troops and loyalists to re-conquer the southern colonies.1  Their first target would 
be Savannah in the sparsely settled colony of Georgia.  For North Carolina, the invasion 
of any part of the south entailed widespread mobilization in the state.  During the 
Revolutionary War most governors believed in a “domino effect:” if one province fell to 
British arms, the others would not be far behind.  As the season of war opened, 
Rutherford could report to his Governor, Richard Caswell, that if needed he could raise 
10,000 effective militia for the defense of the state or deploy them to any region 
threatened by the British.2  It turned out to be an overly optimistic prediction; Rutherford 
never commanded more than 2,000 troops during the remainder of the war.   
As Rutherford would discover during the next two years, threats close to home 
had the potential to frustrate any campaigns the civilian leadership sought to organize 
outside of North Carolina.  During the summer of 1778 he diligently monitored the 
activities of Loyalists in the Salisbury district.  This area encompassed the entire western 
quadrant of North Carolina, a task that relied upon intelligence from informants and a 
quick response to any danger.  This commitment to safety sometimes required extreme, 
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 extralegal measures.  After he arrested Tory ringleaders in Tryon County, Rutherford 
suggested the men be put to death in order to “terrify their followers” in Rowan, Surry, 
and Guilford Counties.  During the late summer, Colonel Francis Locke, acting on 
instructions from Rutherford held elections for militia officers in private, undisclosed 
places, instead of the better known common areas.  The men wanted to take no chances in 
electing company officers who held the wrong sympathies.  When the House of 
Representatives investigated this conduct, the legislature exonerated both men.3    
As one of the most experienced officers in the state, Rutherford would be needed 
in the defense of Georgia, the first target of the English offensive.  It became 
Rutherford’s habit to rush to trouble spots ever since the “Snow Campaign” in South 
Carolina during 1775.  Despite the fact that Patriot armies defeated both a Loyalist 
uprising and an attack at Charleston in 1776, British planners continued to believe the 
soft spot in the rebellion existed in the south.  A second invasion began in late 1778.  
With North Carolina for the time being not in the direct path of the British army, 
Governor Caswell made preparations for sending his militia south. 
Rutherford’s campaigns in Georgia and South Carolina truly tested the mettle of 
the man and his troops.  Unlike the Cherokee expedition, which left with specific goals 
and a concentrated timeline, extended campaigns with militia out of state proved difficult 
both physically and mentally. North Carolinians marching to save their homes was one 
thing, asking part-time soldiers to rescue South Carolina or Georgia was another. During 
the next two campaigns Rutherford learned all too well the challenges facing generals 
since the beginning of time.  Feeding, clothing, and paying men who filled his ranks 
constituted a few of a series of difficult challenges he faced.  Keeping troops in the ranks 
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 at all vexed Brigadier Rutherford throughout the years 1778 and 1779.  Though by now 
keenly aware of the limitations of non-professionals in arms, the campaigns in Georgia 
and South Carolina demonstrated even more clearly the inherent faults of citizen soldiers. 
In spite of the shortcomings, the roles defined for the militia became clearer 
during the fourth and fifth year of the war.  Already by 1778, Carolina militia served as 
the main protection for the frontier in North Carolina.  In Rowan, militia units had 
suppressed Tories since 1775 and marched on expeditions into Cherokee country.  For 
short periods of time these temporary soldiers could be counted on to organize and fight 
other non-professional soldiers such as Tory units or Indians.  In this limited and 
essentially local role, the institution performed extremely well.4  When operating on 
sustained campaigns far away from home, the reliability of these units suffered.  As 
Rutherford discovered during these marches, a general could not ask these citizen 
soldiers to operate away from North Carolina for a sustained period of time.     
Georgia became the location where the British chose to start the invasion of the 
south.  Sparsely settled with half of the population made up of African-American slaves, 
the state represented the weakest point in the southern colonies.  When Governor Caswell 
got word that the British had dispatched troops to the south, he ordered his militia units to 
organize.  In late October 1778 Rutherford received orders from the governor.  Almost 
immediately he busied himself with procuring supplies and other concerns having to do 
with the militia for the present campaign.  As usual, he kept one ear pointed to the west, 
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 listening for rumors of the Cherokee joining other southern Indians just when his militia 
prepared to leave the state.  After receiving his directives, Rutherford asked Caswell to 
take charge of the operations around Charleston, expressing the sentiment that “no man 
living will be more acceptable to me than yourself.”5
Two weeks later, Rutherford by obtained more detailed instructions from the 
governor.  Caswell confirmed that a large British force had sailed from New York with 
the purpose of landing in the vicinity of South Carolina.  Caswell passed along his 
instructions from the Congress, which asked him to send troops to aid his neighbors to 
the south.  Caswell proposed meeting Rutherford in Kingston, North Carolina, on 
November 25, where the governor planned to give the militia a bounty for the upcoming 
service.  Reading the letter the Governor sent, Rutherford could begin to understand the 
severity of the situation.  Caswell urged him to “push on the men as fast as possible,” 
indicating the situation looked grave.  He reminded Rutherford to get a good commissary, 
a man who could purchase and acquire stores needed for the march of the army.  Finally, 
Caswell requested that Rutherford acquire a military secretary to serve during the 
campaign.  He made a point of asking his brigadier to keep accurate accounts of 
commissary transactions and to make copies of any letters sent.  Caswell probably knew 
from experience Rutherford’s reputation for creative spelling and syntax.  For the sake of 
posterity, this turned out to be sound advice.6   
As the organization for the campaign continued, Rutherford and Caswell went 
about the more mundane details of sorting out the preparations for the upcoming march 
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 south.  First among the priorities included paying and preparing the troops.  Militia units 
seemed less willing to operate outside of their own state unless their service could be 
rewarded.  A secondary concern for both men had to do with feeding the troops, and 
acquiring several months’ worth of supplies.  To do this, Rutherford and Caswell hired 
contractors or quartermasters who scoured the countryside and towns looking for 
everything from flour to beef and pork.7
Within his military district, which included his hometown of Salisbury, 
Rutherford could expect to find a good amount of provisions for the upcoming campaign.   
During this operation, the priorities for a commanding general changed drastically from 
the march against the Cherokee two years before.  It had been easy to rally men near 
Salisbury and points west for the march into the mountains.  Vulnerable frontier homes 
and families stood in the path of Dragging Canoe and his allies.  In 1778, the threat did 
not appear as immediate; Charleston and Savannah were weeks away from the Salisbury 
district.  Keeping that in mind, Caswell and Rutherford exerted themselves in keeping 
their troops compensated and provisioned. 
 Rutherford also needed to convince able-bodied men in his district that marching 
to South Carolina or Georgia constituted a worthwhile endeavor.  By mid-November, as 
he informed Caswell of his intentions to march to Charleston, he received a reminder of 
the difficulties involved in his role of maintaining the safety of western North Carolina.  
As Rutherford tallied the men in his ranks, and conversed with militia captains, grave 
news arrived from Washington County.  Born in the aftermath of the Cherokee 
expedition and subsequent treaty of 1777, the district, was located on the far western 
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 border of North Carolina and now fell under Rutherford’s charge when it became part of 
the state.  Rutherford told Caswell that few troops could be expected from the area 
because of the constant threat from the Cherokee.   
 Based on his own assessment of the situation, Rutherford advised Caswell he 
thought “it prudent not to draft out of that County, Men, arms, or Ammunition.”  In no 
uncertain terms, he classified the situation as an unholy alliance of Tories and Indians.  
Everyone in the Washington District would be needed “in the suppression of the Savages 
and other inhuman hostile wretches, who have their livelihood from Carnage and 
Rapine.”  With most available militia from Rowan and Hillsborough Counties in South 
Carolina, the Tories took it upon themselves to “disseminate sedition” among the western 
residents.  Conditions in the area seemed rife for retribution against those who sided with 
the revolutionary government.  The situation left Rutherford little choice but to exempt 
the militia from the district during the current campaign and allow that region to deal 
with “these sons of darkness.”8
 Dangerous conditions in the west became an unwanted distraction to the military 
and civilian leaders in North Carolina.  With either South Carolina or Georgia the target 
of the British army en route from New York, gathering men at rendezvous points delayed 
the march south.  By early December, Rutherford’s force moved only as far as upstate 
South Carolina, north of the town of Camden.  While the willing members of the 
community made their way to his headquarters, Rutherford used a cavalry contingent to 
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 patrol parts of his district and round up the unwilling.  He was encouraged by news that 
South Carolina called up the state militia for the upcoming campaign as well.9  
 As 1779 began, Rutherford’s men set up headquarters in Purysburg, South 
Carolina, upstream from Savannah.  During the time he and Caswell collected militia 
from the state, Savannah fell to British forces on December 29.  A second army of British 
troops captured Augusta a month later.  With these two strategic centers under British 
control, the patriot strategy now shifted to a defense of South Carolina.10   
 Observing the relative ease involved in securing Georgia, British planners became 
more willing to commit extra troops to the southern theater.  If they knew the condition 
of the forces they faced, British confidence would have soared.  Rutherford and his men 
remained in good spirits during the early days of their march to the south, but conditions 
deteriorated quickly.  In an ominous sign, General Rutherford did not even know how 
many men served under his command as the year opened.  What he did understand was 
that his regiments remained under strength because many of his militia did not believe 
even a successful campaign along the current front could bring the war to a conclusion.  
Men in such spirits would find it difficult to commit to a three or six month enlistment 
away from home and hearth under more peril the longer each man remained outside 
North Carolina.  Rutherford could only lament the fact that his army would melt away in 
the coming weeks.  He suggested a longer term of enlistment, perhaps sixteen months, 
with the promise of a generous bounty to all takers.  South Carolina already offered that 
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 guarantee; he held little hope his own state would do the same considering the relative 
safety and isolation that region continued to enjoy.11   
 The strength of the force Rutherford faced led many Georgians to reconsider their 
allegiance and seek refuge with the British army.  Others took up arms against the Patriot 
militia, making the Carolinian’s encampment feel more like they operated in enemy 
country.  Whig forces also had become stretched thin, chiefly because of troop shortages.  
Rutherford maintained his position across the Savannah River opposite the city with 
militia from both Carolinas.  Another contingent kept an eye on the British in Augusta.  A 
third force operated in the area between the towns.  Even as 400 of his militia left at the 
end of their enlistment, Rutherford and the Carolina militia maintained contact with and 
occasionally skirmished with elements of the British army near Savannah.12
 Short of clothing, his troops nevertheless did their best to observe British forces 
near Savannah.  In early March his army moved near Two Sisters, opposite Augusta.  
Benjamin Lincoln, commanding all troops in South Carolina, dispersed his units in 
different positions in the 140 mile expanse from Augusta to Savannah.  Believing he 
faced a much larger group of patriot militia, the British commander at Augusta 
abandoned the city and moved southeast towards Savannah.  John Ashe, commanding a 
contingent of North Carolina troops, followed the British, with Rutherford five miles 
behind in support.  On March 3rd the British forces turned and attacked Ashe’s men near 
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 Briar Creek.  Caught by surprise, Ashe’s troops ran from the field in panic, not stopping 
until they reached Rutherford’s camp four miles away.13   
 With the rout of Ashe’s force, the task of forcing British forces out of Georgia 
became all the more difficult.  A court of inquiry convened a week after the battle 
concluded that Ashe did not secure his camp in a manner suitable to his situation but 
refused to render a serious reprimand.  Rutherford was not about to let the same fate 
befall his troops.  Just days before Ashe’s court of inquiry Rutherford wrote General 
Lincoln telling the southern commander he kept “horsemen constantly patrolling the 
camp but have made no discoveries of the enemies attempting to cross the river.”  Patriot 
units operated in small groups; Rutherford commanded only 800, but a surprise attack 
like the one against Ashe could be disastrous.14  
 Rutherford and the men did not remain in South Carolina to witness the end of the 
campaign.  When their enlistments expired, militia from the Salisbury district began 
marching for home starting on April 10.  With the campaign apparently stymied, and the 
state of North Carolina continuing to use short-term enlistments, commanders could only 
watch in frustration as components of the army packed up and left.  Though ill-equipped 
during their service, Benjamin Lincoln might very well have wanted to keep these troops 
as he prepared to go on the offensive.  Instead he chased the British to Charleston and 
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 sent them reeling back to Georgia in the fall of 1779.  Attempting to dislodge them, his 
forces launched a valiant but failed attempt to recapture Savannah in October. 15   
By this time, Rutherford became fully engaged in his own political and military 
campaign against the enemies within North Carolina.  His soldiers meanwhile had little to 
be proud of during their sojourn along the South Carolina and Georgia border.  
Concerned about springtime planting, they could not be convinced with pleas or promises 
of pay to remain in the field.  More importantly, they learned little in the way of military 
affairs or combat, for that matter.  This lack of preparation would have dire consequences 
for the campaign of 1780.16    
Back in his own state Rutherford could not enjoy a respite from the duties of a 
brigadier.  Soon after his return, the Governor and Assembly raised the possibility of 
returning to South Carolina in an effort to relieve the city of Charleston.  In the summer 
of 1779, this came as unwelcome news to Rutherford.  He conveyed to Caswell that “our 
Frontiers are greatly distressed with Tories and Robbers.”  Loyalists in Burke County 
organized a conspiracy to capture and kill all of the civilian leaders in that area and do the 
same in neighboring parishes.17   
He believed this situation would keep him from obliging the request of Governor 
Caswell to send men from the Salisbury district into South Carolina.  Rutherford 
informed Caswell it was all he could do simply to organize sustenance for the 700 men 
already in the Palmetto state.  He asked for   20,000 to pay for provisions given to the 
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 troops during the last campaign.  If the militia had any hope of being supplied for a future 
expedition, it would have to compensate the state for past generosities. More ominous 
information then arrived in Salisbury that forced Rutherford to send Caswell another 
urgent express. Tories were organizing near the New River in the northwest part of the 
state.  In addition, several sources told Rutherford that Alexander Cameron, British agent 
to the Indians, had begun construction on a new fort in the lands between the Cherokee 
and Creeks nations.  Rutherford promised Caswell that the men in the western sector 
could be mobilized if needed.18         
Rutherford’s evaluation of the challenges his region faced helped gain a respite 
from the leadership of the state.  At the end of July, with the correspondence between 
Caswell and Rutherford before them, the Legislative Council temporarily relieved the 
militia from service in South Carolina.  Based on Rutherford’s information, they decided 
“the Militia ordered to be embodied are not now really necessary in the Southern States, a 
body of Men having Marched to their Assistance from Virginia.”  For the remainder of 
the year, Rutherford returned to the fall session of the Senate where, in spite of his 
military frustrations, he won a major victory with passage of a more stringent 
confiscation act.19   
If Rutherford is to be taken at his word, perhaps the supplies he needed for 
another three or six month campaign into South Carolina could not be obtained.  Or, 
aware of the incessant maneuvering of the armies and lack of a successful conclusion to 
affairs in South Carolina, he was in no hurry to be part of another inconclusive operation.  
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 The absence of troops from Salisbury to South Carolina also threatened the district.  
Tories became emboldened whenever the available militia left on a prolonged campaign.  
This situation concerned Rutherford and added to the anxiety of an officer who had the 
threefold responsibility of watching Tory activity, keeping tabs on the Indian frontier, and 
possibly answering another call to march out of the state.  Loyalist activity, a constant 
threat in a state passionately divided over allegiances, never could be put out of 
Rutherford’s mind.  If he could maintain a large presence of militia in his district, the 
threat might be reduced.  Yet, if the British could march unimpeded into North Carolina, 
the state would have to fight both redcoats and a secondary army of Tories.  For now, 
Rutherford remained in North Carolina, with the full authority of the Governor to deal 
with Loyalist threats as they developed.20
 A renewed British effort against Charleston in 1780 brought a request from the 
southern commander Benjamin Lincoln.  While preparing the defenses of the city, he 
appealed to Rutherford’s militia.  Lincoln told Caswell that upwards of 10,000 British 
troops were bearing down on South Carolina with the intention of subjugating the state.  
Rutherford received Lincoln’s request for 500 light horse and initiated plans to oblige 
him, writing to nine different counties and proposing a rendezvous for March 12.21
As the spring of 1780 wore on, it became clear that civilian and military leaders 
could not coordinate the forces needed for South Carolina.  From John Rutledge of South 
Carolina came a request for Rutherford to march to the west, near the spot of the “Snow 
Campaign” of 1775.  This appeared to be an effort to put down Loyalists in the region.  
Rutherford, however, continued to gather troops with the hope of relieving Lincoln, who 
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 by late spring faced a siege by British General Henry Clinton.  As April and May passed, 
the noose tightened; civilian leaders and Lincoln debated between holding the city and 
evacuating the army.  Lincoln chose the former option and when the British began to 
bombard the city and reduce to rubble the homes of the wealthy state leaders, he received 
permission to surrender.  The British captured over 5,000 Patriot troops, a tremendous 
blow to the war effort in the Carolinas.  North Carolina now held its collective breath, 
waiting for Cornwallis to make the inevitable drive into their state.  
Rutherford could not put his force in the field before the surrender of Charleston.  
It may have come as a relief in light of events after the Patriot surrender.  General Charles 
Cornwallis unleashed his trusted cavalry commander Banastre Tarleton to capture a relief 
column of Virginia troops coming to the aid of besieged Charleston.  When the men 
heard of the surrender, they turned back to North Carolina.  Tarleton caught them first 
and summarily butchered the force as it tried to surrender.  The Carolinas braced for the 
onslaught of British arms and the savagery of what became known as “Tarleton’s 
Quarter.”22        
After the surrender of the Patriot army at Charleston, Cornwallis turned his sights 
on North Carolina.  Since the start of the war, Loyalist leaders had promised British 
regular officers that the Tory population was ready to rise against the rebel governments 
of the southern states.  One such Tory leader, John Moore, rallied supporters near 
Ramsour’s Mill, northwest of Charlotte.  Within a few short weeks of raising his 
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 standard, Moore collected 1,300 men.23  Although the Patriot forces appeared to be in 
disarray, bands of militia awaited orders from their generals and civilian leaders.  When 
all seemed lost at Charleston, Rutherford turned his militia back to North Carolina, 
correctly anticipating that the British would next invade his state.  After the surrender of 
Charleston, he called out the militia in the Salisbury district to rally near the town of 
Charlotte.  In a short time, 900 men gathered and Rutherford deftly divided his men into 
three fighting forces.  Two of his subordinates, William R. Davie and William L. 
Davidson, would fight with distinction in the remainder of the campaign.24
Closer to the Loyalists at Ramsour’s Mill, Francis Locke gathered 400 militia and 
marched against Moore’s force.  Rutherford, in an effort to bring a strong column against 
Moore, crossed the Catawba River south of Locke and attempted to combine Patriot 
regiments against Moore.  Unfortunately, eighteenth-century armies did not always 
coordinate marches well, especially with citizen soldiers.  Locke, being closer to Moore’s 
force at Ramsour’s decided to pursue an attack.  Though outnumbered three to one, he 
sent his troops forward, gaining the upper hand in one of the most unorganized battles 
ever fought in the south. Appearances at the battle told everything about the civil war 
now taking shape in the Carolinas. Troops wore either white pieces of paper or twigs to 
differentiate friend from foe.  No one wore uniforms at Ramsour’s, and as John Buchanan 
has stated, “toward the end the fighting resembled an old fashioned Pier 6 brawl between 
longshoreman and strikebreakers, and not an Englishman within sight or sound.”25  
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 Wanting to press the advantage, Locke sent word to Rutherford to hurry to the 
battlefield.  Rutherford dispatched William Richardson Davie’s cavalry to support Locke 
and rushed his own men to the scene.  The fight at Ramsour’s had all the makings of a 
family reunion for the Rutherford clan.  Major James Rutherford and his uncle, Joseph 
Graham, serving under Locke’s command arrived on the field during the battle.  Griffith, 
it turned out, became the late arrival, getting to the field when the outcome had already 
been decided.  When the two armies stopped during a truce, James Rutherford 
purposefully went ahead of his decimated lines to meet with a Loyalist emissary.  James 
had no intention of letting his opponent see how the brawl reduced Patriot numbers.  
With audacity that would make his father proud he gave the Tories ten minutes to 
surrender.  Moore used that time to tell his men to scatter.26  
Thanks to the efforts of his son and other partisan leaders, Rutherford kept up his 
campaign to clear the Salisbury district of Loyalist activity.  He was well aware that a 
concerted Tory presence provided a real threat to the rebellion.  These forces could offer 
Cornwallis men and intelligence needed to conquer the entire state of North Carolina.  
Though he had few troops at his disposal, Rutherford’s familiarity with the region and 
terrain gave him the upper hand. His ranks swelled with new troops as he marched 
through the district.  This advantage combined with his able subordinates afforded him 
the opportunity to clear the district and demoralize continued Loyalist activity. 
The year 1780 in North Carolina marked a turning point in the war.  After the 
surrender of the Patriot army at Charleston, the revolutionary forces and loyalists “waged 
an intermittent, vicious vendetta war.”  The civil war within the revolution started in 
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 1775, with checks on Tory armies in the Snow Campaign and Moore’s Creek Bridge.  
But the length of the conflict combined with sustained calls for sacrifice and impending 
invasion by British redcoats made the battle for the Carolinas a desperate struggle.  
Tarleton’s butchering of Continental troops trying to surrender outside of Charleston set 
the tenor for the campaigns over the next three years.  Patriot forces were not above acts 
of retribution in this brutal phase of the war.  Moses Hall, a Rowan County militia soldier 
witnessed the execution of British prisoners captured by patriot forces after a small 
backcountry battle.27  The fight at Ramsour’s mill, a brawl between two musket-swinging 
mobs, represented the nature of the conflict once consistent fighting broke out in North 
Carolina.     
In the weeks after the battle at Ramsour’s, Rutherford began an aggressive 
campaign deploying his army in fast moving units in an effort to surprise and flush out 
groups of Tories.  One body of men under Colonel Bryant prowled the east side of the 
Yadkin River, hoping to gather men and march to South Carolina and link with 
Cornwallis.  Apparently Bryant and his men had been shaken by news of the defeat at 
Ramsour’s and by forced marches avoided both the main body of Rutherford’s troops and 
the swift moving cavalry under William Lee Davidson.28
The campaign met with the approval of the ranking officer of the North Carolina 
militia, Richard Caswell.  In a letter to Governor Abner Nash, Caswell bragged that 
Rutherford and company had cleared the state of Tories, and the combined militia forces 
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 could now prepare to meet Horatio Gates, commanding the Continental Army in the 
south.  With this force, Caswell predicted, the British could be driven back to Charleston.  
Caswell’s counterpart, Lord Cornwallis, also took stock of the situation in the summer of 
1780.  He realized the offensive in North Carolina would have to be postponed until the 
fall harvest.  Cornwallis urged friends of the King to remain quiet until he could begin 
operations and march into the state.  His knowledge of patriot troop dispositions proved 
very accurate; he could list the forces of regular army troops and Carolina militia.29
Rutherford, after pursuing bands of roving loyalists around his district, seemed 
elated at having these groups on the South Carolina side of the border.  To General 
Caswell, he expressed frustration at the daunting task of keeping his men in the field 
without supplies and short of arms.  His men stayed in good spirits, although their 
condition remained worn down.  To the southern army commander, Rutherford promised 
Gates a junction with his forces in August of 1780.  In the meantime, his scouts patrolled 
the road to Camden, South Carolina, a likely intersection of two British forces in that 
state.  Caswell, who expected to meet Rutherford north of Camden, seemed less 
knowledgeable about British intentions, but conveyed confidence that the union of forces 
would be achieved soon.30
By the beginning of August Caswell and Rutherford united their forces north of 
Camden.  The situation for the army looked distressing.  Upstate South Carolina, where 
hundreds of troops from both sides marched and countermarched during the year of 1780, 
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 had been picked clean of provisions by late summer.  Caswell passed this information 
along to Gates, acknowledging that Rutherford encountered the same problems.  The only 
good news came from the British camp in early August.  Facing a superior Patriot force, 
General Rawdon retreated south to the British supply base at Camden.31
In the American camp, the sunny optimism of General Gates concerned a number 
of his subordinates.  He continued to march south, towards the British garrison at 
Camden, believing the Patriot force to be numbered at 7,000 troops.  Even the enlisted 
men seemed to know better.  Yet the 3,000 men actually under his command suffered 
from digestive ailments brought on by a steady diet of green pears and molasses.  A 
debilitated, hungry army now faced the pride of Great Britain in the woods just north of 
Camden.32  Gates then made matters worse in his pre-battle arrangements.        
For reasons known only to the Patriot commander, Gates placed his weakest 
troops, raw North Carolina and Virginia militia, on his left flank.  In that position they 
faced Cornwallis’s best troops, members of the 23rd and 33rd Regiment of Foot.  When 
these troops advanced with a “Huzzah” and bayonets gleaming, the Virginia troops fled 
without firing a shot.  North Carolina’s militia followed suit, rushing past the Continental 
veterans as they ran from the field.  One militia regiment, anchored to the Delaware 
Continentals, stayed on the field.  Somewhere in this confusion of infantry and officers, 
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 Griffith Rutherford remained at his post.33  The Patriot hierarchy, including Gates and 
Caswell, were swept up in the chaotic retreat.      
 The clash at Camden was different from anything Rutherford had ever seen 
during his years in combat.  Unlike a firefight between militia or an ambuscade by Native 
Americans, Camden proved to be an hour-long slugfest.  It was as close to a set-piece 
European battle as any Rutherford would see.  As the affair began, scarlet coated troops 
charged bayonet first into an undisciplined group of Southern militia.  Somehow, even as 
his superiors were swept from the field, Rutherford stayed and simply watched the 
methodical British perform textbook military maneuvers.  The Maryland and Delaware 
Continentals, outnumbered and surrounded, fought heroically until Tarleton’s cavalry 
moved behind them, scattering the troops.  In the sand and pines of upstate South 
Carolina, Cornwallis in effect annihilated the Patriot army.  Gates did not stop galloping 
from the battle until he reached Charlotte, sixty-five miles to the north.34    
 Rutherford stayed on until the end of the battle, rallying the remaining militia 
units who fought alongside the Continentals.  With the commanding officer far from the 
field, and with no orders to retire, the Patriot army exchanged volleys with the English 
units until the sheer weight of numbers caused the survivors of the army to retire 
piecemeal.  Officers in groups and as individuals retreated into the woods, making their 
own escape.   
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  Hot on their heels were members of Banastre Tarleton’s dreaded Tory Legion.  
These cavalry troops chased down and sometimes killed with sword blows troops fleeing 
from the scene of battle.  The concluding moments of the battle of Camden were no 
exception.  As one of Tarleton’s troopers came across one soldier, he slashed at the man 
with a sword, cutting through a beaver hat.  Griffith Rutherford, dressed in 
uncharacteristic head covering and wearing no military insignia, was saved by the timely 
plea of a fellow soldier who recognized the North Carolinian and prevented the 
cavalryman from ending his life.  Along with members of his Carolina regiment, 
Rutherford became a prisoner of the British army.35
 Camden, a debacle for Patriot arms, destroyed the rebel cause in the Carolinas for 
months.  Stragglers managed to trickle north, gathering in North Carolina during the days 
and weeks to come.  Spirits were never lower.  For Rutherford, captured by British 
cavalry, the campaign was over, at least for the time being.  Along with other imprisoned 
officers, the future promised only miserable confinement at the whim of the British.  His 
war ended in one of the worst disasters in American arms.  Scattered and demoralized, 
the militia and regulars either waited in gloom for new orders or simply went home, their 
officers captured or driven from the field.  Nursing injuries and a burning desire to take 
the field, Rutherford now watched the war from the sidelines, hoping the patriot cause did 
not die on the sandy fields near Camden. 
 Limping off the field with multiple wounds, Rutherford and other survivors were 
marched back to the village of Camden.  Conditions there proved to be atrocious.  The 
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 British did not build facilities capable of handling the number of captives taken after the 
battle.  Rutherford and others suffered from a lack of basic necessities.  His undressed 
wound had the potential to cause infection or death.  Rutherford did the best he could, 
dressing his leg however he could.  Faced with sanitary and medical problems, the British 
took many of the men and moved them to Charleston.  From there, a large group 
embarked on a prison ship bound for St. Augustine, in British controlled East Florida.  
For a time, no one knew the whereabouts of Rutherford or some of the other prisoners 
whom the British detained after the battle.36
 Capture by an opposing army was a prospect no soldier relished in a time of war.  
In ideal conditions, officers could expect better treatment than enlisted men, who often 
rotted in the hulk of a crowded British prison ship.  Rutherford’s ordeal did not turn out 
to be as traumatic.  His one opportunity for early release came when British officers 
proposed parole for anyone who agreed to never take up arms against Great Britain.  
Most men declined the offer, a decision which surely condemned them to a longer 
imprisonment.  Though passage from Charleston to St. Augustine was no pleasure cruise, 
his confinement in East Florida never became hell on earth.  St. Augustine in fact served 
as the destination for officers and civilians captured in the aftermath of the Charleston 
campaign.  Among Rutherford’s fellow captives were the Lieutenant Governor of South 
Carolina, a speaker of the Georgia House, and civilian planters.  During their captivity, 
the men could grow gardens, and they obtained permission to walk within certain limits 
of the town.37  
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  It must have been agonizing for Rutherford to be so far away from the action of 
the campaign.  His capture came during the absolute low point of the war in the south.  
With South Carolina cowed and the North Carolina militia scattered, it appeared that 
Cornwallis could march unimpeded through the region.  And Rutherford, hearing rumors 
from battles he did not participate in, could do nothing to stop it.  His militia 
responsibilities for the time being were left to William Lee Davidson, who served with 
Rutherford during the summer of 1780.38   Fortunately for the Patriot cause, a competent 
commander stepped in to change the course of the war.   
While Rutherford nursed his wounds and sat out his confinement in an English 
jail, Carolina leaders tried to stop the tide of success the British army seemed to be 
enjoying.  The situation looked incredibly bleak in the late summer of 1780.  Cornwallis 
destroyed much of the Patriot army, dispersing militia units and scattering the survivors 
of the southern army.  A comrade of Rutherford, William R. Davie, brought Governor 
Caswell up to speed on the state of affairs in the Carolinas.  Davie told Caswell that the 
British did not follow up their victory at Camden immediately after the battle.  Instead, 
the Tories returned to their homes and took it upon themselves to plunder the vulnerable 
upstate countryside.  Davie hoped to rally the North Carolina militia, which numbered a 
scant 300 after the British sent hundreds of others running from the fields at Camden.  
Finally, Davie harbored no illusions about the future performance of the militia, who 
would be heavily relied upon once Cornwallis launched the invasion everyone knew was 
coming.39    
                                                 
38 Rankin, 247. 
 
39 Davie to Caswell, August 29, 1780, NCSR, 22: 776-777. 
 
 133
  The British did not count on the stubbornness of the cause.  In spite of the success 
during 1780, which included capturing Charleston and routing the rebel army at Camden, 
Cornwallis continued to feel disappointment that loyalists in the Carolinas did not flock 
to his army, either to fight or provide information needed to crush the rebellion.  Even 
worse, the much-maligned patriot militia continued to fight in small numbers in both 
states.  Partisan leaders like Thomas Sumter, Francis Marion, and Andrew Pickens 
challenged the supply lines and isolated outposts of the British army.40  In William R. 
Davie, North Carolina chose a competent commander to lead the Salisbury district during 
Rutherford’s absence.  These units helped discourage loyalist organizations and aided the 
main southern army as it regrouped and played a cat and mouse game with Cornwallis 
during the winter of 1780-81. 
Desperate not to lose the Carolinas and Virginia to the British, George 
Washington sent his most trusted commander, Nathanael Greene, south in an attempt to 
rally men to the cause and keep Cornwallis and his loyalist allies from running roughshod 
over the region.  Greene was able to patch together remnants of the Continental regiments 
who survived Camden and rebuild his army with these veterans as his core troops.  He 
hoped to stymie Cornwallis and revive the cause among the militia.   
 Almost immediately upon arriving in North Carolina, Greene broke every rule in 
the book of military convention.  Facing two British forces, he divided his own and 
summarily went about driving the British from the Carolinas.  His army lost every 
engagement it fought, starting in late 1780 and continuing into the late summer of 1781.  
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 Late in that year he took on one of the last concentrated forces of troops at a place called 
Eutaw Springs, thirty-five miles northeast of Charleston. 
Nathanael Greene systematically turned the war in the Carolinas around.  His 
divided army scattered a mobile corps lead by the hated Tarleton in upstate South 
Carolina.  Along the Carolina border in October, a group of “Over Mountain” men 
destroyed a loyalist force bent on quelling the backcountry.  This victory forever quieted 
stories which doubted the allegiance of western settlers.  Greene’s main army then forced 
Cornwallis on a costly chase across North Carolina into Virginia.  Exhausted and far 
away from his base of operations, the British chased Greene around the piedmont until 
the two armies battled at Guilford Courthouse in March 1781.41           
 For James Rutherford, action in the Carolinas continued even as the fate of his 
father remained uncertain.  Attached to one of Greene’s cavalry units, James Rutherford 
served in Wade Hampton’s mounted troopers.  Details of Griffith Rutherford’s capture at 
Camden and subsequent imprisonment were known to the leadership of North Carolina 
and his family.  James decided that he was bound by duty to carry on despite his father’s 
current condition.  His own soldiering experience had begun six years earlier when father 
and son marched into the South Carolina upcountry during the Snow Campaign.  James 
enjoyed fast promotion in the same manner his father had; by the time of the battle at 
Eutaw, he held a major’s rank.  James chose to serve in the cavalry, one of the more 
glamorous units in an eighteenth-century army.  The fastest troops on the battlefield, 
these men enjoyed mobility and a shock value once the shooting started. 
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  Nothing illustrated how conditions in the Carolinas had changed during 1781 
more than the prelude to the Battle at Eutaw Springs.  Greene’s army marched within two 
miles of the British force commanded by Alexander Stewart.  If the loyalist contingent 
had been stronger, or even inclined to help the British army, the attack would not have 
occurred with such surprise.  In the swamps around the Santee River during that stifling 
summer day, the two armies fought fiercely for upwards of four hours.  The tenacity 
shown on both sides may have concerned the fact the opposing generals commanded 
troops at one point had fought for the other side.  In Stewart’s force, a regiment of Irish 
Loyalists fought Carolina militia who once wore English scarlet.42   
 After pushing Stewart’s men back, Greene’s attack became stymied when his 
troops sacked and began to loot the English camp.  Reorganized, the British rallied and 
counterattacked, pushing the patriot force off the field.  On the extreme left, one British 
unit led a tenacious defense along the banks of the Santee.  Cavalry units under William 
Washington and Wade Hampton led headlong charges against the British position and 
took heavy casualties.  Major James Rutherford placed himself at the head of one such 
attack, but his cavalry could not maneuver well in the thick brush near the British 
position.  As he approached the enemy lines, a volley cut down Rutherford and scattered 
the patriot cavalry.43  
 At the end of the day, Greene pulled his army away from the Santee River.  
Though he left the field again to the British, his army heavily punished the enemy.  Never 
again did a British force of any size leave its two coastal confines in Wilmington, North 
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 Carolina and Charleston, South Carolina.  Even though James Rutherford died on the 
field, his family had the knowledge that he died bravely.  His brother, Henry Rutherford, 
recounted that James suffered a wound through the front of his chest which exited his 
back, proving that James’s final act involved a charge on his horse.44          
  While the battle raged to win the Carolinas, Rutherford could only experience 
the campaign through whatever rumor or news reached the men at St. Augustine.  Word 
that Greene battered Cornwallis in the North Carolina piedmont did make its way to the 
men in Florida during the spring of 1781.  With Cornwallis chased to Wilmington, all 
Rutherford needed to get back into the field and vanquish the enemy was a timely 
exchange of prisoners and a long trip back to Salisbury.45   
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Chapter Six 
Fighting the “Imps from Hell” 
 
After ten months as a prisoner of the British in St. Augustine, an exchange for 
Rutherford and other detainees was arranged in late June of 1781.  At first told they 
would be marched through Georgia, the British put the men on a ship bound for 
Philadelphia. Away from the action, the last piece of news the prisoners received 
concerning the progress of the war concerned the battle between Greene and Cornwallis 
at Guilford Courthouse.  With the British army making its way to the coast, Rutherford 
had plans swimming in his head during his return trip.  Through the kindnesses of 
members of Congress and friends, Rutherford procured money, clothing, and a horse for 
the trip home.  
Sometime in September, Rutherford arrived in North Carolina.  Upon his return to 
Grants Creek he found the British had sacked his home on the way to the town of 
Salisbury.  Cornwallis, having captured the man who frustrated his efforts to pacify North 
Carolina in 1780, made it a point during this march to stop at Rutherford’s farm.  When 
Griffith returned, he found everything had been looted, even his bandanas.1   
During his absence, responsibilities for the Salisbury district were assigned to 
William Lee Davidson, an able subordinate who served with Rutherford in 1780 when 
the two men helped organize Salisbury militia after the surrender of Charleston.  
Davidson died in action in January of 1781 while contesting a crossing of the British 
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army on the Catawba River.  Command of the district’s militia then fell to Francis Locke, 
Rutherford’s brash son-in-law, commander of Patriot militia at Ramsour’s Mill.2
In order to establish a base of operations along the coast, British generals sailed a 
small force to Wilmington, situated on the Cape Fear River.  In late January of 1781, 
troops under Major James Craig occupied the town.  A burgh of only 200 houses and 
1,000 residents, Wilmington was intended to serve as a base of operations and supply 
now that Cornwallis had started operations in North Carolina.  Immediately after raising 
the standard, and disarming the inhabitants of the town, Craig started organizing 
earthworks for the defense of the city.3    
By the time Rutherford could lead another command, the situation in North 
Carolina changed dramatically. After Greene punished Cornwallis at Guilford 
Courthouse near present-day Greensboro on March 15, 1781 the British commander 
marched eastward to his base in Wilmington.  Cornwallis issued a call to all loyal persons 
to join his army.  Few rallied to his standard, probably because Cornwallis’s 
proclamation was made as he headed east, in order to avoid another battle with Greene.  
Instead of turning south and aiding the outposts in South Carolina, Cornwallis took his 
tired army into Wilmington on April 7.4        
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 Anxious to take the field after his imprisonment, Rutherford rallied the men of 
Salisbury beginning in September of 1781.  He sent word to the quartermaster in the 
district to gather any military stores he could get his hands on, including muskets, 
cartridge boxes, and ammunition.  James Mountflorence, in charge of gathering supplies 
for Rutherford, asked Nathanael Greene to release supplies intended to go to his army, 
currently in South Carolina.  It seems clear that Rutherford hoped to organize quickly and 
march through the piedmont to Wilmington, Cornwallis had left a small contingent of 
troops on the coast, the last British soldiers in North Carolina.    
 Rutherford’s new superior officer, Nathanael Greene, spent the later part of 1780 
clearing both Carolinas of the British army.  After his pyrrhic victory at Guilford 
Courthouse, Cornwallis moved his army to the relative safety of the coastal town of 
Wilmington in April 1781.  The British campaign of 1780, which started with such 
promise, never looked bleaker.  After capturing Charleston, the largest seaport in the 
south, and routing a Patriot army at Camden, Cornwallis was poised to pacify North 
Carolina and move to Virginia.  By the spring of 1781 however only Charleston and 
Wilmington on the east coast, belonged to British arms.  Cornwallis stayed only a short 
time in the coastal city before moving north to the Virginia seaport of Yorktown.5   
 Greene’s army was in no better shape.  As much as the aggressive general wanted 
to go on the offensive, the condition of his troops prevented it.  After the Battle of Eutaw 
Springs, where James Rutherford had given his life, Greene camped his army near 
Charleston, one of the last coastal cities remaining under British control.  Any operations 
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in North Carolina at this point would have to be conducted by militia.  Greene, 
commanding a small, exhausted army, had his hands full in South Carolina.   
Fortunately for Greene, Griffith Rutherford, after a short reunion with his family, 
prepared to take the field again in the late summer of 1781.  During the next several 
months, Rutherford’s actions served as a sometimes unwelcome diversion to Greene’s 
effort to secure the Carolinas.  Nevertheless, he now could utilize the services of an 
experienced commander.  The British withdrawal from the field and confinement in 
coastal havens put the Carolina countryside in a surprising amount of peril.  Until the 
peace treaty and departure of the last British troops from the United States, Greene and 
other army commanders had no choice but to keep some organized force in the field.  To 
many Americans, who had sacrificed and bled for six years, the war seemed to be over.  
But an absence of British forces, especially in the Carolina countryside, created a vacuum 
filled by roving bands of Tories and Whigs.6   
 North Carolina continued to be a dangerous place after Cornwallis left the state in 
1781.  In September of that year a Tory raiding party stormed Hillsborough, captured 
Governor Thomas Burke and all of the officers in that town and summarily took them to 
Wilmington.  Rumors of murder and pillaging on both sides swept the countryside.  
Small bands of men carried out revenge of a very personal nature, knowing that Loyalists 
could no longer count on the protection of the British army.7
 After surveying the damage at his home and farm, Rutherford immediately started 
planning operations which would clear the state of the continued Tory presence.  In the 
summer of 1781 the strongest area of Loyalists remained in the eastern part of the state.  
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Major James Craig, operating out of Wilmington, had no intention of hunkering down 
behind his earthworks waiting for an attack.  On a small scale, he initiated the strategy 
that British generals had spoken of since 1776.  Craig appointed David Fanning 
commander of the loyalist militia, who carried out a highly successful guerrilla war that 
included capturing Whig leaders of the state, freeing Tory Prisoners, and robbing homes.  
This was a campaign bent on demoralizing any part of the populace with rebel 
sympathies.  It also stirred a great deal of resentment among Patriot militia and the 
officers who led them in battle.8
 By August it was known that Rutherford was organizing the militia in his district 
for a campaign in the east.  As in campaigns of the past, he sent officers to the counties in 
the Salisbury district and asked them to meet in Montgomery County, just southeast of 
Rowan, along the Little River.  The destination of the army became Fayetteville, the old 
trading town of Cross Creek, renamed after Marquis de Lafayette.  Rutherford correctly 
believed the main concentration of Tories, the bands of soldiers aiding in the plunder 
conducted by Fanning, operated between the Cape Fear and Pee Dee Rivers.9
 As Rutherford waited for his militia to assemble his troops drilled and practiced 
maneuvers.  This familiarized his horse soldiers with the scouting assignments they 
would undertake.  Second, the show of force demonstrated to loyalist sympathizers and 
spies in his camp that Rutherford commanded a substantial body of troops.  Fortunately 
for Rutherford, many of his cavalry served in past campaigns under William R. Davie 
                                                 
8 Robert M. Calhoon, “Loyalism and Neutrality,” in Jack P. Greene and J.R. Pole eds., A Companion to the 
American Revolution (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 245; Robert M. Calhoon, “The 
Reintegration of the Loyalists and the Disaffected,” in The American Revolution: Its Character and Limits,  
ed. Jack P. Greene (New York: New York University Press, 1987), 61. 
 
9 Graham Narrative, in William Henry Hoyt ed., The Papers of Archibald D. Murphy (Raleigh: E. M 
Uzzell, 1914),  2: 298-299; ?? to Colonel David Fanning, August 2, 1781, Lindley S. Butler ed.,  Narrative 
of Col. David Fanning (Davidson, NC: Briarpatch Press, 1981), 50-51. 
 142
and William Washington, giving him the advantage of a skilled corps of mounted troops.  
By October 1 the troops started the march to the east, moving at a slow pace to allow for 
any late-arriving units to catch the main army.  By this time Rutherford commanded 
1,400 troops, 350 of whom were cavalry.  Though not as large as the force he took into 
the Cherokee towns five years before, the men made up in experience what they lacked in 
numbers.10  
 In addition to logistical details and organization of troops, Rutherford concerned 
himself with the void in civil authority.  In the middle of his efforts to put together an 
army, the Governor of North Carolina, Thomas Burke, was captured by a raiding party 
under the direction of David Fanning.  This development elevated Alexander Martin, 
Speaker of the Senate, to the governorship and caused a great deal of concern for 
Nathanael Greene operating in the High Hills of the Santee in South Carolina.   
 To Burke, Greene expressed his frustration at not being able to aid the state any 
further.  Greene could only make the token gesture of sending one of his generals from 
the Continental Line to the state.  He put his hope in reducing British forces in the state 
on Rutherford, who he understood was marching to Cross Creek.  “Wilmington,” Greene 
lamented, “is the root of the evil.”  With a secure base of operations, the bands of Tories 
could continue to sack and plunder unimpeded through the state.  Nevertheless, Greene 
could do little from upstate South Carolina in the fall except inquire of Rutherford what 
his intentions were.  He asked the North Carolinian about the forces under his command, 
their length of service, and a possible union with other militia coming from the northern 
part of the state.  Greene gloomily told Rutherford that if the British garrison could not be 
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dislodged from the town, Tory activity would continue.11  What Greene did not 
understand, without knowing the size of Rutherford’s command, was that the Carolina 
brigadier had every intention of driving the British from Wilmington.  
 Unable to know Rutherford’s intentions, Greene concerned himself with news he 
received in South Carolina.  To Governor Martin, Greene drafted a strongly-worded letter 
addressing the news he received about Rutherford’s army.  Reports filtered to Greene that 
Rutherford “is driving all the tories, their wives and Children, burning their houses and 
laying waste their plantations.”  Greene concerned himself with the fact that 
indiscriminate destruction hurt friend and foe.  It drove impartial Carolinians to the 
British and turned others “from a feeble and partial enemy a firm and determinate foe.”   
With General Washington’s army in Virginia, Greene hoped a favorable outcome 
along the York peninsula would be more beneficial than ravaging homes and property of 
the neutral or loyalist citizens.  If this Rutherford’s policy Greene believed, all of the 
future retribution against Whigs in the state could be laid at the feet of Patriot 
commanders and their scorched earth campaign.        
Separated from the action in North Carolina, Greene seemed to be relying on 
rumors brought from loyalist sympathizers or the militia who made their way south into 
Greene’s army.  With information passing only by horseback, the turnaround for letters 
regularly took several days. Greene was making the highest civil authority in the state 
aware of the behavior of one of his brigadiers.  He hoped Governor Martin in no way 
sanctioned this “narrow principle of private resentment.”  Any stores, crops, or forage 
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destroyed by well-meaning patriot militia could just as easily be used for his army if joint 
operations against Wilmington or Charleston could be initiated.12   
Greene wrote his letter to Martin in order to establish contact with the new 
governor after Thomas Burke became a prisoner of the British.  Greene sought to 
establish with the acting governor a principle that guided his actions in the Carolinas.  
Unable to take his weakened army into the field, he had to rely on the civilian authority 
and the judgment of militia officers to direct any offensive actions that might take place 
against the British.  The last thing Greene wanted was a rogue general, who was bent on 
revenge and burned with some personal vendetta.  With the possibility of victory so 
close, the final stages of the war could not become the place for a war of attrition.   
Greene finally passed his thoughts along to Rutherford in October.  Repeating 
many of the ideas written to Martin, he drafted a long missive, part grand strategy, part 
lecture, which responded to the news concerning Rutherford’s behavior as his troops 
approached Wilmington.  Greene was troubled with reports that “you are treating the 
Inhabitants denominated tories with great severity driving them indiscriminately from 
their dwellings without regard to age or Sex and laying waste their possessions 
destroying their produce and burning their houses.”  As a leader of men, Greene 
understood the motivation behind Rutherford’s supposed actions remembering that “your 
sufferings in Captivity has been sufficient to exasperate you.”  Nevertheless, barbarities 
against the enemy could never be sanctioned.  
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To Rutherford, Greene repeated many of the themes mentioned to the civilian 
leaders of North Carolina.  Anything his army destroyed near Wilmington had the 
potential to hurt the Patriot war effort.  No one could predict in what area the army might 
operate in during future months.  Destroying crops and produce that at first might only 
hurt the enemy could one day “prove distressing to ourselves.”  Finally, Greene made a 
personal appeal to Rutherford.  He reminded the North Carolinian that “as I am 
answerable for the Southern operations generally I hope they will have their proper 
effect; for be assured I have nothing more at heart than the interest and happiness of this 
country.”  He hoped his past service not only in the south but with Washington in the 
early part of the war made this sentiment clear.   
Greene’s letter to Rutherford hit all the right notes.  He assuaged Rutherford’s 
sense of vanity, realizing that a man who lost almost a year of his life in confinement 
might hold a grudge against his captors and their American allies.  He sympathized with 
the troops in Rutherford’s army, understanding that resentment of past actions by the 
Tories could easily enrage the men under his command.  But he warned Rutherford that 
“passion is a bad councellor and resentment an unsafe guide.”  In the short run Greene 
conceded, cruelty to the enemy would make the Patriot cause look desperate.  Harsh 
measures make the adversary a more dangerous foe, leading them to provide aid and 
comfort to the British, or to join the ranks as soldiers.  Greene tried to set the little part of 
the war in North and South Carolina in a bigger picture.  Give the British army or 
Parliament incidents of vindictive behavior, and these groups will give permission for 
their American allies to do the same.13      
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Rutherford’s response to Greene, which has not survived seemed to relieve 
Greene’s concerns about the situation in North Carolina.  By the time Greene drafted his 
inquiry, Rutherford’s forces already engaged loyalist troops outside of Wilmington at a 
place called Raft Swamp.  After marching for two weeks, Rutherford’s screening force 
made contact with Tories near the Lumber River.  As his troops and cavalry approached, 
he reached the Tory camp as their campfires continued to burn.  Gathering intelligence 
from captured men, Rutherford and his officers discovered they were hot on the heels of a 
force of about 600 Tories. 
 After pursuing the Loyalist’s force, cavalry units and mounted infantry caught up 
with the Tory units and charged the position.  The Tories fled into a ravine near the 
swamp, but according to William Graham, an officer under Rutherford, their sand ponies 
could not outrun the mountain horses Rutherford’s men brought from the Salisbury 
district.  Rutherford’s troopers killed sixteen Tories and wounded fifty.  Following the 
battle, small units of cavalry also became targets of Tory bands firing from yards and 
potato patches. 
 In the days after the battle, Rutherford met with his officers to plot the next course 
of action.  He determined to clear the surrounding swamps and marsh of any Loyalist 
forces that might be in hiding.  The general likened his situation to that of Francis 
Marion, “The Swamp Fox,” who followed the same course of action in South Carolina.  
Aside from frightening a family of civilians who lived in the area and scaring cattle his 
troops mistook for soldiers, this exercise did little in the effort to find or capture pockets 
of resistance.  The effort did send many Loyalists out of the swamps and toward 
Wilmington.  Even without fighting a second pitched battle, the news of patriot militia 
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wading in waist-deep muck and briars had the desired effect.  As Graham recounts, 
“news soon spread through the whole hostile districts that Rutherford’s men were driving 
the swamps, and it is believed but few of the Tories took shelter in them afterwards.”14
 As Rutherford’s army of 1,400 slowly approached the coast, Acting Governor 
Martin paid a visit to the militia camp.  According to Graham, Martin “issued a very 
flattering address to the army, in which he noticed the officers who commanded when the 
Tories were defeated at Raft Swamp.”  The call gave encouragement and a sense of 
purpose to the troops, and the visit allowed the opportunity for some needed rest.15
 In the days after the battle of Raft Swamp, as Rutherford approached Wilmington, 
Greene’s follow up letter arrived, conveying the relief he felt that rumors about 
Rutherford’s pillaging turned out to be untrue.  Greene told Rutherford that he always 
urged moderation in dealing with Tories.  This was a sound policy because in each state 
he served, Greene found no uniform policy toward loyal residents residing in each state.  
Without Congress adopting a uniform course of action, Greene simply urged restraint and 
repeated relief that reports coming to him proved to be false.  He finished the letter by 
asking Rutherford to send a contingent of troops en route from the mountains to his army, 
since Greene hoped to begin an offensive against Charleston.16    
 A great divide emerged at this point between the two men responsible for 
operations in the region.  To Rutherford, the Tories constituted the enemy.  And he had 
been away from the battle for a year after his capture at Camden.  Before he left on his 
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march east, he kept a patriot force in Anson County to pacify one region of the state.  As 
he took his troops to the Cape Fear region, the general even went to the trouble of 
commandeering a guide for the trip; Rutherford doubted his own knowledge of the area.  
Greene tried to argue for the larger strategic picture, ordering that Carolina militia should 
not initiate a similar terror campaign against suspected loyalists.17  As a skilled political 
general, Greene clearly was looking farther down the road than Rutherford, toward 
conclusion of the war and the reconstruction of the Carolinas.  He did not want Patriot 
arms to be associated with burning, looting, and theft.  During the remainder of the time 
his militia stayed near Wilmington, Rutherford struggled to maintain the high ideals 
Greene outlined in his two letters to the Carolina brigadier. 
 The dilemma of how to treat civilians in the war vexed both British and Patriot 
commanders.  Oftentimes officers became caught in the middle.  Governor Burke, before 
his capture in the late summer, realized like Greene that the first side that created some 
stability in North Carolina would win support the of the people.  Greene echoed this 
sentiment in letters to Acting Governor Martin and to subordinates such as Rutherford.  
Rutherford’s antagonist in Wilmington, Major Craig, commanding all British forces 
believed disorder would prove only the Crown could keep order in the state.  This 
became his rationale behind the campaign to unleash David Fanning into the eastern 
section of the state and disrupt civil government.18    
With Fanning injured, and Craig undermanned behind the fortifications around 
Wilmington, the opportunity to strike the British stronghold seemed at hand.  Once he 
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reached Wilmington, his scouts gave him new information.  British Redcoats occupied 
the town.  Joseph Graham, Rutherford’s brother-in-law, and an officer in the army 
noticed the intelligence gave his general pause.   After six years of fighting, Rutherford 
could look back and catalog the behavior of the militia he fought alongside and 
sometimes commanded.  They performed well in the Cherokee campaign but abandoned 
the southern army in Georgia.  Troops his son commanded acted more like a mob in 
action against the Tories and later that summer ran from the field at Camden.  When 
fighting Loyalist militia in the field, the King’s friends were as likely to run as the 
farmers, artisans, and tavern-keepers Rutherford drafted from the western piedmont.  
Against disciplined redcoats, his troops had no chance. 
Rutherford had developed several strong opinions about the militia.  As an 
organized force, militia generally did not fight British regulars well.  When he planned a 
strategy for capture of Wilmington, Rutherford considered two modes of attack.  Up to 
this point in the campaign, he could count on his superior numbers and competent 
subordinates to drive smaller forces of Tories before his army.  Before he left Salisbury, 
Rutherford organized his troops into infantry and cavalry.  Many of his men, talented 
horsemen, rode to battle and fought as infantry.  Others stayed mounted adding speed to 
his army.   
Knowing the limitations of the men in their charge, Graham and Rutherford 
developed the only strategy available to them.  Entrenched behind earthworks, any attack 
against the town would result in high casualties to the attacking forces.  Rutherford 
sought a more prudent step of surrounding the town, looking for weak points, and 
preventing the countryside from re-supplying the garrison.  With this knowledge, 
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Rutherford skillfully deployed his men using information from loyalist militiamen who 
changed their allegiance and joined his army.  Though he enjoyed an almost three-to-one 
advantage in troops, Rutherford planned to surround Wilmington and keep anything from 
going in to supply the town.  He positioned a combination of cavalry and infantry on the 
south side of the town to monitor activity on the Cape Fear River.  Rutherford stationed 
himself and his troops north of the town to prevent any entrance overland.19    
The plan was cautious and methodical.  At one point, when it appeared a group of 
redcoats might be marching out to attack his force, Rutherford, knowing he would have 
to face professional troops, did everything he could to avoid a battle.  His men could 
scatter a group of amateur Tory militia, but as Graham expressed the view of his men, 
“all knew the British regulars were a foe to be respected.”  His lack of artillery also ruled 
out the option of storming the works.  Within the city, Major Craig realized what was 
happening.  He ordered all women and children known to be Whig sympathizers out of 
the town to conserve food.20   
Rutherford then began to close a fist around Wilmington.  Any information he 
received about an open escape route or access to outside supplies became sealed off by 
his fast moving cavalry.  He attacked any movements out of the town by loyalist militia,   
keeping a strong but distant perimeter around the city.  As October gave way to 
November, Craig stopped venturing out of the town, and did not risk the health of his 
redcoats in an attack.  With the river and sea lanes open, his troops could always escape 
by water.  From inside the city, Craig faced a difficult situation.  Rutherford’s army not 
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only kept stores and supplies out, but cut off all contact from loyalists outside of the 
town.21     
A significant piece of information arrived from Virginia during the second week 
of November.  Riding from Yorktown, Light Horse Harry Lee, brought news of the 
capitulation of the British garrison at Yorktown.  With the surrender of Cornwallis in 
Virginia, other British commanders still clinging to port cities contemplated their next 
move.  For Craig, who at this point was looking for any excuse to leave Wilmington, 
holding North Carolina at all seemed a silly assignment.  The capture of the governor had 
not shaken the civilian government of the state.  Cornwallis and his army, now prisoners 
of the American and French army, would not be coming back to rescue Craig.  After 
reports reached him about the surrender on the York peninsula, he immediately organized 
a hasty evacuation.22
  Upon receiving reports of the British surrender, Rutherford’s men began an 
immediate celebration; the general drew up his army and fired a feu de joie.  Several 
gentlemen from inside the town approached the army and told Rutherford that the British 
were loading boats in preparation for sailing down the Cape Fear to the Atlantic.  
Rutherford slowly moved his army closer, cautiously observing British movements in an 
effort to verify Craig’s true intentions.  Rutherford ordered boats procured and moved 
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them down the river just in time to see the sails of the British vessels drifting seaward.  
The British evacuation was completed on November 14.23         
Challenges for the residents of Wilmington did not end when the British 
evacuated.  As Rutherford’s troops moved in, the looting started.  North Carolina militia 
troops treated the town as a conquered province.  Rutherford placed guards at the homes 
of several inhabitants, protecting the private property of Whig and Tory alike.   To his 
subordinate, Joseph Graham, Rutherford only ordered the taking of stores the British 
troops used during their occupation.  This included salt, which he allowed to be put on 
wagons for the return trip to Salisbury.24   
Graham seemed to sugarcoat the incidents, stating only that stores of the enemy 
were the only things taken.  Letters and secondary sources contradict this account.  
Rutherford dispensed no mode of punishment, but he would have been hard pressed to 
stop all of the acts of looting going on in the town.  If his troops removed personal 
property from Wilmington, concealing these items would be a tall order for average 
militiamen.  Certainly abducting African-American slaves, as one resident claimed, 
would not have been missed by the officers of the army.  Those friendly to the cause of 
independence also suffered acts of confiscation.  William Hooper endured destruction at 
the hands of both Craig’s men and North Carolina militia.  He complained to James 
Iredell that Rutherford’s militia broke into his house, cut open beds, and took volumes 
from his extensive library.25   
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For Rutherford, giving his men salt seemed a trifle, but in a poor state enduring its 
seventh year of war, provision was scarce in all regions.  Whether he condoned random 
looting or confiscation is impossible to tell.  It would have been difficult for Rutherford 
to control his troops as they encountered the homes or property of Loyalists in the area 
around Wilmington.  During the previous campaign, as Cornwallis chased Greene 
through the piedmont, the homes and farms of his men became targets of British soldiers 
and the Tories who attached themselves to the army.  British forces also swept through 
the town of Salisbury, commandeering supplies and taking whatever he wanted.  
Rutherford, having endured the ransacking of his own home by the British army, could 
surely understand the motivations of his men who pilfered household goods or stole 
food.26
Nathanael Greene, commander of the Continental Army in the south, did not 
share Rutherford’s sentiments.  When he arrived in Salisbury in early December, more 
letters from Greene awaited the Carolina commander.  The behavior of his troops caused 
more concern for Greene, a man who could not simply retire from the field and return to 
a home halfway across the state.  Greene again asked Rutherford to answer for the 
conduct of his men as his militia approached and eventually occupied the town of 
Wilmington.  As usual, the tone of the letter was civil, but the question was a direct one.  
Though he wanted to rebuke Rutherford, Greene needed his cooperation in securing 
supplies for his small army stationed outside of Charleston.  As the highest military 
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officer in the large Salisbury District, Rutherford’s authority would be necessary to 
procure items for Greene’s army.27       
The surrender of the British army at Yorktown did not mean the end of the war.  
Though the British lost their post in Virginia, they continued to hold New York, 
Charleston, and Savannah.  The final peace was more than a year away and troops needed 
to stay in the field and endure more hardships while negotiations in Paris continued.28  
Greene in 1782 had the unenviable task of keeping an army sustained when few in the 
populace realized the rebellion had not ended.  While the rest of the south and the other 
members of the confederation began to rebuild their lives, several armies scattered 
around the country continued to require cattle, horses, and foodstuffs to keep the troops 
supplied.  
These items needed to come from the willing citizens and respected local officials 
in the surrounding states.  When Rutherford arrived at his home letters from the 
commander of the Southern department were already in Salisbury.  Both concerned the 
treatment of “Enemies of oure Country,” to which Rutherford responded, “sume of the 
Charges you mentioned I ame not guilty of.”  The letter constitutes the only admission by 
Rutherford of any vindictive behavior carried out by his troops on the road to 
Wilmington.  It is interesting that he admits some of accusations may be true.  Surviving 
accounts show that his troops did steal and take property in Wilmington.29   
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In his response to Greene, Rutherford believed he had the endorsement of state 
officials in this matter stating “as for my Behavour tords that set off Miscrents I have the 
Law of my Country to Protect me.”  This statement, at least in the administration of the 
current governor, was correct.  In the middle of his campaign against Wilmington 
Governor Martin stated the Patriot militia could “chastise the present disaffection, long 
prevailing in some of the Counties of this State, by destroying, dispersing, and capturing 
ring-leaders and some of their adherents.”  Clearly this was not carte blanche to pillage 
the property of loyalists, but coming only a month after Tory raiders captured Governor 
Burke, a definite tone had been established.  Greene had to concede that he could do little 
to stop the actions of the militia in North Carolina other than warn them that depredations 
against loyalists only hurt the American cause.30  
In his last letter on the treatment of loyalists, Greene once again urged caution, 
stating, “I have always observed both in religion and politiks moderation answers the 
most valuable purposes.”  At this point, Greene wanted to end the discussion and focus 
on a real problem facing his army.  His army needed supplies; he beseeched the brigadier 
of the Salisbury district to help him.  Though Greene warned Rutherford his treatment of 
Tories could injure his reputation, he needed Griffith’s standing in the community to 
obtain stores for his army, which continued to maintain itself in South Carolina.  Along 
with Greene’s letter a circular addressed to the people of the Salisbury district praised 
their “zeal and patriotism” in the war, and asked for the necessary wagons to move items 
to his army.31             
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Many of the letters leaving Greene’s camp in the late winter of 1782 concerned 
the acquisition of provisions from any area of North Carolina.  Most of these supplies, it 
was hoped, could come from Salisbury and Charlotte, central gathering points for 
materials.  Greene and his subordinates in the quartermaster department ran headlong into 
Rutherford, who could control wagons in the district and the pack animals required to 
move them.  Several letters arrived at Rutherford’s home imploring him to impress 
wagons for service to Greene’s army.  But the brigadier hesitated, stating he could send 
teams to posts in North Carolina, but not out of state.  In other words, it was too much to 
ask the teamsters in his district to leave the state, but they would move to different supply 
gathering areas.  To move as far as Greene’s army, state quartermasters and drivers in 
their employ would have to be used.  Added to this, Rutherford expressed the notion that 
during this time of year, commandeering wagons would not be a popular policy.32   
When Greene sent subordinates to investigate what was going on in the Salisbury 
district, two officers seemed to be under the impression that Rutherford continued to drag 
his feet in the matter.  Greene, in a letter to Rutherford’s subordinate in the 1780 
campaign, William R. Davie, even threatened to go to the Governor if the action would 
resolve the problem.  Slow mail service seemed to accentuate the problem for all parties 
involved.  Greene’s letter dated January 29 reached Salisbury on March 2.  This 
represents either a very slow delivery or Rutherford’s reluctance to open a letter from 
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Greene.33  Based on earlier missives, which contained sermons on how to run a campaign 
against loyalists, Rutherford’s hesitation is easily understood.       
Considering the dangers within the state of North Carolina in 1782, Rutherford’s 
attempts at holding back supplies or pack animals makes sense.  In an oft-repeated 
scenario since 1775, confrontations with the Cherokee Indians remained on the minds of 
many residents of western North Carolina.  Sending supplies to an army in another state 
not engaged in fighting apparently struck many residents in the Salisbury district as 
wasteful.   
Another factor may explain the entire situation.  Many suppliers in Rutherford’s 
district did not trust Greene’s quartermaster, Edmund Gamble.  These commissaries 
chose to withhold necessities for the army, rather than see them wasted under the shoddy 
management of quartermaster Gamble.  This situation put Rutherford in a bad light, 
making it seem as if the people in his region did not want to aid Greene’s army. 
Rutherford, once the urgency of requests finally arrived, promised to send anything 
citizens of his district were willing to part with.  He conveniently presented to Greene a 
laundry list of abuses by Gamble, including abandoned guns and exposed gunpowder.  
Greene seemed satisfied with Rutherford’s efforts in a letter which pointed out for the 
second time he was misinformed about the efforts of the North Carolina Brigadier.  He 
conceded that during the affair there had been “great misrepresentations.”  By the end of 
the letter, Greene admitted that Gamble might have to be brought up on charges. He 
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bemoaned the fact that “if the great public and individuals will not do more for our 
support than has been done it will be impossible for me to keep the army together.”34
Though the issue seemed settled, Rutherford, playing the injured warrior, 
demanding Greene give him the names of those who accused him of cruelties in 
Wilmington.  These “wolves, in sheeps Cloathing,” meant to ruin his name and make a 
bad impression on Greene.   It pained him to think he invited “the Displeasure of a 
Gentleman of youre Merit, & that I should be so unhappy to have such Enemeys.”  In 
conclusion, Rutherford called into question quartermaster Gamble, the subject of a 
previous letter and a convenient fall guy for any hesitation Rutherford underwent in 
forwarding stores to South Carolina.35
A last issue passed between the two generals in the spring of 1782.  For the third 
time a miscommunication plagued the relationship between the two men.  Acting at the 
bequest of the British commander in Charleston, Greene inquired about the condition of 
prisoners of war in the care of the Salisbury jail.  Reports reaching the British indicated 
that detainees in North Carolina might be suffering under harsh conditions.  Again, 
Greene repeated his theme that abuse of prisoners reflected badly on the cause of 
America and hoped Rutherford used every method to prevent this rumor from becoming 
scandalous.    
In his by now characteristic style of answering the Rhode Islander, Rutherford 
summarized his course of action and promised Greene that the men enjoyed provisions 
and fair treatment in Salisbury.  Rutherford also commented that “this is the way that the 
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Prisoners are disposed of in those Parts.  If it should meet sir with your approbation I 
would be glad to know, but this I know that I did not Receve such Liberty when I was a 
prisoner with the British.”  Still smarting from losing almost a year of his life in 
confinement, Rutherford’s letter suggests a man who resented that his methods were 
being called into question.  Ironically, the prisoners were captured at Eutaw Springs, 
where James Rutherford lost his life seven months before.36       
Rutherford concerned himself with more than jailing prisoners and gathering 
supplies in the spring of 1782.  Threats from Cherokee Indians in the west distracted the 
Salisbury district and the state called on its brigadiers to organize another expedition 
west.  At the same time letters from South Carolina were being addressed to Rutherford, 
he received correspondence concerning the start of another campaign into Cherokee 
territory.  Griffith Rutherford had every intention of accompanying another journey 
against the Cherokee beginning in August.  The march would be led by Charles 
McDowell, like Rutherford a westerner and militia officer.   
McDowell only recently had escaped charges of impropriety before his march 
west.  A court martial ordered by Rutherford had sought to investigate charges that 
McDowell took bribes from Tories and enlisted others to serve in General Greene’s army.  
Rutherford, who helped thwart elections of officers who might be Tories earlier in the 
war, cleared McDowell of the charges.  In his letter to the North Carolina Assembly, 
Rutherford maintained that McDowell “has acted as a good officer & a real friend to his 
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country.”37  McDowell, who barely escaped serious military reprimand, would lead the 
troops into Cherokee villages, with Rutherford playing the role of experienced guide. If 
the summer of 1782 proved one fact, it was that the amount of tasks which fell to a 
militia Brigadier, even when not in the field, could be staggering. 
Though not in charge of the mission to the Cherokee towns, Rutherford made a 
significant contribution to the endeavor.  On his return route from the Middle towns in 
1776 his men cut a trail known as “Rutherford’s Trace,” a path that could be used for 
future offensive operations into the towns.  Though the combined expedition of 1776 
wreaked havoc on the Cherokee nation, Overhill leaders such as Dragging Canoe 
continued to field troops and threaten the western counties in three states.  Faced with a 
prospective end of hostilities with Great Britain, finally ending the threat in the west 
constituted another part of a plan for peace. 
Moving through Rutherford’s route, McDowell, John Sevier, and western militia 
moved into the Chickamauga towns, believed to harbor Dragging Canoe, and razed many 
of the villages.  Their actions, in a campaign scarcely garnering a paragraph in 
scholarship, led to another treaty with Cherokee leaders, more land cessions, and more 
settlers moving farther into the territory over the Appalachian Mountains.38    
Lacking the urgency and excitement of the 1776 march, where three armies 
combined to destroy the Cherokee, the McDowell campaign nevertheless succeeded in 
removing the threat of an organized resistance to western settlement.  For Rutherford, it 
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represents the last chapter of a storied military career; a quarter century as a soldier 
beginning and ending in battles against Native Americans.  His other campaign, a rather 
vindictive one against those who tried to stop the cause of the United States, entered a 
new chapter, away from the battlefield and back in the halls of government.    
 With his military career apparently finished, Rutherford’s political career seemed 
to be over as well.  His captivity in 1781 forced him to forfeit his Senate seat, making it 
appear that his campaigns were behind him.  Leaders of the state felt differently, and in 
1782 the Assembly appointed Rutherford as Commissioner of confiscated property for 
the Salisbury district.  The responsibilities and duties given by the state continued as 
Rutherford, now aged 61, won election from the Assembly as a member of a Council of 
State.39
 Upon returning to the Senate, Rutherford picked up his campaign against loyalists 
where it left off in 1779.  In the middle of the war, he antagonized pacifist Moravians, 
and conservatives who favored conciliation with the Tories.  With the fighting of the war 
concluded, he decided to resume his unapologetic efforts to punish the populace of North 
Carolina who according to Rutherford impeded the war effort against Great Britain.  
During the spring 1783 session of the legislature, Rutherford attempted to reprimand 
those who opposed efforts to ensure the survival of United States and others who did not 
make the same sacrifices as his family. 
 Anyone who expected mercy from General Rutherford would be sorely 
disappointed.  One individual, James Kerr, a loyalist in Wilmington appealed to 
Rutherford for help in getting back together with his family.  Kerr in some capacity 
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helped Rutherford during his internment in St. Augustine after the battle of Camden.  
This kindness, Kerr believed, might make Rutherford more inclined to help him.  As 
Robert DeMond has observed, several members of the legislature, who favored lenient 
laws or opposed confiscation did so in behalf of family members or in-laws who sided 
with Great Britain.  Archibald Maclaine and James Iredell, members of the Senate, 
lobbied for the conservative, pro-Tory cause in the legislature.40
 Rutherford gave Kerr a thorough lecture on his beliefs about the two sides in the 
Revolution.  If Kerr believed his past kindness would have any effect, he was sadly 
mistaken.  He reminded Kerr that if he had taken Rutherford’s advice before, concerning 
which side to take in the rebellion, circumstances could be different.  He lamented that 
Kerr passed Rutherford’s name around as if he enjoyed a friend in government.  “You 
have cause to think you deserve countenance, but as an open enemy you must know that 
you deserve none, for if a blast of your mouth would have annihilated the 13 United 
States we have a right to believe you would have done it.”  As for being a friend in 
government, providing Kerr a favor would have violated the oath Rutherford took to the 
state.  He suggested that Kerr travel to Nova Scotia “where I understand the Royal Brute 
of Britain has made provision for all his Loyalists in North America.”41
 This letter effectively summarizes Rutherford’s state of mind after retiring from 
his many military campaigns as he began a campaign to support and draft bills which 
would punish loyalists.  During the 1783 term, loyalist legislation in the postwar 
settlement occupied a good deal of time for the legislature.  Rutherford wanted the 
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Moravians and all others who had not taken the oath of allegiance to the state to pay a 
twofold tax.  The amendment lost by sixteen votes.  Not losing a step after his defeat, 
Rutherford won passage of a bill to protect Whigs from lawsuits for damages from 
Tories.  This law won approval by the Senate.  Another relating to confiscation allowed 
commissioners to seize livestock and property from the loyalists.  In a short time, 
Rutherford achieved victories for those who benefited from confiscation, and protected 
them under state law.  The laws were considered and voted on rapidly, a reflection of the 
mood in the state after the surrender of Cornwallis and while the confederation waited for 
news from Paris.42      
One such law became an example of legislative compromise.  Called “An Act of 
Pardon and Oblivion,” the law pardoned offenses committed against the state in an 
attempt to move on.  But the law made certain exceptions when it refused to pardon by 
name Peter Mallet, Samuel Andrews, and David Fanning.  These men, some of the most 
notorious and destructive Tories, could expect no leniency from the government.  The 
law also enforced confiscations against persons named in 1779 and anyone guilty of 
murder, rape, robbery, or house-burning.  One of the many debates in the Senate centered 
on who specifically would not be pardoned.  Some senators, with personal animosities 
towards Tories in their district, wanted to add names.  This included Rutherford, 
classified by one man as “blood thirsty old scoundrel,” who thought adding any person 
would be fine.43  
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From the speed with which Rutherford and his allies tried to submit legislation, it 
seems clear the radical senators attempted to pass laws while the sentiment against 
loyalists remained strong.  This strategy carried over into the next year when North 
Carolina had to deliberate the Treaty of Paris, which formally ended the American 
rebellion.  Rutherford and his allies specifically objected to article five of the treaty 
which ordered a restoration of lands previously confiscated.  Article five enjoyed little 
support in the North Carolina Assembly, and reaction to it in the Senate proved outright 
hostile.  Rutherford, speaking against the measure, labeled all Tories “imps of hell.”  
Supporters of the article could not even marshal ten votes.  Even as the Confederation 
Congress urged the states to pass all articles of the treaty, North Carolina would have no 
part of it.  Confiscated land sales began again in earnest in 1782.  Westerners like 
Rutherford supported provisions in the law that allowed payment for land in devalued 
soldiers’ certificates.  During this time, both legislators and constituents, purchasing 
tracts of land large and small, began the revolutionary process of redistributing land in 
the state.44
As indicated by the voice votes, Rutherford insisted on holding for much of the 
legislation he passed, the bills for confiscation and protection of Whigs in the aftermath 
of the war enjoyed support among his colleagues.  Rutherford tried in his legislative 
efforts to never act alone. On one occasion, he offered an adversary in the Senate, 
Archibald Maclaine, who earlier called Rutherford a “scoundrel,” a gesture of 
conciliation.  Rutherford made an effort to take Maclaine by the hand in an effort to vote 
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on pending Tory legislation.  Maclaine felt the gesture “not displeasing, considering his 
influence.”  Rutherford’s bill to exempt persons from holding state office who sided with 
Great Britain since April of 1775 ended in a tie.  An opposing amendment proposed to 
make the date July of 1776, the formal date of independence.  When the vote ended in a 
tie, the moderate Senate speaker voted in favor of the July date.  For Rutherford and his 
friends, the birth of the United States happened a year before the formal break with Great 
Britain.  In this session, Rutherford tried to enlist an opponent on his side to pass harsh 
legislation.45     
The somewhat vindictive attitude Rutherford held towards Tories did not hurt his 
political career in the months after the end of the Revolution.  He ably submitted bills that 
aimed to punish loyalists and exempt anyone who profited from seizure of land and 
property.  His popularity earned him a nomination for governor in 1783.  This historic 
nomination would have given the office to a westerner for the first time and put a truly 
radical leader in the state’s highest executive position.  A final vote, in which Rutherford 
received no votes, indicated the nomination was flattering but not taken seriously by 
other members of the legislature.  After losing the vote, Rutherford helped carry the bill 
that set the salary for governor at   700 and not   800.46       
 The position of Commissioner of Confiscated Land occupied a good amount of 
Rutherford’s time after the legislature passed bills in 1782 and 1784.  Opponents of the 
bills believed it violated the peace treaty with Great Britain and reflected badly on the 
new nation.  The 1782 law allowed the sale of land belonging to Tories named in the 
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1779 bill, and the selling started right away.  By the end of 1783 Rutherford reported 
more than    19,500 cleared in the Salisbury District.  Rutherford as a commissioner of 
property collected a two to three percent commission for the identification and sale of 
land.  In neighboring Anson county, over    20,000 of property labeled by Rutherford sold 
starting in 1782.  Though his name did not appear on any purchases, Rutherford received 
pay for his surveying services; each plot of land measured added to his income.47  Thirty 
years after he arrived in North Carolina, Rutherford went back to dealing in land and 
surveying. 
 His reputation and service in North Carolina continued to allow him to participate 
in some of the most important events in the history of the state.  In July 1788, the North 
Carolina Convention at Hillsborough met to consider adoption of the new Constitution.  
When the convention opened debate, ten states had already approved of the document.  
This circumstance did not sway the strong anti-federalist majority in Hillsborough.  
Rutherford, in the rare moments he spoke, probably reflected the sentiment of many 
delegates at Hillsborough.  He wondered if the members could vote on certain paragraphs 
they objected to, indicating some provisions were to his liking.  Samuel Johnston, 
president of the meeting quickly shot down this idea, reminding the convention that the 
express purpose of the meeting was not to write a constitution, but vote on the one in 
front of them.48
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 Rutherford would have none of this argument.  He won passage of a vote which 
allowed for discussion of the provisions clause by clause.  The late day North Carolina 
took up discussion should have no bearing on their debates, he claimed.  Rutherford 
believed “we ought to decide it as if no state had adopted it.  Are we to be thus 
intimidated into a measure of which we may disapprove?”  Federalists who supported the 
document did feel pressure however.  At the start of the convention, ten states ratified the 
document, and an eleventh joined in the middle of the North Carolina deliberations.49
 Rutherford rarely spoke during the meeting, but his fellow anti-federalists 
expressed reservations about many of the provisions in the document.  He favored free 
and open debate, not just of the document as a whole, but of provisions he and others 
might object to.  After eleven days, and in spite of heavy lobbying by James Iredell, a 
strong supporter of the document, the convention overwhelmingly passed a resolution 
that neither approved nor rejected the constitution.  Like other states, the members of the 
convention favored a bill of rights, and agreed to meet to reconsider the vote.   
 During the following year, sentiment in the state changed dramatically.  Only 
Rhode Island and North Carolina remained out of the Union, and the new government 
could be expected to level economic sanctions against any state that remained outside the 
new government.  Since the rejection of the document a year before, Federalists 
organized a public relations campaign to educate people of the state on the merits of 
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joining the union.  In 1789 a second convention met in Fayetteville, where this time the 
Federalists enjoyed a large majority and promptly ratified the document.50
 Rutherford and Matthew Locke, who voted against the Constitution in 1788, 
became casualties of the change in public opinion.  Both men lost their seats since the 
entire western region had gone Federalist, allowing for easy passage.  This lack of 
support for the new government did little to hurt Rutherford’s reputation among his 
colleagues.  Though rejected by the qualified voters, his associates in the assembly chose 
him to serve as Councillor of State.51    
 Participation in the convention became one of the last services Rutherford 
performed in the state of North Carolina.  Adventure and new land beckoned in the 
sparsely settled and promising future over the mountains in Tennessee.  At almost 70 
years of age, Rutherford decided to uproot his family and develop new land he obtained 
in his service to North Carolina.  In 1792, the Rutherford clan moved west.  
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Conclusion 
On to Tennessee 
 
 
 Griffith Rutherford associated himself with the western part of North Carolina.  
He moved to the farthest point of settlement in the early 1750s and helped insure its 
protection during the French and Indian War.  In the colonial system, during his years in 
the assembly, he advocated creation of new counties as a way to alleviate Regulator 
grievances.  His service to the state from 1775 to the end of the war became well known 
in different parts of North Carolina and especially in the west.    
 One of his highest hopes for the future of the state as it considered joining the new 
nation involved the creation of a permanent seat of government.  Like other state capitals, 
North Carolina arranged to move her capital farther inland.  The old location, in New 
Bern, had associations with colonial abuses and the unpopular Governor Tryon.  Also by 
1788, New Bern no longer represented the geographic center of the state.  Isolated on the 
coast, western delegates found it time consuming to travel to the area.  In spite of this 
inconvenience, successive assemblies deadlocked during debates about establishing a 
permanent seat, thus allowing seven towns between 1777 and 1794 the title of capital.1    
 Frustrated by their inability to resolve the matter, many legislators decided the 
1788 ratification convention would be the time to finally decide the location.  Rutherford 
and other western representatives favored Fayetteville, the old colonial trading post on 
the road from Salisbury.  The locality continued to be an important depot for overland 
goods and its commercial importance made it popular with more than a few assemblymen 
and senators.  Rutherford helped introduce the legislation for choosing a permanent 
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capital in the middle of debates concerning ratification of the Constitution.  Rutherford 
had reason to hope his site or another western location might be picked.  As recently as 
1782, Hillsborough in Orange County served as a temporary site.  In his late sixties, he 
could appreciate any effort at shaving miles off the biannual trip to the coast.   
Rutherford’s stubborn allies continued to lobby for Fayetteville.  They used the 
example of Williamsburg and Annapolis to show that a location of little commercial 
relevance could never become anything more than a village.   But their arguments only 
postponed a final decision in subsequent sessions until the 1792 spring meeting bought 
plantation land in what would become the village of Raleigh.2   
 Rutherford’s final service in North Carolina’s government proved to be a 
frustrating experience.  While he represented an overwhelming majority in rejecting the 
initial ratification of the Constitution, sentiment in the state changed 180 degrees within 
only a year.  Voters in Salisbury sent Rutherford and Locke packing, choosing Federalist 
representatives in their place.  Failure to put the seat of government in Fayetteville 
proved to be a final frustrating development.  This series of events did not seem to affect 
Rutherford adversely; his fellow Senators continued to respect his reputation enough to 
choose him Councillor of State after the people of Salisbury voted in a new 
representative.   
By 1790, his life reached a crossroads.  North Carolina voted to join the union, the 
loyalists were vanquished or stripped of land and Native American resistance ended.  For 
Rutherford, few enemies lived within the borders of his state.  For adventure and 
challenge, Griffith Rutherford continued to indulge in land speculation and surveying to 
keep him active and test his skills.  An appreciation of the outdoors and love of his 
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vocation may explain why Rutherford continued to survey land and travel into the 
sparsely settled wilderness even as he approached seventy years of age.  As the former 
British colonies waited to hear news of a permanent peace treaty, the state asked 
Rutherford to survey lands put aside for soldiers who served in the Continental line.  
These troops had been promised land during the end of the war as a reward for their 
service.  For North Carolina, it provided a way to compensate soldiers in a state that 
always seemed short of funds.  The state began issuing grants in 1783 for land in the 
Cumberland valley of Tennessee.3  Almost immediately, Rutherford became involved in 
this venture, taking an assignment from the governor as one of the surveyors charged 
with measuring parcels of land.    
His own holdings in North Carolina remained impressive.  At the end of the war 
he owned in excess of 2,000 acres in the Rowan county area.  He acquired more land 
when he and his son Henry traveled to the Cumberland and surveyed land set aside for 
soldiers who served in the North Carolina Line.  For at least the fourth time in his life, 
Rutherford journeyed through the mountains and into the land that became Tennessee.  
Like the Polk family and later Andrew Jackson, trips to this area cast a spell over visitors 
to the area; either in the course of a military campaign, or for the allure of inexpensive 
land.  Griffith Rutherford traveled west from his home in Salisbury during hunting trips 
with Daniel Boone in the 1750s.  Marches to the west provided more opportunities to trek 
from foothills to mountains and to explore the rugged scenery at the foot of the 
Appalachians.  Perhaps Rutherford never lost the desire to acquire land and use it as a 
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source of income.  During Rutherford’s last excursion to this area as a surveyor, he and 
his son possibly decided to settle the family in the area.       
 For this service, he obtained tracts of land in Rowan county and in Tennessee.  
During these early surveys, Rutherford deeded land in Rowan to his son Henry.4  Griffith 
decided to present his son with land as a wedding present when Henry got married in 
1787.5  Clearly, Rutherford would have had little trouble justifying accepting the land 
grants from the state.  During the war Cornwallis pillaged his home on Grants Creek.  His 
oldest son James gave his life with Greene’s army in South Carolina.        
Rutherford’s penchant for land speculation and dealing helped him get involved 
in one of the most elaborate land schemes in North Carolina history.  The men involved, 
who included William Blount and John Sevier, were all former “over-mountain” men 
who settled in the mountains in North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.  Moving into 
the Watauga and Holston settlements that Rutherford had helped clear of Cherokee 
Indians, these men dreamed up elaborate ideas for making money in western lands. 
 Though his own participation was quite limited, it seems the promoters decided 
having Rutherford’s name on the endeavor would give the project an air of legitimacy.  
Christened the Muscle Shoals Speculation, the project hoped to lure settlers to an area 
known as the Bend of the Tennessee, in what is now northern Alabama.  At the head of 
navigation for the Tennessee River, settlers could use the connecting Tombigbee River to 
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move goods south to the Spanish town of Mobile.  William Blount, the driving force of 
the scheme, even urged his associates to make it appear that people were settling there by 
forging warrants for land.6  
 Rutherford added his name to the short-lived project but his involvement beyond 
that is unknown.  At the time of the project, his thoughts centered on Tory legislation 
going through the Senate.  John Sevier and Richard Henderson handled the land dealings 
involved with the project, as they could remain closer to the territory in question.  The 
experiment did not last long, primarily because a series of political decisions changed the 
status of the land in which the investors hoped to profit.7  
 In 1784 North Carolina ceded its western lands to the United States.  Western 
land adventurers saw this opportunity as a chance to form a new western state, combining 
part of eastern Tennessee, western Virginia, and the Muscle Shoals land.  The idea 
seemed popular enough in the west, where settlers believed the eastern government of 
North Carolina had forgotten about them.  They demanded western courts and protection 
from Indian raids, something the cash-strapped eastern government could not or would 
not provide.  News of the cession reached westerners at the same time they heard of the 
effort of Thomas Jefferson to organize territories opened after the Treaty of Paris.8
 Within a year, the North Carolina government had a change of heart and repealed 
the cession of western land.  Since the settlers in the area already initiated the beginnings 
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of government, the land in the west, now called the state of Franklin, looked like a 
rebellious group of isolated counties with a rogue government.  Unable by force to 
change the mind of Sevier, now the Governor of Franklin, Governor Caswell offered 
what the settlers first clamored for; representation in the North Carolina Congress for 
Sevier and an appointment of a Sevier ally as Brigadier General of the western district.  
The state of Franklin, now split among those pacified by the governor and others who 
clung to independence, collapsed in 1788.  The next year, North Carolina ceded its 
western lands back to the United States.9
While he profited from surveys of confiscated Tory land, the real payoff for 
Rutherford came when North Carolina granted him thousands of acres of land in the 
middle district of Tennessee.  The state awarded blocks of 3,000 to 5,000 acres beginning 
in 1788.  Because he acquired both large and small tracts, it is evident Rutherford 
purchased the rights to several continental soldiers’ holdings paying in cash.  By 1790 he 
owned 13,000 acres.  At this point, Rutherford seemed determined to occupy the land 
given to him by North Carolina.  His son Henry, a trained surveyor, also received grants 
because he accompanied his father to measure the continental line grants.  Either father or 
son broached the idea of settling in Tennessee after 1790.  We can never be sure if this 
move involved a family negotiation or if the leader of the Rutherford clan in North 
Carolina made promises to his extended family.  What is clear is that families tied to 
Rowan County for more than a generation decided to go along with them to Tennessee.  
The clannish structure of life in North Carolina persisted when the families decided to 
move over the mountains after 1790.   
                                                 
9 Powell, North Carolina Through Four Centuries, 220; Lefler and Newsome, 260. 
 175
Beginning around 1789, Rutherford began to sell his land in North Carolina.  The 
next year, during the first Federal Census, Rutherford counted eight slaves in his 
household and was enjoying the fourth decade of marriage to the former Ms. Elizabeth 
Graham.  We can never know who initiated the idea of giving up the homestead and land 
in Rowan and moving into the wilds of Tennessee.  At least the political situation had 
improved since the region now made up part of the Southwest territory.10    
 After selling the 700-acre tract of land where he built his home, Rutherford and 
his family left North Carolina in September of 1792.  Traveling with thirty wagons and at 
least one other family, the caravan arrived in middle Tennessee in November.  Their new 
home in Sumner County proved isolated enough that the family built their new home in a 
stockade to guard against Indian attacks.  Middle Tennessee in the 1790s was not 
altogether different from Rowan County in the 1750s.11   
Trading his North Carolina lands for those in Tennessee proved to be 
advantageous.  His new holdings easily totaled 13,000 acres from grants by North 
Carolina and the purchase of continental soldiers’ tracts.  Immediately he started to use 
the land to establish income.  His sales in North Carolina made him a hefty profit, and his 
first sale of land in Tennessee was finalized when he arrived at his new destination.  
Indentures and sale of land continued to provide income for the Rutherford clan through 
the 1790s.12
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 Settlers in the territory wasted little time in taking advantage of the prominence of 
their new resident.  After the Bend of Tennessee and State of Franklin schemes ended, 
the United States under the new Constitution exercised its authority in organizing land 
opened after the Revolution.  North Carolina ceded western land to the United States in 
1789.  The next year, the Territory South of the Ohio was established.  From this land 
emerged the Territory of Tennessee.  Rutherford became involved again in politics.13
 Once Tennessee was deemed a territory, its governor, William Blount, announced 
an election for the House of Representatives.  From this group, a Legislative Council 
would be formed, and Blount chose the names of men to be nominated.  Rutherford was 
placed on the list that eventually made its way to the desk of President George 
Washington.  The President approved the nomination in July 1794.  Joining Rutherford 
on the Council was John Sevier.  The selection of familiar names helped provide a natural 
leadership of the new territory from several men who had political experience.14   
 Washington’s approval only seconded the sentiment of many people in middle 
Tennessee.  For Governor Blount, able to survive the Muscle Shoals and Franklin fiascos, 
Rutherford’s name added legitimacy to the new government.   Though his role in 
Tennessee politics was short, Rutherford addressed issues familiar to him from his four 
decades living in North Carolina.  In the fall of 1794 the Legislative Council, with 
Rutherford as its President, sent a memorial to Congress concerning the Indian situation 
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in the territory.  Creeks and Cherokees continued to kill citizens of the territory, a matter 
that demanded the attention of the Congress.      
 In the ultimate irony, the new United States in 1794 played the role Great Britain 
had played during the colonial period.  This time, the United States, through Indian 
agents tried to keep peace between its citizens and two Native American nations.  As the 
council surmised, Congress favored treaties, but the leaders in Tennessee thought treaty 
talk only invited the Indians to be bolder.  As a statement from the council to Congress 
indicates, the Tennesseans believed, “Fear, not love, is the only means by which Indians 
can be governed.”  By feeling the sting of war, the council believed, the nations would 
appreciate peace.  This lack of culpability and fiery language is reminiscent of the 
dialogue in 1776, when Cherokees attacked settlers in the valleys of western North 
Carolina.15       
 Like North Carolina before it, Tennessee rapidly filled with eager settlers.  A 
1795 census of the territory counted 65,000 free people, more than enough to petition for 
statehood.  As political leaders made plans to create a state, Rutherford felt confident 
enough in the founders of Tennessee to retire.  During his final months in the Legislative 
Council he may have crossed paths with another Scotch-Irish orphan from the 
backcountry who learned law in Salisbury; Andrew Jackson.  Appointed to the drafting 
committee for the state constitution, Jackson would one day turn his frontier military 
                                                 
15 William Blount to John Gray Blount, July 29, 1794, Alice Barnwell Keith and William H. Masterson , 
ed., The John Gray Blount Papers, 3 vols.  (Raleigh: State Department of Archives and History, 1962-
1965), 2: 420-421.  Governor Blount to the Secretary of State, July 28, 1794, Memorial of the Legislative 
Council and House of Representatives, to the Congress of the United States of America, September 21, 
1794, in Carter ed., Territorial Papers, 4: 350, 355. 
 
 178
exploits into political endeavors.  With his political career finished after Tennessee 
achieved statehood, Rutherford retired.16
 Content to live the rest of his years on the Tennessee frontier with his family, 
Rutherford continued to profit from his land awards and purchases.  He served as a 
witness to several land transactions after 1796 and for the second time in his life, he was 
a living witness to the growth of a frontier.  As in North Carolina, the Tennessee 
experience remained a shared family experience.  In the Tennessee Deed books, the 
names Weakly, Locke, and Graham appear on land transactions, proof that settlers of 
1750s North Carolina moved together into Tennessee. 
 As he became aware he was living his last years, Rutherford included his family 
in sharing the vast areas of land he owned.  In 1798 he gave a parcel of land to his 
recently married daughter and son-in-law’s family, probably as a wedding present.  The 
next year, he sold to Francis Locke, the man who served under him in the 1780 North 
Carolina campaign, a 160-acre tract on the Cumberland River.  In 1802, one of his last 
transactions, the sale of a 320 acre piece of land involved his youngest son, Griffith 
Weakley.17  
 On August 9, 1805 Rutherford attended Presbyterian services at his local parish 
church.  The next morning, according to the family history, he died peacefully in his 
sleep.  In his will, Rutherford did well by his family, providing for several kinfolk living 
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in Tennessee.  His son Griffith Weakley inherited 5,000 acres of land in middle 
Tennessee.  To his married daughter Elizabeth, he left his slaves and household goods.18     
 Griffith Rutherford’s life, filled with action and violence, ended peacefully.  The 
day before his death, his trip to Sunday worship was made on horseback, an active 
pursuit giving no hint of impending death.  Within a few months, his wife Elizabeth also 
died in her sleep.  His descendants remained in Tennessee, several living in the county 
that after 1803 was named for the General. 
 
 Only a handful of soldier-politicians achieved the distinction of making a 
significant contribution to their state in the same way Griffith Rutherford did.  All of 
these men, including Richard Caswell, William R. Davie, and William Lee Davidson 
served with Rutherford as officers or elected officials.  All men garnered more attention 
than Rutherford because their writings were more extensive or the early years of their 
lives could be more fully chronicled.  This should not diminish the importance of 
Rutherford to the state of North Carolina.    
 On a personal level, his most important contribution remains in the field of 
soldiering.  In 1776, with the question of independence with Great Britain in doubt, the 
gravest threat to North Carolina came from political dissent by loyalists and the actions of 
Native Americans in the mountains.  Within a twelve month period Rutherford 
confronted both threats in the form of military campaigns.  The first put down Tories in 
neighboring South Carolina.  A second demonstration supported the army marching to 
quell the Highlanders’ uprising in the east. 
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 As important as these responsibilities were, Rutherford directed his full energies 
into organizing the expedition against the Cherokee.  Like his contemporaries, Rutherford 
believed the British incited the Cherokee, urging them to strike against the scattered 
defenses of the foothills.  In language shared by his civilian superiors, Rutherford blasted 
the Indian attackers, urging no mercy, and promising quick destruction.  After a sustained 
Cherokee attack threatened Salisbury in 1760, Rutherford understood the commitment 
needed to keep the frontier safe.  It took the British army three campaigns to finally bring 
a close to the Cherokee War.  When his turn came in 1776, Rutherford prepared well and 
his efforts kept the Cherokee from becoming a serious threat for the remainder of the war.           
This training started in the French and Indian War, where Rutherford, already a 
skilled hunter in the mold of Daniel Boone, received training in woodland warfare.  
Fortunately for North Carolina, he learned as much from the failed British efforts to 
defeat the Cherokee in 1760 as he did from the eventual success of James Grant.  During 
his life, the only formal training Rutherford received was as a surveyor.  His school for 
soldiering began in the backcountry of Virginia and ended on the coastal plains of North 
Carolina.   
The same tenacity on the battlefield manifested itself in the halls of government.  
During the 1750s and 1760s, Rutherford dutifully served as an officer and official in the 
British colonial system, first as a surveyor, then as a provincial military officer.  His 
connection to the crown remained tenuous as the imperial crisis of the 1770s worsened.  
Clearly, Rutherford used his connections to advance a political career.  The Regulator 
movement proved any elective office; especially one tied to the controversial courthouse 
rings could easily come under attack or lose its valued status.  Since Rutherford could 
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claim the mantle of reform by advocating the creation of western counties, he survived 
politically.  By frustrating the establishment of the Anglican Church in his dissenting 
region, he won more supporters in Rowan County. 
An ability to carry the mantle of reform allowed Rutherford as militia captain to 
keep the King’s peace by enforcing the law against Regulator rioters.  When confronted 
with his own possible excesses in office, he deftly maneuvered to correct any errors in 
judgment.  This action kept him in the good graces of the people in Rowan and allowed 
him to serve the governor as the law abiding officer, marching to stop the Regulator 
army.  Without this crafty tactic, Rutherford may not have had the opportunity to join the 
revolutionary government during the mid-1770s.   
His sympathy and eventual identification with the revolutionary cause remains 
more difficult to evaluate. Some mistrust of a revolution led by easterners must have 
lingered in the mind of a westerner who could not get his Regulator laws passed.  
Perhaps, with appointments to the Committee of Safety, a commission as Brigadier, and 
vast responsibilities heaped on him by the state, Rutherford realized his personal success 
was tied more to the revolutionary government than the British.  It remains a frustrating 
development for the historian to realize there is no moment or incident that made 
Rutherford choose one side over the other.  Once committed, he gave everything to the 
cause, a rigid commitment that would run roughshod over Native Americans, Pacifists, or 
Tories during the years of the revolution.     
 If Rutherford seemed rough and vindictive to his enemies, they failed to 
understand the unique perspective of someone who led troops into battle, and only a few 
months later turned his attention back to lobbying for legislation in the state.  Other men 
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in North Carolina underwent a similar experience; Richard Caswell as Brigadier General 
and governor is a similar case.  Few soldier-politicians could claim the wide variety of 
experience that Rutherford enjoyed.  He did not simply serve in a campaign and go back 
to work in a legislative capacity.  Instead, he crisscrossed the state, traveling to the South 
Carolina-Georgia border and crossing the mountains to sack Cherokee villages.  While 
Caswell reached the highest office in the state, Rutherford was chased from the field at 
Camden, running with his routed troops.  
 A measure of Rutherford’s influence can be taken during the 1780 campaign in 
North Carolina.  With a British army poised to invade the state, Rutherford called out the 
western militia.  Within days he took command of troops in three counties.  Though not 
strong enough to face Cornwallis’s army, these men prevented the union of Tory and 
regular troops during 1780.  Though his capture at Camden proved a blow to Patriot 
arms, the willingness of his militia to fight under other leaders proves that late in the war 
the militia system could operate well if the commanders understood the limitations of the 
system. 
 His acumen as a soldier also improved during the war.  After the professional 
British army shattered the southern Patriot army, Rutherford learned what every officer 
who took militia into battle found out-they rarely could fight redcoats.  Upon release 
from his St. Augustine prison, he rallied the militia again, bearing down on the last 
concentrations of troops in the state holding up on the coast at Wilmington.  Along the 
way his infantry and cavalry drove Tories off the field.  When his men reached the city, 
Rutherford paused and refused to send his army against British regulars within the town.  
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Although his men became targets of loyalist rage by their looting, his pause before 
Wilmington saved lives and quite possibly the town itself. 
 Rutherford never separated the often vindictive spirit of the battlefield from his 
struggle to shape policy of his state.  He attempted to punish Tories with severe 
measures, advocating early in the war a more radical position concerning those who 
remained loyal to Great Britain.  This attitude hardly lost its edge after spending a year in 
prison and learning of the death of his son in South Carolina.  As late as 1782 he 
continued to associate loyalism with treason. He helped lead efforts to strip Tories of land 
and property, giving them no choice but to leave the state.  Though he made enemies in 
government and was chastised by superior officers, he never expressed doubt about his 
way of carrying on the war.     
 At the end of his life, when he led the Rutherford clan with their extended 
members into Tennessee, Griffith Rutherford kept together the institution which helped 
him achieve success in North Carolina during his early years.  The Lockes and Grahams 
he first met in North Carolina in the 1750s moved together to a new frontier across the 
mountains.  By this time, Rutherford could live as the patriarch squire with grandchildren 
and family close by.      
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